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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to develop a comparative analysis
of pension plans in the automobile, steel, rubber, and petroleum
refining industries.

Perspective is supplied by a brief history of

industrial pension plans in the United States.

The evolving legal

status and extent of coverage is given particular attention.
Problems connected with the size and control of pension funds are
explored.

The foundation upon which the comparative analysis rests

is provided by a detailed examination of pension plan provisions
as they appear in contemporary pension agreements.

Attention is

given to methods of administration; eligibility requirements for
normal, early, special early, and disability retirement; benefit
computation, and; financing arrangements.

Pension plans cur

rently in operation in the automobile, steel, rubber, and petroleum
refining industries are compared on the basis of their provisions.
i

Pension plan benefits for the various types of retirement are
computed with several hypothetical age, service, and earnings
combinations.

An attempt is made to point out the strengths and

weaknesses of each plan.

Developing trends in pension plan pro

visions are discussed along with an evaluation of the long-run
implications of these trends.

Special attention is given to the

problems connected with vesting provisions and the methods by which
pension plans are financed.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Growth in privately financed pension plans in the last two decades
has been phenomenal.

The increasing need for pension planning is

apparent to any casual observer of demographic, social, and economic
changes in our society.
Demographically,
population at large.

the older citizenry is

growing faster than the

The most recent census (I960) shows that 16.6

million Americans were 65

or older.

A year later, the United States

Department of Health, Education and Welfare set the figure at 17 million, with an estimate of 19 million by 1965.

2

This problem is compounded by the fact that the labor force par
ticipation rate of the aged is declining steadily.

The unavoidable

conclusion is that we will have more and more elderly citizens who are
not gainfully employed, and therefore in need of some form of retirement
income.

The purpose of this study is to make a comparison of how this

growing need is being provided for by several of the nation's major
industries.
An understanding of this or any other topic requires a reasonably
complete grasp of its background and terminology.

Chapters II and III

are therefore devoted to the development of what might be called a

^U. S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population,
1960, General Population Characteristics,. U. S. Summary, Final Report,
1961.
^U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, The Health
Care of the Aged, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1962,
p. 1.

1

2

minimal background necessary to an understanding of private pension
plans and their provisions.
in these chapters.

Little will be found that is new or novel

Such is not their purpose.

Several methods of providing for old age security are not con
sidered in this work.

No attempt is made to deal with systems and

programs such as Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI),
and related governmental programs.

Nor are such programs as profit

sharing plans, matching savings plans, stock purchase plans, or
pension systems supported solely by employees, considered.

Though

all of these might provide retirement income, they are not negotiated
pension plans as such, and therefore fall outside the scope of this
study.

Such systems are treated only as they are incidentally con

nected with the negotiated pension plans under study.
Chapter II contains a brief historical sketch of private pension
plan development in the United States.

In addition to certain

obvious historical facts, an attempt is made to show ways in which
early practices and plans influenced present pension planning.
Chapter III is designed to provide an outline of pension plan
provisions that are common to most plans.
arrangement is twofold.
veloped.
developed.

The purpose of this

First, the necessary terminology is de

Second, a basis for comparison of pension plans is
Since the chief purpose of this study is to provide a

comparative analysis of several pension plans, it is only logical
that the comparison be on the basis of their provisions.

Some

indication will be given of the extent to which such provisions
appear in contracts throughout the nation.

Some provisions are

practically universal, while others are relatively rare.

Certain

variations will be discussed where the variation seems destined to
become the rule in a significant portion of the nation's industry.
Finally, some of the problems associated with each type of provision
will be briefly discussed.
Chapter IV is the heart of this study.
major industries are examined and compared.

Pension plans in four
The industries involved

are the rubber industry, the steel industry, the automobile industry
and the petroleum refining industry.

As noted above, the comparison

is on the basis of t h e .individual pension plan's provisions.
The plans analyzed were all negotiated by industrial unions.
Most of them were chosen primarily on the basis of the extent of
coverage, and perhaps more importantly, because they tend to be
pattern setters.

With the exception of the petroleum refining in

dustry, there is a high degree of uniformity between plans within
each industry studied.

Four specific plans are therefore analyzed

separately for the petroleum refining industry, while the automobile
steel, and rubber industries are analyzed on an industry rather than
on a firm-by-firm basis.
The study will be directed toward several questions concerning
negotiated pension plans.

In particular:

1.

How extensive is the coverage of negotiated private
pension plans?

2.

What developing trends in pension plan provisions can
be detected?

3.

What are the long-run implications of these trends?

4.

Are some type plans best suited to particular employeremployee relationships than others?

4

5.

What is the future of private pension plans?

As indicated, the analysis contained herein deals with only a
selected

group of major plans.

to anyone interested in a plan

The following sources are available
not covered by this study.

Information

available from each source is as indicated.
1.

Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts, Bureau
of National Affairs. The information contained herein
is quite brief and distilled, with only the most perti
nent facts of a plan noted.
It is an excellent quick
reference to such facts, however.

2.

United States Department of Labor, Office of LaborManagement and Welfare-Pension Reports. Regional
offices are scattered throughout the nation.
These
offices have on file rather detailed information as
required by the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act of 1958. Under provisions of the Act, these files
are open to the public, and contain the following
kind o f information on a plan:
a.

Who is covered by the plani

b.

A detailed description of the administration of
the plan.

c.

Copies of plan documents under which the plan was
established and is operated.

d.

The plans assets, liabilities, contributions, and
benefits paid.

3.

U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
bulletins. The Department of Labor regularly publishes
bulletins dealing with particular labor problems. Well
over 1,500 of these releases have been published, but an
index is available so that those dealing with a partic
ular topic is easily located.

4.

Commerce Clearing House, Pensions and Profit-Sharing.
The Commerce Clearing House periodically revises this
publication, which is an excellent source for anyone
interested in plan draftsmanship.
It consists of
specimen clauses selected from several hundred plans.
The plan from which each clause is drawn is not identi
fied, however.

CHAPTER II

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVATE INDUSTRIAL PENSION PLANS -IN- THE UNITED STATES

Development Prior to World War II
Before delving into the historical development of private pension
plans, it might be revealing to examine the meaning and some of the
connotations of the term "pension."

The word itself derives from an

identical Latin word meaning "payment."

As currently used, a pension

is understood to mean a regular or periodic payment to a beneficiary
who has not directly contributed to the cost of its provision.

The

term "annuity" is used to designate a recurring payment, the right to
which was purchased by the beneficiary.

The term pension, therefore,

connotes a gratuity passing from one party to another, while annuity
conveys the idea of a purchased or earned right.
crucial.

The difference is

A gift might be withdrawn at any time, at the discretion of

the giver, while an annuity, being an acquired right, cannot.

1

The early legal status of privately provided retirement systems
tended to place them well within the meaning ascribed to the term
pension in the above discussion.

Further examination of this problem

will be reserved for later treatment.
Pre-dating the inauguration of pension plans were certain
employer practices which eventually led to the development of form
alized pension systems.

One such practice was to assign aged

‘'"Murray W. Latimer, Industrial Pens ion Systems (New York:
Industrial Relations Counselors, 1932) p. 9-10. For a somewhat
contrary view, see Arthur David Cloud, Pensions in Modern Industry,
(Chicago: Hawkins and Loomis Co., 1930), p. 251.
5
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employees to duties requiring little physical or mental application,
e.g., gatekeeper or watchman.

The number of such jobs available are

obviously limited, however, and a number of firms appear to have slowly
evolved highly informal systems for providing retirement income to long
service employees.

Where they existed, these schemes were not generally

announced to employees.

A superannuated employee was simply released

from service and informed that he had been granted a pension "for long
and faithful service."

Whenever a formal statement concerning such a

plan was issued, the firm often hedged by stating that it would grant
pensions to the "deserving,"

Such a system really amounted to

paternalistic charity, and was not a true pension system at all.

It

could be Successfully argued that a pens ion system exists only where
benefits are available to any employee who satisfies a set of stated,
standardized requirements, without discrimination.

2

Under such a definition, the first pension plan in manufacturing
was inaugurated by Alfred Dolge, a felt manufacturer, in 1882.
plan was preceeded by plans in the railroad

4

3

This

and a closely related in

dustry,^ but it must be counted as the first manufacturing or industrial
pension plan.

By present standards, it was a most ambitious undertaking.

^Ibid., p. 10.
3
Ibid.. p. 39, and Rainard B. Robbins, Pension Planning in the
United States, Mineographed, 1952, p. 3.
^See United States Department of Labor, Fifth Annual Report of the
Commission of Labor, 1889, p. 28, for description of a plan established
by the Grand Trunk Railway in 1874.
"’The American Express Company (now the Railway Express Agency)
introduced a plan in 1875.
See M. Riebeneck, Railway Provident
Institutions in English Speaking Countries (Philadelphia:
Pennsylvania
Railroad Co|, 1905), p. 182. Cited in Latimer, 0 £. cit., p. 38.

7

After ten years service, an employee could retire with a yearly benefit
equal to one-half of what his wage had been during the final year of
employment.

After twenty-five years service, he could claim full pay.

Other benefits included a profit sharing plan, a life insurance plan,
and an endowment fund plan.

These plans were highly publicized by

Dolge,’apparently recommending their adoption by other firms.

The

record of appeal in the case of Dolge vs. Dolge cited two publications
dealing with the plans.
After an employee had achieved five years of service, he was
given a passbook by Dolge into which was annually entered a record
of benefits to which he had become entitled or amounts which had
been

credited to his accountfor payment of future benefits. What

the passbook seemed to give with the one hand was quite efficiently
taken away by the other, however.
which appeared therein:

Witness the following statement

7

It is distinctly understood that all and every of the
provisions of this law are voluntary on behalf of said
house of Alfred Dolge, and that this law does not, nor
does any of the provisions herein contained, confer any
legal right or create any legal right in favor or any
employee of said house mentioned herein, or of any
person or persons whomsoever, nor any legal liability
on behalf of said house of Alfred Dolge, or of said
Alfred Dolge, either in law or in equity.

C.
Alfred Dolge, The Just Distribution of Earnings, So-Called
"Profit Sharing" (New York: Paris Exposition, 1889), p. 93 and
Practical Application of Economic Theories in the Factories of
Alfred Dolge and Son (New York: Dolgeville Herald Publishing
Company, 1896), p. 244.
^Dolge vs. Dolge, 70 App. Div. 517, 518, quoted in Latimer,
o p . cit., p. 686.

There is no record of any funds ever having been set aside by the
house of Dolge to meet obligations seemingly created by the plan.

The

Dolge firm failed in 1898, precipitating a suit by former employees who
sought to recover benefits believed to have accrued to them.

The court

relying on .the passbook language quoted above, ruled that the plan did
not constitute a binding agreement between Dolge and his employees.
"It was simply a benevolent plan proposed by him, and it was solely
within his power to carry it out or not."

8

Another plan, quite similar to that of Dolge, was established by
the Solvay Process Company in 1892, with similar results.

Although it

was established later than the Dolge plan, a case at law reached the
courts under the Solvay plan first.

The announced purpose of the plan

was to provide "a means of support by reason of accident, sickness or
advanced age labor must cease."
ported wholly by the firm.

9

The plan was noncontributory, sup

The passbook method of record keeping was

employed and each employee's share in the fund was entered periodically
The company declared the monies so set aside to be gifts, and the
company's trustees were authorized to rule on all questions of any
employee's right to collect.
An employee who was discharged in 1895 entered suit to recover the
amount credited to his passbook, claiming this to be his share of the
pension fund.

The case reached the New York Supreme Court which.

ruled, in part, as follows:

10

8Ibid., p. 520-521.
Q

Latimer, o£. cit., p. 682.
^ McNevin vs. Solvay Process Co., 32 App. Div. 610, 612-613.

9

Under the regulations established it seems to me that none
of the employees has a vested right in any part of this fund,
even though credited upon their passbooks, until the gift is
completed by actual payment. Until that time, it is an inchoate
gift. The articles provide that an employee cannot in any
case demand payment of the sum credited to his account except
when the defendant shall adjudge the account to be payable in
whole or in part, according to the rules and regulations
established, and it is also provided that the sums credited
shall remain the property of the defendant until actually
paid, and that the fund shall be and remain under the sole
control of the defendant's trustees, who are authorized to
decide all questions concerning it without appeal.
Posting of credits to an employee's passbook was quickly abandoned
as a method of accounting for accrued pension "rights."

The passbook

seems to have been much too close to an admission of liability for the
amounts credited therein.

The holder of such a passbook naturally

assumed that he had a vested right to the extent of his credits.

While

this might have been good for employee morale, it was very bad legal
practice.

It is not surprising therefore that the use of passbooks

was quietly and quickly discontinued.
The Solvay Plan was discontinued in the same year, 1895, that the
above mentioned case was adjudicated.

According to one writer, the

President of Solvay "believes that the class of workmen employed at
Solvay are not yet ready to appreciate a scheme of this character.

11

The oldest plan of continuous operation was established by the
Carnegie Steel Company in 1901.

Operated at first on an informal basis,

the system was formalized in 1911 when Carnegie merged with the United
States Steel Company.

The method of computing an individual's annual

pension was surprisingly similar to present practices.

11

The amount

Nicholas Paine Gilman, A Dividend to Labor (New York:
Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1899), p. 287.

10

payable annually was equal to 1 percent of the average annual salary
during the whole period of employment times years of service.

Thus, a

20-year man who had averaged $2,400 in wages per year was eligible for
a $480 annual benefit.
mum of 15 years service.

Normal retirement age was 60 years, with a mini-

12

The plan was revised in 1911, raising the

service requirement to 20 years, with compulsory retirement at age 70.
In addition, the benefit was computed by taking 1 percent of the
average pay during the last ten years of employment.
of $144 and a maximum of $1,200 was established.

A minimum pension

13

Effective January 1, 1903, the Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey established an informal plan which was to become the basis
of several separate plans upon the dissolution of the firm in a 1911
antitrust suit.

All retirements upder the original system were

solely at the discretion of the Board of Directors.

Some of the rules

under which the plan operated were somewhat eccentric, especially one
which allowed a 20-year employee between ages 60 and 65 to retire with
an annuity equal to 50 percent of his average pay, while an employee
with 25 years service could retire at age 65 with a pension of only 25
percent of average pay.

In any event, a man who retired before 65 got

his allowance cut in half upon reaching that age.

It would appear

that the firm wished to encourage retirement at earlier ages, at least
14
in those cases approved by the board.

12

Latimer, op. c i t ., p. 40.

13Ibid. , p. 1005
14Ibid., p. 1010

11
A 1929 survey conducted by the non-profit Industrial Relations
Counselors,

Inc. showed that an additional 14 manufacturers had joined

the rank of those with plans by 1910.^

Age and service requirements

of most of these plans had eligibility requirements which closely r e 
sembled those of the plans discussed above.

Several, such as the

du Pont plan, required that the employee be incapacitated.

Others

allowed early retirement where incapacity was present after a minimum
service requirement of from 5 to 15 years.

A few provided that pay

ments, at the discretion of the firm, could be continued to the
dependents of a deceased pensioner.
It is apparent from examining these early schemes that many
present pension plans use essentially the same methods of establish
ing eligibility and computing the amount of benefit to be received.
The most outstanding changes have been connected with funding of the
plans, the Achilles heel of many early plans, and with vesting pro
visions.

Too, collective bargaining has formalized present plans,

with much less discretion in the hands of management.
•^These firms are listed below in order of the date of pension
plan adoption.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Talbot Mills (textiles)
Gerham Manufacturing Co. (silverware)
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.
National Machinery Co.
Western Electric Co.
Deere and Co. (farm machinery)
International Harvester
Murphy Varnish C o .
Tidewater Oil Co.
Westinghouse Air Brake
Simonds Saw and Steel Co.
American Stove Company
Parke Davis and Co. (pharmaceutical)
Wurlitzer Manufacturing Co.

1903
1903
1904
1905
1906
1908
1908
1908
1908
1908
1908
1910
1910
1910

12

From the faltering start discussed above, the pension movement
gradually spread to other American firms.

As was the case originally,

most of the firms involved were quite large.

By 1929, 139 manufacturers

reported plans covering 1,227,494 employees.

The iron and steel in

dustry led the way, with 24 separate plans covering 390,854 workers.
The petroleum industry reported 15 firms with plans covering 192,645
employees.

Conspicuously absent was the burgeoning automobile

industry, which reported not a single plan.

16

The above figures tend to grossly overstate the extent to which
employees in American manufacturing were "covered," on the eve of the
great depression.

It should be pointed out that only a minute portion

of the employees affected had a right to a pension payment even if all
of a plan's prerequisites were net.

Furthermore, even after pension

payments commenced there was no guarantee that they would not be r e 
duced or withdrawn altogether.

Finally, labor mobility studies

indicate that a surprisingly small percentage of these "covered" would
actually fulfill the age and service requirements.

In one recent study,

a firm which employed 776 workers in 1940 had retained only 17 percent
of these until 1956.

17

In 1963, a Census Bureau sampling showed

average job tenure for men to be only 5.7 years.

16

18

Latimer, op. c i t ., p. 991.

17U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Analytical
Note No. 113 (1960) p. 2, Table 1.
1Q

U. S. Department of Labor, Job Tenure of American Workers,
January, 1963, Special Labor Force Report (1963).

13

Present practices do not alleviate the problem of becoming
covered which springs from this last mentioned pitfall.

The more or

less contractual nature of present plans does, however, go much
further in insuring that pension payments will be made to those
employees who satisfy eligibility requirements.

Presently, 70 percent

of the covered workers in manufacturing are included in plans mentioned
in collective bargaining agreements.

19

The pension plan movement continued to spread in spite of the
Depression of the 1930s.
manufacturing alone.

20

A 1938 study showed 238 plans operating in
The U. S. Department of Labor estimates that
21

in 1940 some 437 manufacturers had plans covering 2,819,000 workers.
How was it that, even in the face of adverse economic conditions, the
pension movement continued to spread?

One answer might be the in-.

creasing strength of trade unions, particularly in the industrial
sector of the economy.

This does not, however, appear to be the case.

One authority, writing in 1932, stated that little if any of the
impetus came from workers.

"Rarely, if ever, as the record shows,

has the inauguration of a pension plan came about as the result of
22
demands from the employees."
There is, in fact, no evidence that
organized labor took an interest in bargaining for pensions until after

19

U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin
No. 1407, Labor Mobility and Private Pension Plans, U. S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D. C., p. 7.
’
^ C h a r l e s L. Dearing, Industrial Pensions, Washington, D. C.:
(Brookings Institute, 1954), p. 47.
^B.L.S. Bulletin No. 1407, p. 52.

22

Latimer,

ojd.

cit., p. 19.

14

World War II.

The answer must lie elsewhere.

Primarily, the movement

seems to have expanded because of: (a) the changing status of the
American worker, and (b) increasing recognition by employers that,
for one reason or another, providing pensions to aged employees is a
sound business practice.
A.

23

The Changing Status of the American Worker

(1) Passage of the frontier and free lands.
Many writers, including historians, sociologists, and economists, believe
that the frontier and its abundant free acreage provided a safety
valve for the urbanized, industrialized East.

The frontier undoubtedly

gave the worker the feeling that he had "somewhere to go" should
employment become unavailable in the nation's mills and factories.

In

the case of the aged worker, the escape valve may have been more
psychological than real, but it probably did add a feeling of security
in the future which would otherwise have been missing.
(2) The rise of industrial organization and the passage of
agriculture and handicraft manufacturing as the primary
employments.
Generally, the farmer and the blacksmith found it possible to eke out
a subsistence level of existence in spite of the ravages of old age.
The employee of a large industrial firm must labor full time and
efficiently or not at all.

23

For discussion of these factors, see: Charles L. Dearing,
o p . cit., p. 30-40; Arthur D. Cloud, oj3. cit.. p. 158-172, and
Merton C. Bernstein, The Future of Private Pensions (New York:
The
Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), Chapters I and II.

15

(3) Increasingly complex domestic arrangements stemming from the
breakdown of the family as the economic unit.
Whereas the family farm operated as an economic unit and provided
security for its aged members, city grandparents commonly live apart
from their adult offspring whose cash income is often stretched to the
limit in providing for their own needs.
(4) The increasing number of employees who reach retirement age.
Many factors have combined to give the modern worker a longer life
expectancy.

Among these are better medical treatment, better diet,

safer and more healthful working conditions, and a shorter working
day, week, and year.
B.

Changing Employer Attitudes

(1) Adoption of the corporate form of organization.
An individual proprietorship and a partnership's life is concurrent
with that of the owner(s).

Pension planning is necessarily a matter

of long-run plannings and the corporation, with its unlimited life,
can establish a viable plan much more readily than can an organization
with an uncertain life expectancy.
(2) Discovery that the maintenance of the aged and infirm as
regular employees can be costly.
Retention of the superannuated worker can be an expensive operation,
particularly for such pursuits as railroading and heavy industry,
where a single accident might cost thousands or even millions of
dollars.

Additionally, for employers who pay equal wages to all - a

common practice in industry - many probably found themselves paying
a wage which exceeded the value of marginal product of the aged worker.
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If the disparity was great enough, pensioning the aged employee in
creased profits.
(3) During periods of labor shortages, pension systems aid the
firm in attracting and holding a competent work force.
As will be discussed later, many firms during World War II offered
liberal fringe benefits, including pensions, as a means of securing
badly needed workers.
(4) Pensions encourage long, uninterrupted service.
Most pensions require lengthy service as a condition of eligibility.
A firm might therefore be able to retain valuable, experienced personnel
if the inducement of pension rights is present.

Also, while present

strike settlements provide that strikes will not be considered an
interruption in service, such was not the case formerly.

In an

earlier time, the existence of a pension plan not only discouraged
union membership, which enhanced the possibility of a strike, but
also counseled against striking after a union had been formed.
Either way, the employer stood to benefit.
(5) Reputation of the firm.
Business firms discovered long ago that it is good policy to maintain
a good public image.

As present writers are fond of pointing out, the

large corporation has many publics, including stockholders, customers,
government, and employees.

jThe "humane" nature of pension planning

appeals to various degrees to all of these.
(6) Altruism.
No capitalist outside the covers of Karl Marx is so callous as not to
feel some pangs of conscience upon releasing an aged long service
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employee without providing him with some means of support.
(7) Taxes.
The Department of Internal Revenue allows an employer to deduct pension
plan contributions from taxable income.

With the drastic increase in

tax rates during the early 1940s, providing for a given pension pay
ment began to cost much less in terms of after tax profits.
For these reasons, it appears that pension plan coverage would
have expanded without the considerable upheaval experienced by the
nation during and after World War II,

Nevertheless, events following

1940 drastically changed the extent and nature of pension planning.

The National War Labor Board and the Advance of Fringe Benefits
During World War II
On the eve of America's entry into World War II, it was apparent
that some type of public body would be necessary to insure peaceful
industrial relations in the nation's defense connected industries in
the event the nation became an active participant in the hostilities;
an occurrence which seemed inevitable by 1941.

The first such public

body was the National Defense Mediation Board, created on March 19,
1941.

Fortunately, America's involvement in the war came gradually,

because the powers of the NDMB soon proved inadequate to its task of
maintaining industrial peace.

For all practical purposes, the Board

was active for eight months, during which time it developed tech
niques and procedures which were to prove invaluable when the nation
became directly engaged in the world-wide struggle.
The demise of the NDMB came as a result of a dispute between the
United Mine Workers and several steel manufacturers concerning the
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adoption of a union shop arrangement in the so-called "captive mines,"
a group of coal mines owned directly by the steel firms.

The firms

were afraid that acquiescense in the coal mines would result in re
newed efforts on the part of the United Steelworkers, a CIO union, to
secure the union shop in the steel mills themselves; a demand which
they had been successful in opposing.

Increasing bitterness among

members of the tripartite NDMB over the issue led to the resignation
of the CIO members in November of 1941, robbing the Board of its power
of persuasion, the only weapon with which it could secure compliance.
With the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, it was
imperative that some method be found by which costly work stoppages
could be prevented.

When the National War Labor Board was formed on

January 12, 1942, its primary function was therefore to prevent
strikes in war industries by mediation and adjudication of disputes.
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The Board was concerned with wage issues only if they were the basis
of a dispute which came before it.

At first, no attempt was made by

the Board to control wage rates generally.

During the first several

months of its existence, "the Board acted on the assumption that
employers would be reluctant to grant wage increases, and that,
therefore, they could be expected not to agree in collective bargain
ing negotiations to greater wage increases than the Board would grant
had the matter come before it as a dispute case."

25

^ J . C. Record, "The War Labor Board: an Experiment in Wage
Stabilization," American Economic Review, Vol. 34, Sept. 1944, p. 99.
25

U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin
N o . 1009, Problems and Policies of Dispute Settlement and Wage
Stabilization During World War II, 1950, p. 63.
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With full-scale mobilization underway, however, pressing manpower
shortages resulted, and employers throughout the nation readily granted
sizeable wage increases in the hope of attracting the necessary work
force.

As it was apparent that the nation would experience a chronic

shortage of manpower for the duration of the conflict, the Board's
original policy promised to be highly inflationary.

In early 1942,

in the General Cable C ase, the Board formally recognized that "it
would be impossible to stabilize wage rates if limitation on wage increases were “applied only to the dispute cases that came to it."
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Developing technique and precedent as it went, the Board in
July, 1942, established wage guidelines in the so-called "Little
Steel Formula," a standard to which it adhered more or less steadfastly for the duration.
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Basically, the formula was intended to

permit to employees an increase in wage rates equal to the rise in
the cost of living between January, 1941 and May, 1942.

An increase

of this amount was granted to workers in "Little Steel" and it was
the intention of the Board to allow employees in "laggard" plants an
equal percentage increase.
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The formula worked with a minimum of friction until early 1944.
Difficulty arose as the cost of living continued to rise, while the
Little Steel Formula remained unchanged.

Both wage earners and union

leaders felt they were suffering under an unjust formula.

26Ibid., p. 64.
27Ibid. ,, p., 156.
28Ibid., p. 157

Employers,
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reversing their usual role, constantly pressed the Board for wage in
creases in the hope that such advances would enable them to attract and
hold larger and more competent work forces .

"The unchanged formula

became a symbol of grievance which grew in irritation."
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Unwilling to depart from Little Steel for fear that once the
guideline had been breached there would be no stopping the tides of
inflation, the Board for a while stoically withstood the growing pres
sure being placed on it by management and labor alike.

One public

member of the Board admitted frankly that during this period the
Board operated in a "strangely murky atmosphere."
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Operating pragmatically as it had from the start, the Board soon
found what they considered a relatively inflation-free escape valve.
The idea was to allow rather liberal (for then) advances in fringe
benefits, such as vacations, shift differentials, severance pay, and
pensions, while holding the line on wages.

By doing so, the Board

felt that it "relieved somewhat the always tremendous pressure to in,
.
_
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crease basic wage rates."
Relying heavily as it did on voluntarism to secure compliance with
its directives, it was imperative that the Board retain the support of
of both labor and management.

Hence, "considerable flexibility" was

required if the support of these groups was to be maintained in

29Ibid.
30

Dexter M. Keezer, "Observations on the Operations of the
NWLB," American Economic Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, June, 1946, p. 240.
31

Ibid., p. 256 . .o
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"accepting and applying the Government principle of wage stabilize^
tion."32

The result of the Board's "considerable flexibility" was that

although basic wage rates were reasonably well stabilized, labor costs
advanced rather rapidly because of failure to hold the line on fringe
issues.

According to the Board, "this moderate weakening of the

stabilization line had the more than compensating virtue of permitting
a realistic adjustment of labor standards to the practical problems
of peaceful and cooperative industrial relations.

°

Of all the

issues which came before it, "...fringe issues were the most flexibly
34
treated."
The explosive spread of fringe benefits created new problems.
Although they did not unduly aggravate the economy's inflationary
tendency by directly increasing demand for the limited output of
civilian goods, they did increase the cost of production, making the
price stabilization program of the Office of Price Administration
much more difficult to administer.

Consequently, the Board soon

found it necessary to establish standards or guidelines for fringe
benefits.

The announcement of such limits had an unforeseen result.

As in the case of any stabilizing limit, these fringe stan
dards came to create in the minds of labor leaders and
workers the notion that they were entitled to such benefits
as a matter of right.
It became increasingly difficult to
deny such increases to any group of employees.

•^BLS Bulletin 1009, p. 66.
33Ibid., p. 69.
34Ibid., p. 93.
3^Ibid., p. 16,6.

By the time hostilities ceased and demobilization had begun, a
very sizeable number of the nation's blue collar workers found them
selves enjoying perquisites which had formerly been reserved for in
dustry's upper echelons.

The degree of effort which unions currently

devote to fringe issues indicates that the nation's employees often
prefer these benefits over higher basic wages.

A trend started under

the exigencies of war is obviously here to stay.

Certainly, workers

have come to consider such benefits as perfectly legitimate demands on
indus try.
Although industrial pension planning had a history covering more
than half a century, organized labor, for the most part, remained in
different to the experiment until the mid-1940s.

Indeed, it appears

that some of the nation's unions had "actually opposed employer
sponsored plans, viewing them as paternalistic devices designed to
wean the allegiance of the workers from the unions to management."
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At most, until the close of the War, unions had more or less accepted
pensions as falling wholly within the discretion of management to give
or withhold.

Whatever the cause, pensions had not become the subject

of collective bargaining except where management had occasionally in
vited organized labor to participate in preparing or revising a plan.
It was left to the United Mine Workers under John L. Lewis to force
fully draw labor's attention to pensions.

"^Dearing, op. cit., p. 41.
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The United Mine Workers and a_ Union Sponsored Plan
A new philosophy began to envelope the nation's labor movement
following the war.

Whereas unions, particularly industrial unions,

had

formerly been interested in securing immediately realizable gains such
as wage boosts and greater union security, attention now began to
focus more strongly on long-range benefits such as pensions.

The new

position of labor was succinctly stated by John L. Lewis of the Mine
Workers in 1948.

According to Lewis, a coal company would be prohib

ited from using a mule to a point where it became incapacitated:
...and then turning it out on the street to die; and yet
that is what the bituminous industry has been doing with
its man power.
We hold that the proper care of the human element in the
mining industry should properly be charged to the cost
of production and not assessed against the taxpayers as
a whole. The industry should do it, and the commodity
should bear the cost of it - whatever that may be. This
is a chance for labor and management to take care of
these problems and eliminate the necessity for government
to build up huge, inefficient and costly administrative
bureaus to try to do the task in a less efficient way.
This was the philosophy which led Lewis to demand an industry
sponsored retirement fund for coal miners in contract negotiations of
early 1946.

The original demand was for a 7 percent payroll assessment,

the fund thus created to be administered by the union.

38

The Mine

Operators Negotiating Committee balked at the union's demands, and the
President ordered the mines seized on May 21, 1946, under provisions of

37

U. J3. News and World Report, "Pensions: The Coming Issue in
Labor Relations.
An Interview with John L. Lewis," Nov. 19, 1948,
p . 35.
38
U. S. Department of Labor, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 63,
No. 2, August, 1946, p. 171.
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the War Labor Disputes Act.

On M a y 29, 1946, Secretary of the Interior

Julius A. Krug, acting as Coal Mines Administrator, signed an agreement
with the Mine Workers which, among other things, provided for a
"welfare and retirement fund financed by 5 cents a ton on coal produced
for use or sale."

39

By 1948, the contribution had risen to 20 cents a

ton, and in 1950 was set at 30 cents a ton.
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The Krug-Lewis agreement became the springboard from which other
unions later launched their retirement system demands.

For almost

three years after this agreement was reached, however, neither labor
nor management could say with certainty whether pensions were a
legitimate subject for collective bargaining.

The issue was finally

resolved in a case arising out of a dispute between the United
Steelworkers of America and Inland Steel Company.

The Inland Steel Case: Pensions Become a Bargainable Issue
Since passage of the Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act) in
1935, it has been the policy of the federal government to encourage the
use of collective bargaining as a means of settling labor-management
disputes.

The act states that employees shall have the right to organ

ize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing for the purpose of "negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment...," Further, the act made it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively over these matters

39

Ibid., p. 172.

40U. S. Department of Labor, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 74,
No. 1, January, 1952, p. 37.
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with a certified bargaining agent.

While this general obligation had

rested on management since 1935, the specific issue of pensions as a
bargainable issue was not presented to the National Labor Relations
Board until 1947.
In 1936, the Inland Steel Company had unilaterally installed a r e 
tirement plan, and had amended it several times thereafter.

The

Steelworkers Union charged that Inland, by unilaterally amending the
pension program, and by refusing to discuss the matter at the bargain
ing table, had changed the employees "wages" and "conditions of :
employment" and was thus violating Section 8(a) of the Wagner Act
% 41
(refusal to bargain).
As this was the way the issue was presented to the NLRB in late
1947, it was the duty of the Board to decide whether a retirement plan
could be rightfully considered either "wages" or a "condition of
employment."

Inland sought to show that pension plans fell outside

the acceptable interpretation of both these terms.

It further argued

that the case should be dismissed on the grounds that pensions lay out
side the range of bargainable issues since their negotiation at the
bargaining table was not a "general practice of collective bar42
gaining."
The board dealt first with the issue of whether pensions could
properly be considered as "wages" under the Act.

Emphatically stating

that they should be so considered, the Board found that an employer's

^ I n the Matter of Inland Steel C o . and Local Unions N o . 1010
and 65, United Steel Workers of America (CIO) , 77 NLRB N o . 1, p . 1.
^ Ibid., p. 5.
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monetary contribution to a pension plan constituted an economic enhance
ment of the employee's money wages.
Realistically viewed, this type of wage enhancement or
increase, no less than any other, becomes an integral part
of the entire wage structure, and the character of the
employee representative's interest in it, and the terms
of its grant, is no different than in any other ease where
a change in the wage structure is effected.
Indeed, the
practice of offering retirement benefits in lieu of current
wage increases is not uncommon in bargaining between
employers and employee's representatives.^3
The Board went on to note that the Treasury Department had taxed
pension income as wages since 1918, and that the courts had ruled
that pension benefits constituted."wages" in.a bankruptcy case,44
On the question of whether pensions were bargainable on the
grounds that they were a "condition of employment," Inland argued
that the term should be interpreted to mean "working conditions," and
therefore should only be used to refer to the physical conditions
under which an employee is required to work, not to the terms or con
ditions upon which employment is. afforded.
The Board, observing that viewing pensions as wages was sufficient
to establish a bargainable issue, only briefly considered the merits
of this argument, although it did strongly imply that pensions were a
"condition of employment."
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Ibid., p. 5. The same view had been stated much earlier by
a professional economist: See Albert deRoods, "Pensions as Wages,"
American Economic Review, Vol. 3, June, 1913, p. 287.
44Ibid., p. 6.
45Ibid., p. 7.
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Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, that body, in upholding the Board,
indicated that it thought the Board would have been on sounder ground
had it ruled pensions bargainable on the basis of "other conditions of
employment" rather than on the basis of their being wages.
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In a

later (1953) case, the Court explicitly stated that pensions should be
considered as a "condition of employment."
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Turning to Inland's contention that pensions lay outside the
"general practice of collective bargaining" and because of this was
not a bargainable issue, the Board saw the matter quite differently.
It stated that disputes over pensions should be subject to collective
bargaining "irrespective of the fact that the specific difference to
be adjusted has not previously been regularly considered in the
framing of collective bargaining."
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After the NLRB's ruling that pensions were a bargainable issue was
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1949, the Board subsequently ruled that
several other similar benefits were bargainable, such as hospitalization,
sick benefits, group insurance,
and thrift plans.
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stock bonuses,

50

stock purchase plans,
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46Inland Steel C o . vs. NLRB, 170 F. 2d 247, 251 (1949) certiorari
denied by the Supreme Court, but accepted on another point, 336 US 960
(1949) .
4 7plsen v s . Potlatch Forests, Inc., 200 F. 2d 700.
4^In the Matter of Inland Steel, 77 NLRB No. 1, p. 9.
4977 NLRB No. 1162.
5096 NLRB No. 1309.
5l110 NLRB No. 356.
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With the legal nature o f :pensions as a bargainable issue firmly
established, unions lost little time opening the subject in contract
negotiations.

The phenomenal rate of growth of such plans is a gauge

of their success in securing pensions benefits and of management's
willingness to grant them.

52

,

The Extent of Fens ion .Plan Coverage at the Present
The rate of installation of new pension plans
decades has been quite rapid.

Time
in thelast

two

In the fall of 1960, the U. S.

Department of Labor received reports on over 16,000 private pension
plans covering 15.6 million workers.
approximately 1,000 workers.

The average plan coverage was

Only 2 percent of these plans were estab

lished in the first four decades of this century.

Approximately two-

53
thirds were established after 1949,More than 60 percent
plans and covered workers were in manufacturing.
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of all

As of July, 1963,

the Department of Labor reported that it had on file some 32,610
retirement plan reports.

Only about 22,000 of these were pension

plans; the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that about 30 percent
of all plans reporting are profit sharing, stock bonus, and savings
plans, and therefore not pension plans per s e .

On the basis of the

previously noted average coverage, some 20 to 22 million workers are
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In 1949, the Steel Industry Board strongly recommended the
establishment of private pension plans.
See: Steel Industry Board,
Report to: the President of the United States on the Labor Dispute
in the Basic Steel Industry. Sept. 10, 1949,
50

U. S. Department of Labor, "Labor Mobility and Private
Pension Plans," Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No, 1407, June,
1964, p. 3-4.
^ 4 Ibid., p. 6.
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covered by pension systems.
ufacturing.^

Approximately one-half of these are in m a n 

For the same month of 1963, the civilian labor force was.

75.1 million, of whom 17.1 million were in manufacturing.
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From these

data, it would appear that less than 30 percent of all labor force
participants are covered, but that approximately two-thirds of the
nation's manufacturing employees are covered.

A 1959 prediction by

Robert Tilove that by 1969 "approximately 45 to 55 percent of the wage
and salary force - outside agriculture and government - will be covered
by private pension plans...

appears overly optimistic in view of

recent data.
Despite the rapid rate of installment of new plans in the last two
decades, the overall picture of pension plan coverage is still rather
spotty.

As the above figures indicate, coverage is concentrated in

manufacturing.

Even.here, there are thousands of small firms employ

ing millions of workers who are not covered.

At the other extreme is

such pursuits as retailing, services, and agriculture, in which a
very small minority of all employees are covered.
While there are many elements which undoubtedly influence the
spread of pension plan coverage, three factors stand out.
(a) firm size;

These are:

(b) labor force turnover rate of an industry, and;

the existence or absence of a trade union.

(c)

These will be discussed

in turn.

-^U. S. Department of Labor, Fifty Second Annual Report, 1964,
p. 103.
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U. S. Department of Labor, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 86,
No. 10, p. 1220.
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'Robert Tilove, Pension Funds and Economic Freedom, (New York;
The Fund for the Republic* 1959), p. 9.
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In a day when we are constantly being bombarded with books and
articles warning of the dangers of bigness, it comes as a surprise to
find that at latest count there were 3,362,835 firms operating in the
United States.

For the most part, they are small.

Some 3,000,000 of

them employ less than 20 workers; 3,240,000 of them less than 50.
Fewer than 60,000 employ 100 or more.
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As previously noted, only

about 20,000 of these firms have pension plans, and, on the average,
each plan covers about 1,000 workers.

Obviously, a large majority of

the nation's small employers have no plan at all.

While a growing

number of new plans being installed are by smaller firms,
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many labor

experts doubt that more than fifty percent coverage can ever be
achieved.
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Another problem which faces a large number of the nation's workers
is connected with meeting pension plan service requirements.

In em

ployments where the labor turnover rate is high, this problem is
especially acute.

Indeed, in the construction industry pension plans

are almost

non-existent because of

this problem.

Theonly solution

appears to

be the establishment of

multi-employer plans with portable

credits.

The thorny problems connected with such a system are manifold,

however.

One authority believes the solution lies either in vesting of

credits or

in the establishment of

a central clearing house device to

s. Department of Commerce, 1965 Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 86th ed., p. 496.
■^BLS Bulletin 1407, p. 6.
^ C l a r k Kerr, "Social and Economic Consequences of the Pension
Drive," Handbook on Pensions (New York: National Industrial Conference
Board, 1950) , p. 84.
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facilitate transfer of credits from one employer to another.
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Until

some such system is developed, workers in rapid turnover industries
will have to rely on Social Security benefits, however inadequate these
may b e .
While it is not here suggested that the remedy to the problem of
inadequate coverage is to be found in expansion of trade unionism, the
fact remains that approximately 70 percent of all plans now operating
are contained in collective bargaining agreements.
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Furthermore, the

rapid spread of coverage since 1949 strongly suggests that the expansion
occurred as a result of pensions becoming a bargainable issue.
Table II-l catalogues this expansion.

Table II-l.

Distribution of Private Pension Plans by Date of
Establishment (all Industries).

Year

Number of Plans

1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

418
532
579
287
939
949
433
1,351
694
1,232
1,194
642
528
1,572
812

Workers Covered (1,000)
637
366
402
290
1,901
707
454
479
330
1,090
665
559
499
347
154

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 1407

Bernstein, oj5. cit., p. 264.
Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 1407, p. 7.
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While bargained pension plans are approaching saturation in many
industries - in 1960, 90 percent of the members of the Steelworkers
Union were covered

63

-..in. traditionally non-union Indus tries...and

regions.,, coverage is not nearly so extensive.
Whatever the factors which encourage or discourage the spread of
pension systems, the above discussion suggests that much remains to be
done if the mass of this nation's employees are to enjoy the benefits
of private pensions in their final years.

As indicated by Table II-l,

the rate of introduction of new plans is rather high, but it also in
dicates that the average coverage per plan is falling rapidly.

This

is somewhat encouraging in itself, however, since it is among small
employers that coverage is least prevalent.

It will also be noted

from Table II-l that pension plan installations exhibit a cyclical
sensitivity.

During or immediately following the post-war recessions

of 1947-48, 1957-58, and 1960, the number of plans established show a
marked decline.

Perhaps the sustained prosperity of the 1960s will

result in a more rapid spread of pension coverage.

Recent statistics

strongly indicate that such a trend might be under way.

63
Bernstein, o£. cit., p. 183-184.
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v CHAPTER III

NORMAL PLAN PROVISIONS

Introduction
Of necessity, every pension plan contains a series of provisions
dealing with such matters as administration of the plan, eligibility
requirements, benefit formulae, and financing arrangements.

Obviously,

therefore, pension plans differ insofar as their provisions treat these
matters differently.

This Chapter is devoted to an examination of the

variety of plan provisions which are common to present pension systems.
Such an examination serves several purposes:

the terminology of pension

systems is developed; a basis for comparing pension plans is provided;
detection of developing trends in plan provisions is made possible,
and; the types of provisions which are widely used as well as S:CMa%':
relatively fare provisions may be .pointed out.
The order in which pension plan provisions are examined in this
work has no particular significance except that of lending clarity to
the exposition.

Treatment of these matters in actual plans may occur

in quite different order, as, indeed they do.
Finally, this examination makes no pretense of being a comprehen
sive examination of all extant plan provisions .

It is the belief of

the author, however, that all of the more frequently used industrial
pension plan provisions are to be found here.

Administration of the Plan
Broadly speaking, there are three administrative functions con
nected with the operation of a plan.

These functions involve (1) record
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keeping, (2) ruling on the validity of benefit claims, and (3) financial
administration.
A routine function of plan administration is the maintenance of
basic records necessary to establish eligibility and benefit rights
under the plan.

These records contain such information as the age, sex,

earnings, and date of employment of each plan participant.

Basically

a clerical chore, little administrative supervision is needed once the
system is established.

As a practical matter, record keeping is

usually delegated to the firms' personnel departments whose files already contain most of the records needed.

1

A more important function of plan administration is the processing
of behefit claims as they are presented by participating employees.
When such a claim is presented, the administrative agency must (1)
verify that the applicant has reached retirement age, (2) determine
the applicant's eligibility insofar as service requirements are con
cerned, and (3) compute the amount of benefit to which he is entitled.
Finally, under many plans, safe and profitable investment of accum
ulated pension funds is the. responsibility of the plan's administrative
body.

In the past, this duty has been avoided by many of the smaller

plans by either relinquishing control of pension funds to banks who act
as trustees of the fund, or by the purchase of annuities from insurance
companies.

At present, almost all of the larger plans and many of the

smaller ones retain control of financial management of funds accumulated

D. C.:

Jay V. Strong, Employee Benefit Flans in Operation, (Washington,
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1951), p. 117.
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under the plan.

In such a case, it is the duty of the administrative

agency to manage what may be a rather large investment portfolio.
A.

Administration by Management

Industrial pension plan administration has gone through two phases
and.appears to be entering a third.

In the first phase, administration

of plans tended to be exclusively exercised by management.

This was

before the development of negotiated pension plans, which generally
date from 1949.

With few exceptions, plan administration was under the

control of the sponsoring firm before this time.

Most larger firms

appointed a "pension board" or "pension committee" to supervise plan
operations.

The members of these supervisory bodies were answerable

directly to the firm and served at the firm's discretion.

Unions

generally assumed that they had no right to participate in these
matters,^
B.

Joint Adminis tration

As a consequence of pensions becoming a bargainable issue in the
late 1940s, many unions have obtained contractual rights to participate
in plan management.

As pension administration moved into this phase,

union members gained the right to sit on joint administrative boards
composed of equal numbers of company and union representatives.

The

power of such administrative bodies was limited however to determina
tion of an applicant's eligibility and pension.amount.

2

Management of

Charles L. Dearing, Indus tr ia1 Pens ions, (Washington, D. C.:
Brookings Institute, 1954), p. 81.

36

funds created under the plan remained under the exclusive control of
3
management.
By and large, this is the way in which most industrial pension
plans are now administered.

The chief function of the union in such a

restricted administrative capacity is to insure that a pension will be
forthcoming to a worker who has established eligibility, and to make
certain that the amount of the benefit is correct.
The third phase into which industrial pension plan administration
appears to be entering concerns union participation in the handling of
trust funds created under pension plans.

The advance of union control

in this area can be expected to be slow as opposition is quite strong.
Traditional management attitudes and currently prevailing conditions
can be illustrated by practices of the U. S. Steel Corporation.
The original pension plan negotiated by the United Steel Workers
and U. S. Steel established a contractual obligation on the part of
the firm to pay benefits in accordance with a formula contained in the
plan.

The company did not have to set up a pension fund under the

agreement.

It could have adopted a pay-as-you-go policy had it wished,

but financial prudence led to the establishment of a fund as a more
convenient way of providing for foreseeable pension costs.

Having

been thus established, an official of the firm testified before a
Senate Subcommittee in 1955 that, "Under these circumstances, since the
determination of whether or not to create a trust is a matter of

3Ibid., p. 82.
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internal policy, we believe that the operations of the trust are of a
4
like nature."
It bears mentioning that U. S. Steel has established something of
an anomaly - a trust without a beneficiary or owner.

The following ex

change took place between Mr. Enders M. Voorhees, General Counsel for
the firm, and Paul J. Cotter, Chief Counsel to the Senate Sub-Committee
on Welfare and Pension Funds
"Mr. Cotter: Is that an irrevocable trust?
Mr. Voorhees:

As far as the United States Steel Corporation is
concerned, it is irrevocable. We can;11 put a
finger on that money.

Mr. Cotter: What... is the purpose of the fund?
Mr. Voorhees:

It is for the use of
*

employees.

# *

Mr. Cotter: But while it is for the use of the employees, they
don't have a vested interest in it?
Mr. Voorhees: That is right."
One might easily wonder about the legal status of such a "trust."
This problem will be more fully discussed in connection with funding of
pension plans.
Some of the nation's labor leaders are beginning to challenge the
"internal policy" method of pension fund management.

While it was esti

mated in 1956.that 86% of all pension funds were administered solely by

Testimony of Enders M, Voorhees, General Counsel for U. S. Steel,
before the Senate Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds, contained
in Hearings on E>. R e s . 40, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 195 5 , Part 3, p. 1171.
5 Ibid.. p. 1171-1172.

38

employers,

it seems inevitable that unions will gain more control in

this area in the future.
There are two concepts of pensions and pension funds which bear
upon the validity of the trade unionist’s claim to a right to share in
pension fund management.
One concept, which might be called the
has been espoused for many years.

In 1912,

"human depreciation" view,
one author wrote that:

It might be added that from the standpoint of the whole
system of social economy no employer has a right to engage
men in any occupation that exhausts the individual's in
dustrial life in ten, twenty, or forty yearsj and then
leave the remnant floating on society at large as a
derelict at sea,^
A similar philosophy was later advanced by John L. Lewis of the
United Mine Workers (see Chapter II, p. 23), and the President's Steel
Industry Board echoed this view in 1949.

8

If the concept that a pension represents a depreciation cost is
accepted, then it appears that it should be the prerogative of the firm
to decide how to meet that cost.

It would logically follow, therefore,

that management should have exclusive control over any fund that they
might choose to create.
A second concept of pensions, however, gives unions a strong

Final Report of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 84th
Congress, 2d Sess., 1956, p. 14.
^Lee Welling Squiers, Old Age Dependency in the United States,
(New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1912), p. 272.
g

The Steel Industry Board, Report to the President of the United
States on the Labor Dispute in the Basic Steel Industry, Sept. 10,
1949, p. 10.
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argument that they have a right to participate in pension fund manage
ment.

According to this concept, pensions are "deferred w ages.11

The

present practice of "package" bargaining, under which the firm agrees to
pay advances of so many cents per hour and then allows the union consid
erable leeway in determining the form in which the increase will be
taken, lends credence to this concept.
United States Steel, while strongly opposing union participation
in fund management, appears to hold this view of contributions to
pension funds.

In a formal statement submitted to the Senate Sub

committee on Welfare and Pension Funds, the firm stated:
The funding of current service costs starts out by
recognizing that the cost of an employee's service is
greater than the amount currently paid to him as
wages because, as he works, he concurrently establishes
a possible claim to a pension.
In a sense this is a
claim to more pay for the same work; it is therefore
deemed to be a part of the cost of that work and hence
a part of the cost of the product resulting from that
work.^
Of course, what U. S. Steel thinks of as the cost of labor is the
wage of labor to an employee, and therefore, rightfully his.

Conse

quently, through his representatives, he has a valid claim to the right
to participate in the management of his "deferred wages."
Whichever concept is accepted, unions are currently pressing for
the right to become joint administrators of pension funds.

They

reason that the pension money really belongs to the wprkers and that
the worker's representatives should therefore share in making decisions
which affect their funds.

9
Senate Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds, o£. cit., p. 1171.
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The AFL, before the 1955 reunion with the CIO, stated that "union
representatives have as

much right to a voice in the management of the

funds as if the workers

had set up the fund entirely through their own

resources."

10

Walter Reuther has long advocated joint control of pension funds,
Testifying in support of the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act
of 1958, Reuther commented that "It is incredible that we should know
as little as we do about the billions of dollars in investments repre11
sented by these plans," He argues that the
fund belongs to the workers and is

money in the pension

being held in trust for them.

Consequently, he believes that employees should have more control over
the use of the funds.

He has advocated that automobile industry

pension funds be invested in housing and other community facilities in
areas where automobile workers live.

12

Growing union pressure will probably bring about a greater degree
of union participation in pension fund management.

Changes, if they

come, can be expected to be slow and evolutionary in nature; no over
night revolution appears in the offing,
C,

Settlement of Disputes Under Joint Administration

Although, as previously noted, the employer has final authority
with regard to pension benefits under some plans, an increasing number

^ A m e r i c a n Federation of Labor, Pension Plans Under Collective
Bargaining, a Reference Guide for Trade Unions, (no date), p, 3.
Cited in Paul Harbrecht, Pension Plans and Economic Power, (New York:
The Twentieth Century Fund, 1959), p, 96,
11
12

Senate Subcommittee, o£. cit., p. 1175,
Harbrecht,

ojj.

cit., p. 98,
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of plans provide for some degree of employee participation in making de
decisions which deal with eligibility and benefits, to be received.

At

present, in fact, about two-thirds of collectively bargained plans
provide for some type of pension committee composed of an equal number
of members appointed by the employer and b y the union.

13

The following is typical of pension plan clauses establishing
such a board:
There shall be established a central Board of Administration
hereinafter referred to as the Board, composed of six members,
three appointed by the Corporation and three by the Union...
Either the Corporation or the Union at any time may remove
a member or alternate appointed by it and may appoint a
member of alternate to fill any vacancy among members or
alternates appointed by it.-^
Plans commonly provide that deadlocks between corporation members
and union members of the board will be broken by an impartial chairman;
The Corporation and the Union shall mutually agree upon and
select an Impartial Chairman, who shall serve until requested
in writing to resign by three Board Members,
The Impartial Chairman will not be counted for the purpose
of a quorum, and will vote only in case of a failure of the
Corporation and Union by vote through their representatives
on the Board to agree upon a matter which is properly before
it
.I . U «

*

«

The decision of the Board is generally final and binding on both
parties.

Typically:

^ Ibid., p. 47.
■^Commerce Clearing House, Pension and Profit Sharing Plans and
Clauses, Chicago, 1957, p. 72.
15Ibid.. p. 72.
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There shall be no appeal from any ruling by the Board which
is within its authority. Each such ruling shall be final
and binding on the union and its members, the employee or
employees involved, and on the Corporation.
Elsewhere, this same plan states that no matter respecting the
pension plan "shall be subject to the grievance procedure established
in the collective bargaining agreement between the Corporation and
the Union.
This plan also spells out the authority of the Board which,
typical of such Boards, includes:
pensions;

(1) review of applications for

(2) the handling of complaints regarding an employee's age,

service, or computed benefit;

(3) providing employees with information

regarding service credits, and; (4) settlement of disputes over per18
manent disability claims.
Although the above plan clauses are cited as typical of dispute
settlement machinery and of the scope of authority of such joint boards,
other methods are occasionally utilized.

Some plans provide for the

selection of permanent or ad hoc outside umpires, some resort to the
services of the American Arbitration Association, while a few provide
that the regular grievance procedure machinery shall be used.

19

1®Ibid., p. 72.
17

19

Ibid.

Dearing,

0 £,

cit., p. 97, and Harbrecht, o£. cit., p. 47

Eligibility Requirements

™

All pension plans establish conditions which must be met in order
for an employee to become eligible for a benefit under the plan.
Principal among these requirements are provisions that require some
minimum period of continuous service and some minimum age of the
employee, and, often, special provisions which apply to those who become
disabled or retire early.

Additionally, many plans provide that an

employee may continue work after normal retirement age at the employer's
option.

Where this is allowed, the plan usually has a compulsory

retirement age, commonly 70 years.
A. Normal Retirement Age
Normal retirement age may be defined as the earliest age at
which an employee may retire with full benefits under the normal
benefit formula of the plan.

Under most plans, the normal retirement

age is 65, assuming that the employee has otherwise qualified for a
benefit.

In a recent study by the Department of Labor, only 20 out of

a sample of 300 plans had a normal retirement age either higher or
lower than 65.

20

Of this 20, two set age 70 as the normal retirement

age, fifteen age 60, one age 62, one age 55, and one allowed normal
retirement benefits whenever an employee's age plus service added to
80.

21

The prevalence of age 65 as the normal retirement age no doubt

20

U. S. Department of Labor, Pension Plans Under Collective
Bargaining; Normal Retirement. Early and Disability Retirement,
Fall, 1959, BLS Bui. 1284, p. 18.
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reflects the fact that this is the age at which benefits become avail
able to a covered male under the Social Security Act.

.

The normal retirement age takes on added importance when it
influences a worker 1s rights under other plan provisions.

Many plans

which have vesting provisions, for instance, provide that full vesting
occurs only when normal retirement age is reached.

Plans with early

retirement provisions commonly pay benefits which decrease in some
proportion as retirement occurs before normal retirement age.

Also,

there appears to be a current trend toward making the normal retirement
age and the compulsory retirement age the same.

The Bankers Trust

Company found that this was the case in 79% of the plans surveyed in a

22

1959 study and in 91% of the plans included in a 1965 'study,.

These

matters will be more fully discussed later in this chapter,
B , Minimum Service Requirements
In addition to the age requirement, most plans also require some
minimum period of "unbroken" or "continuous" service.

As Table III-l

indicates, over three-fourths of the plans included in a 1959
Department of Labor study had some minimum service requirement.

Some

72 of the 300 plans specified age only as a condition of eligibility.
This figure is somewhat misleading, however, as most of the firms in
volved follow a policy of not hiring workers over 45 or 50 years of
age.

23

The result is that by the time they have reached the usual r e 

tirement age of 65, 15 or 20 years of service with the firm has been

22

Bankers Trust Company, 1965 Study of Industrial Retirement Plans,
New York, 1965, p. 10,
23BLS Bui. 1284, p. 4
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accumulated.

About 25% of the plans called for ten or less years of

service; slightly more than one-half specified 10-15 years, reflecting
the patterns set by the automobile (10 years) and steel (15 years) in
dustries.

The remaining plans either require more than 15 years

service - up to 30 in one plan - or provide some alternative method of
computing eligibility.

Table III-l.

Minimum Requirements for Normal Retirement in Selected
Pension Plans Under Collective Bargaining, Fall, 1959.

Minimum Requirements
All Plans

Number of .Plans

Workers (1,000)

300

4,672.7

72
216

644.7
3,903.6

years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years

1
1
1
8
1
2
4
64
1
98
1
21
9
1
2

3.0
4.0
10.0
471.8
180.0
43.0
29.0
1,249.0
16.2
1,051.2
10.0
678.9
137.8
7.5
8.4

Age and Participation

6

29.0

Age 65 and 5 years
Age 65 and 10 years
Age 65 and 15 years

2
2
2

11.2
6.6
11.2

6

95.4

Age Only
Age and 1
Service
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age

55
60
60
60
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
70

and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and

10
12
15
20
2
5
6
10
12
15
18
20
25
30
20

Alternative Requirements

Source: U. S. Department of Labor, BLS Bui. 1284, Table 6, p. 18
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In determining what constitutes a year's service for the purpose of
establishing pension eligibility, various methods are utilized.

In

plans negotiated by the United Automobile Workers, 1700 compensated
hours or more during a calendar year is sufficient to earn credit as
one year of service.

(52 x 40 = 2,080, so a worker must be compensated

for slightly more than 80% of a normal work y e a r ) .

Plans in the steel

industry require only that some compensated service occur during the
course of a year.

Some plans use a specified amount of pay during a

year as the yardstick.

24

C. Early Retirement
An increasingly large number of plans allow an employee to retire
before reaching the normal retirement age.

A 1952 Department of Labor

study found that 166 of 300 plans had early retirement provisions;

25

a comparable 1959 study showed that 224 of 300 plans provided for early
retirement.^

It is quite common to require some additional condition

of eligibility for those who wish to retire early.

The employers con

sent, rarely required for normal retirement, is often required.

Some

plans specify impaired capacity as a condition; others require that the
employee face layoff or job loss.

27

24

Merton C. Bernstein, The Future of Private Pensions (New York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 20.
25

U. S, Department of Labor, Pension Plans Under Collective
Bargaining, BLS B u i . 1147, 1953, p. 15.
BLS Bui. 1284, p. 30.
27Ibid.
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The Department of Labor estimates that about 2 out of 3 workers
under plans are covered by early retirement provisions.

Such provisions

were found to be practically universal in the lumber, rubber, primary
metal, fabricated metal, paper, tobacco, petroleum, transport equipment,
communications, and utility industries.

They are almost non-existent

in the apparel, hotel, and restaurant industries, however.

28

Early retirement benefits are always less than benefits which
are available at normal retirement age.

Formulas used to compute

early retirement benefits vary, but in every case the employee receives
a monthly benefit which decreases as his age at retirement falls short
of the normal retirement age.

Table III-2 shows the method used to

compute early retirement benefits in the steel and automobile in
dustries.

While other methods are used, all achieve similar results.

Table III-2.

Retirement Age

65 (Normal)
64
63
62
61
60

Early Retirement Benefits as a Percent of Normal Retire
ment Benefits in the Basic Steel and Automobile
Industries (1959)

Basic Steel
(actuarial reduction)

Automobile
(0.60 percent per
month reduction)

100,00
91.84
84.60
79.14
72.36
67.18

100.00
92.80
85.60
78.40
71.20
64.00

Source: U. S. Department of Labor, BLS Bui. 1284, p. 31,

28

Ibid.
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Of the 224 plans in the 1959 sample which had early retirement pro
visions, about three-fifths allowed an early retiree to delay receipt
of his benefit until age 65.

In such a case, the benefit is increased

by approximately 50%, but remains less than the benefit which would have
been available had employment continued until normal retirement age..

29

Hypothetically then, a worker who might get $100 per month at normal
retirement age could currently receive perhaps $60 by accepting retire
ment at age 60, but would be entitled to a $90 benefit if receipt was
deferred until age 65.
D. Special and Disability Retirement
A small number of plans provide that an employee may become
eligible for a pension prior to the achievement of normal retirement
age if some special condition is satisfied or if the worker becomes
disabled.

Benefits available under these circumstances usually exceed

by a significant amount the early retirement benefit to which an ef30
fected employee might be concurrently entitled.
The objective of the "special" early retirement programs is to
provide larger benefits to early retirees whose separation from
employment is involuntary.

Employees are generally placed in this

category in a limited number of situations such as may arise when an
employer initiates the retirement of a worker, where the employee is
31
partially disabled, or where recall from layoff is unlikely.

29Ibid., p. 33.
30

Ibid., p. 33.

31 Ibid" , "p. 34
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The 1959 Department of Labor study of 300 plans contained 25 with
such provisions.

Age and service requirements were usually the same as

for early retirement, but, as mentioned above, the pension amount was
substantially greater.

I n m o s t of these plans, the regular retirement

benefit formula became operative when the employee reached normal retirement age.

32

A 1964 study of 15,818 plans found that 1,051 of the plans
(covering 2.7 million workers) provided for special early retirement.
Plans with this type provision were most common in agreements negoti
ated by the Steel Workers, Automobile Workers, Rubber Workers, and
33
United Packinghouse Workers unions.

The conditions under which

special early retirement was available under these plans are reflected
in Table III-3.
Insofar as the benefit amount is concerned, about half of these
plans provided a special retiree with a pension equal to the normal
retirement benefit, while the other half gave benefits either double
or somewhat larger than the normal retirement benefit.

In any of these

cases the benefit available would exceed the benefit under the regular
early retirement provision.

Also, normal retirement benefits were pay-

able when the worker reached the normal retirement age.

34

■^Ibid., p. 35.
33

U. S. Department of Labor, Labor Mobility and Private Pension
Plans, BLS Bui. 1407, June, 1964, p. 31.
34
BLS Bui. 1407, p. 33.

Table III-3.

Conditions Under Which Special Early Retirement is Available.

Special Early Retirement Conditions

Plans

Plans with Special Early Retirement

ijOsi1

At Employers' Request
By Mutual Consent
Terminated (shut-down)
Disability (not sufficient to qualify for
disability benefit)
Layoff
Other

Workers (1,000)

2,67a 1

818
498
128
227

1,429
1,886
1,013
1,095

121
37

943
170

Source: U. S. Department of Labor, Labor Mobility and Private Pension
Plans, BLS Bui. No. 1407, June, 1964, p. 31.

^Sums of individual items do not equal totals because of plans which
allow alternative conditions.

Ul
o
i
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One respected authority in the field expects special early retirement provisions to become much more common.

35

In the past, the steel

and automobile industries have been pattern setters and, as- previously
noted, this type provision is already quite prevalent in these in
dustries.
Disability retirement is similar to special early retirement in
that both are contingent upon some special condition and that both
provide a pension benefit which may differ from the benefit to which
an employee might otherwise be entitled.
In a 1959 study, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that
approximately 90% of all workers covered by negotiated single
employer plans were protected by a disability retirement provision.

36

Another study covering plans negotiated in the period from 1960 to
1965 showed that 94% of these plans provided disability pensions.

37

Under most of these plans, the worker must be disabled for a
certain length of time, usually six months, by a physical infirmity
which renders him, to some degree, incapable of performing his usual
duties.

In addition, the employee is usually required to meet either
38

an age or service requirement, or both, to qualify.

35
36

Bernstein, oj>. cit., p. 23.
BLS Bui. 1284, p. 35.

■^Bankers Trust Company, 1965 Study of Industrial Retirement
Plans, New York, 1965, p. 17.
38BLS Bui. 1284, p. 35,

When compared with early retirement requirement, the age require
ment tends to be lower while the service requirement tends to be
longer.

Three-fourths of all plans have no age requirement at all.

For those that do, age 50 and 55 are most common.
ments are almost universal, however.

40

39

Service require

Table III-4 shows age and service

requirements for 70 plans included in a recent study by the Bankers
Trust Company of New York.

Several pronounced trends are revealed by

comparing the results of a similar study covering plans negotiated in
the period from 1956 to 1959 with plans negotiated in the period from
1960 to 1965.

Table III-4.

Disability Retirement Provisions.

Retirement Provision

1960-65 Plans

1956-59 Plans

10%
38%
33%
13%
6%

16%
54%
1%
13%
16%

Age 50 After 15 Years Service
15 Years Service Only
10 Years Service Only
Other Age and Service Requirement
No Disability Retirement Provided

Source: Bankers Trust Company, 1965 Study of Industrial Retirement
Plans, New York, 1965, p. 17.

Particularly evident is the increase in the proportion of plans
having disability retirement provisions.
1953-55

39
40
41

41

It increased from 80% in

to 84% in 1956-59, and to 94% in 1960-65.

Bankers Trust Co.,

0 £.

cit., p. 17.

BLS Bui. 1284, p. 37.
Bankers Trust Co.,

0 £,

cit., p. 17.

Another trend is

53
toward liberalization of service requirements.

In 1956-59, plans re

quiring 15 years service predominated; in 1960-65, one-third required
10 years service.
Insofar as the benefit amount is concerned, the disability pension
is equal to the normal retirement benefit in most plans.

In the few

42
that differ, most provide benefits that are higher.

In more than

half of the plans, the disability benefit is reduced by the amount of
other disability benefits received, such as Workmen's Compensation.
There is a trend toward elimination of such offsets, however.

43

Benefits To Bfe Received
To a retiring employee probably the most important element of a
pension plan is the method of computing the benefit and the amount
thereof.

Most authorities believe that the benefit should equal

approximately 50%, of the employee's money wage during the last few
years of employment.

44

There has so far been little effort to adjust

benefits to reflect price level changes.

However, the periodic r e 

negotiation of most plans probably results in some adjustments made on
the basis of the changing purchasing power of the dollar.

If such is

the case, the need for built-in adjustment machinery is minimized.
■ One writer estimates that a retirement plan which, when combined
with OASDI benefits, provides a gross benefit equal to 507. of gross

42BLS Bui. 1284, p. 38.
43

Bankers Trust Company, o£. cit., p. 17.

^ S t r o n g , o p . cit., p, 42 and Dan M. McGill, Fundamentals of
Private Pensions, (Homewood,„Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1964),

l?: 59.------------ —
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pre-retirement income will give an employee a spendable retirement in
come equal to 65% of disposable income prior to retirement.

This

apparent incongruity results from the fact that disposable income more
nearly approximates gross income after retirement than it does before
retirement.

For the retiree, gross and spendable income are brought

closer together because:

(1) numerous payroll deductions cease;

(2) no income tax is collected on OASDI benefits, and; (3) the retiree
45
falls into a lower income tax bracket.
For the most part, pension plans now in effect do provide retire
ment income which meets the 50 percent test.

Also, the great majority

of industrial plans provide a retirement income equal to or greater
than the "modest but adequate" income for a retired couple as computed
by the Department of Labor.

For most areas the Department found that

$3,000 a year would be sufficient to maintain an aged couple.

46

A

review of the statistics used in arriving at this figure indicates
that the $3,000 may be more "modest" than "adequate" however.

The

life of a washing machine is projected at 15 years; the couple is
allocated 64<? per year for pots and pans;the television set must be
kept operational on $1.22 per year.

47

Expenditure levels such as

these could hardly be expected to allow most couples to maintain any
thing near their accustomed standard of living.

^Strong,

0 £.

cit., p. 41.

^ M a r g a r e t S. Stotz, "The BLS Interim Budget for a Retired
Couple," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 83, No. 11, 1960, p. 1142.
47Ibid., p. 1155.
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It is true, however, that the need for cash income is generally
less for an aged couple than for the young.
paid for by age 65.

Many will have their home

It is a common practice to write life insurance

programs so that policies are paid up by retirement age.

Children are

likely to have become financially independent and possibly capable of
contributing to the support of the parents.

Many will have sources of

income other than that provided by retirement plans.

Finally, it is

generally accepted that needs diminish with advancing age.

The newly

inaugurated Medicare program provides protection in the one area in
which needs are most likely to increase.
As will be discussed later, some plans are designed to provide a
retirement income which is at least partially determined by earnings
before retirement.

Under such a system, retirement income is to a

certain degree tied to a retiree's attained standard of living.
Other plans provide benefits independent of past earnings but which
are strongly influenced by years of service.

This latter type plan

obviously gives less consideration to maintaining a worker's pre
retirement standard of living than does those influenced by earnings.
Of course, where seniority is the basis of advancement, which is often
the case where there are negotiated plans, years of service and
earnings tend to advance together.

Roughly, the same result may be

achieved by the different approaches.
Before delving into the methods of computing benefits, it is
necessary to distinguish between two manners in which a plan's under
taking may be expressed.
study.

Only one of these will be germane to this

The obligation assumed by the employer may take two forms.

One

approach is referred to as a defined contribution plan under which the
firm asstimes the responsibility of making fixed periodic contributions
to a pension fund.

The benefit to be received is treated as a variable

factor and depends primarily on the number of retirements under the
plan and the earning experience of the fund.

This type plan is very

rarely found among industrial retirement systems.

It is most preva

lent among public retirement plans and plans established by public
utilities and non-profit institutions to whom it is attractive because
the outlay is known m

advance.
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The second type plan may be referred to as a defined benefit plan.
Under this arrangement, the benefit is established by formula and the
contribution is treated as the variable factor.

The following discus

sion is concerned only with defined benefit type plans as this is the
arrangement found in industrial pension systems.
There are three methods of computing benefits currently in vogue.
One method actually requires no computation as it provides for a flat
monthly benefit once eligibility has been established.

This method is

commonly used by craft unions of the AFL-CIO and by the Teamsters
Union.

49

This method of arriving at benefits payable will be of little

^McGill, o£. cit., p. 61.

49

U. S. Department of Labor, Digest of One-Hundred Selected
Pension Plans Under Collective Bargaining, Winter 1957-5 8 , BLS B u i ,
No. 1232, p. 4 and U. S. Department of Labor, Digest of One-Hundred
Selected Pension Plans Under Collective Bargaining, Spring, 1961,
BLS Bui. No. 1307, passim.
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importance to the present study as the plans to be examined herein all
cover industrial workers.
Another method of computing benefits is by formula based on earn
ings and service.

Finally, benefits may be computed by giving a fixed

monthly benefit for each year of service without regard to past
earnings.

These two latter methods are discussed in some detail below.

A. Benefits Determined by Formula Based on Average Earnings
and Years of Service
Computation of benefits on the basis of earnings during past
employment is based upon the philosophy that an employee should receive
a benefit which is in some way correlated with both earnings and
service.

Such a benefit formula typically provides that the monthly

pension shall be a given percent (usually 1 to 1%%) of average monthly
earnings during the last ten years of employment times years of
service.

This type formula has come to be known as the "steel pattern"

as it is commonly used in plans negotiated by the United Steel Workers
and the nation's major steel firms.

A limit is often set on the years

of service which may be used in computing the benefit.

In the 1961

USW - U. S. Steel agreement, no more than 35 years service may be used
in the computation.

An $80 offset against Social Security benefits

was also p r o v i d e d U n d e r

these conditions, a worker would be

eligible for a gross pension (OASDI plus private plan benefit) of
$197, assuming:

50U. S. Department of Labor, BLS Bui. No. 1307, p. 34.
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a. 1% of average earnings is taken
b. $500 per month was the workers' average earnings during
the last 10 years
c. The employee had 30 years of credited service
d. The worker is eligible for $127 OASDI benefit (minus
$80 offset).
A variant of this type benefit formula is used by the Aluminum
Workers.

The 1961 Aluminum Workers - Alcoa contract provided ‘that the

annual pension would be 1.25 percent of total past earnings.

Total

earnings were limited, however, to wages received during the last 40
years.

A man with 30 years service who had averaged $5,000 per year

would thus have total earnings of $150,000, 1,25% of which is $1,875.00.
The monthly private pension would therefore be $156.25.
allowed an $80 OASDI offset.
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This plan also

As will be discussed later, there is

a trend toward elimination of the offset against OASDI benefits.
B. Benefits Determined by Fixed Monthly Benefit for Each Year
of Service Without Regard to Earnings
A large number of industrial pension plans provide that the
monthly benefit shall be determined by multiplying a fixed sum by
years of service.

The emphasis here is of course on service.

All

workers who have equal service receive the same benefit under this type
plan, irrespective of what differences may have existed between their
wage rates before retirement.

This type benefit formula is commonly

used by the United Automobile Workers and is therefore known as the
"automobile pattern."
Where this formula is used, the flat amount may vary by time
periods.

For instance, the plan negotiated by Ford Motor Company and

51BLS Bui. No. 1307, p. 36.
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the Automobile Workers in 1961 provided that the monthly benefit would
be service times $2.50 for years of service after December 31, 1958,
$2.43 for service during 1958, and $2.40 for each year of service prior
52
to January 1, 1958.
It is common for the fixed amount to be raised somewhat in each
succeeding three-year contract.

The raises accrue primarily to future

retirees however, since they are seldom retroactive.

It is obvious in

the Ford plan mentioned above, that a man who retired after 1958 would
get a larger pension than a man of equal service who retired prior to
that year.
To make benefit increases retroactive would undoubtedly place an
onerous burden on an employer whose past funding practice was based
on lower benefit levels.

Too, unions are necessarily more responsive

to the desires of present membership than to past members.
Some plans differentiate between "past service" and "future
service" in computing benefits.

As used in the plans, "past service"

indicates service prior to plan adoption, while "future service"
refers to service after plan adoption.

Thus, under a plan adopted-in

1950, all service after that time would be regarded as future service.
The distinction is important in plans that make the differentiation
since past service yields a smaller benefit for the same amount of
service and earnings than does future service.

As the plans get older,

the distinction will become less and less significant as fewer and
fewer employees will have "past service."
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Ibid.

The distinction is often

60

necessary to avoid having a firm assume a full blown pension obligation
without the benefit of past funding.

It will undoubtedly continue to

appear in new plans.
C. Special Payments Under the Steel Formula
Steel industry plans since 1960 have contained provisions for
special one-time payments to retirees.

The steel plans call for a

lump-sum payment equal to thirteen weeks pay at the time of retirement.
It has been estimated that the special payments would run from $1,300
to $1,500.
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The 1962 U. S. Steel - United Steelworkers' agreement

provided extended vacations for employees on the upper half of the
seniority list.

An employee may forego the long vacations and defer

receipt of the vacation pay until retirement if he chooses.

The lump

sum payment may therefore exceed the figure quoted above by a
substantial amount.

54

A few plans outside the steel industry have been amended to
include this type special payment.
has developed, however.
tain no such provision.

Nothing describable as a trend

The most recent automobile industry plans con55

D. Survivor Benefits
Regardless of how the benefit is computed, its amount at normal
retirement age may be affected by survivor benefits which are being
made available to an increasing number of retirees.

Under a plan

^ S t a t e m e n t by USW President David McDonald in the New York
Times, Jan. 6, 1960, p. 43,
"^Bernstein,

ojd.

" ^ Ibid. , p . 36.

cit., p. 31.
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without such provisions or for an employee who does not elect certain
options, all private pension benefits cease at the death of the pen
sioner.

The result is that the widow is left solely dependent on the

survivor's benefit under the Social Security system (currently 82%% of
the husband's primary benefit, or a maximum of $138.60).

Even this

benefit is payable only if the widow is "aged" (over 62) or has de
pendent children.

A "young" widow without dependents receives no

benefit until age 62.

The result is that, there is a considerable gap

in pension coverage for millions of workers and their dependents, most
of whom no doubt assume that they are fully protected against income
loss during old age.

Although one writer professed in 1952 to be

"really astonished" that this gap has been allowed to remain,
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efforts

to close it have only just recently been made.
Pension plans may provide protection for survivors in two ways:
(1) under provisions by which death benefit payments automatically are
made to survivors upon the death of the pensioner, and;

(2) by joint

and survivor options which allows the worker the option of surrendering
part of his regular pension to provide protection for survivors.
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The first mentioned type of death benefit may take a variety of
forms, none of them dependent on the prior choice of the worker.
They are integral parts of the plan and so automatically commence upon
the death of a retiree.

Some plans provide for lump-sum payments to

“^Hilary Seal, "Are Widows' and Orphans' Benefits Practicable,"
Journal of Commerce, June 12, 1952, p. 26.
57u. s. Department of Labor, Pension Plans Under Collective
Bargaining: Benefits for Survivors, Winter 1961-6 2 , BLS B u i . N o .
1334, 1962, p. 1.
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the worker's beneficiary immediately following his death.

Some plans

provide that the widow will receive some portion of the worker's pension
until she dies, or, in some cases, re-marries.

Finally, a plan may

contain a device known as "payment certain" under which a pensioner is
guaranteed a minimum number of pension payments - often 60.

Should he

die before receiving the full number of guaranteed payments, those re
maining are made to his beneficiary.

Should he live to collect the

"payment certain" in full, further benefits are coincident with his
lifetime.
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In 1962, it was estimated that about 1 out of 6 industrial workers
were under plans which provided some form of death benefit.

Eligi

bility for such a benefit was commonly dependent on the fulfillment
of some age and/or service requirement.
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Possibly more important in providing protection for survivors is
the joint and survivor's option under which the worker is allowed to
choose to receive a reduced benefit until his death, following which
a previously determined benefit is payable for life to his designated*
joint annuitant.

The following is the type of pension plan provision

which allows such an option;
An employee may, before the due date of the first payment
of his normal disability, or early pension, elect to
convert such pension into an optional form of benefit of
equivalent actuarial value,60

58Ibid., p. 2
59jbid., p. 4
60 Ibid.

A number of plans make the option available only in case of normal
retirement, so that employees who retire early or because of disability
lose the right of election.^
As indicated above, the worker who opts for the survivor benefit
must accept a lower regular pension because of the additional obliga
tion which is assumed by the plan.

The amount by which the normal

benefit is reduced depends on the age and sex of both the pensioner
and his joint annuitant at the time of the worker's retirement.
Standard actuarial tables are used to make these computations, so that
a pensioner with a young female joint annuitant would receive a
benefit considerably reduced as a result of exercising such an option.
To leave his wife a benefit equal to one-half his own, a man retiring
at age 65 would receive a benefit reduced by about 20%.

(This assumes
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the wife to be 5 years younger than her husband).
Under the 1961 automobile industry agreements, the regular
pension is reduced by only 12%%.

The cost of providing the larger

benefit is absorbed by the companies.

Too, only a spouse may be named

as beneficiary, whereas, under most plans the worker can name anyone
with an insurable interest as beneficiary.
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To avoid adverse selection, all plans require that the option be
exercised before the attainment of some age or some specified point in
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time before retirement.

There is considerable variation among plans,

but a common provision requires that the option be exercised three
years before retirement or before reaching age 62.

Some plans allow a

worker to exercise the option after the specified age or point in time
upon presentation of evidence of good health, usually a physical
• «.•
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examination.
As desirable as joint and survivor options appear to be, they do
not seem to have been fully accepted by workers.

Under one plan

covering several thousand workers, a union official reported that,
"Not a single retiring worker elected the option in our tool and die
plan."
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In explaining this lack of worker interest, two possibilities
suggest themselves.

First, lack of understanding of what the survivors

option is designed to accomplish is probably widespread among workers.
Indeed, many probably do not know the option exists.

Since it must be

exercised years in advance of retirement, for some the knowledge that
it does exist

probably comes too late.

it should not

be too difficult to

If ignorance is the problem,

resolve.

A second possible explana

tion for the workers' disinterest is that exercise of the option leads
to benefit reductions so great as

to be unacceptable to the majority

of retirees.

a tendency to take the undiminished

There appears to be

benefit and gamble that it will be more favorable.

The worker is

64Ibid., p. 10.
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James Bindle (Director, UAW Social Security Dept.), "Organized
Labor's Objectives in Employee Benefits," 15th Annual Conference
Council on Employee Benefits, 1961, p. 18, Cited in Bernstein,
. cit., p. 33.
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generally in a poor position to assess the odds of whether the undi
minished benefit will yield a larger aggregate return than the joint
benefit.

Man's proclivity to accept present value in preference to

future value has been well established since the publication of Eugene
von Bohm-Bawerk's work in the latter part of the 19th. century.
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If

the disainutioa of present benefits is the difficulty, perhaps some
thing on the order of the automobile industry plan mentioned earlier
is the answer.
E . P r e -Retirement Death Benefits
The survivor benefits discussed above apply only if the pensioner
dies after■retirement.

They therefore provide no protection for the

survivors of an employee who dies shortly before retirement.

Some

authorities believe that a pension plan that does not provide pre67
retirement death benefits is "deficient" and "inequitable."

An

attempt to correct this apparent short-coming has been made in a few
industrial pension plans.
leader in this development.

The automobile industry appears to be the
Six recently amended plans in that in

dustry provide protection for survivors of employees who have attained
age 60 with credited service of ten years, o r falternately age 55, if
the decedent's age plus service totals 85.

These plans pay a monthly

benefit to the surviving spouse that is about 40% of the benefit

„

which would have been available had the deceased retired early.
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88See Eugene von Bohm-Bawerk. Capital and Interest, Translated
by Wm« Smart, (;New*Yor.kr-— Gt Ev Steckert arid Co. ] 1932), p.,.259«.'(The
original work appeared in Germany in 1884).
^ B a n k e r s Trust Company, oj>. ci t ., p. 21.
68Ibid.
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The provision of such benefits is an attempt to supplement group
insurance which is seldom adequate to provide lasting economic security,
to survivors.

Thirteen percent of the negotiated industrial plans in

cluded in a recent study (70 plans in all) had some type of
pre-retirement death benefit.
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:

It is too early to judge whether

these benefits will be made generally available to the nation's
industrial workers.
F, Provisions for Minimum and Maximum Benefits
Many industrial plans contain provisions designed to insure that
each employee will receive at least a subsistence level pension upon
retirement.

In some plans, the minimum is established by specific

provisions while in some it is inherent in provisions dealing with
eligibility and benefit computation.

Possibly in no other area of

pension planning is greater diversity to be found.

Some of the more

prevalent practices are outlined below, however, for illustrative
purposes.
In those plans which have provisions specifically establishing a
minimum, the following clauses are cited as typical:
A pension granted to an employee who shall have had
at least twenty-five years of continuous service at
the time of his retirement shall not be at a rate of
less than twelve hundred dollars per year and a
pension granted to an employee who shall have had
fifteen or more, but less than twenty-five years of
continuous service at the time of his retirement,
shall not be at a rate per year of less than that
part of twelve hundred dollars which the number of
years of his continuous service bears to twenty-five.

6^Ibid.
^Commerce.Clearing House, o£. cit., p, 313,
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This same contract provides that if the minimum monthly pension is
less than $65 the firm may make an actuarially equivalent lump-sum
payment.
Another contract states:
The minimum normal retirement allowance payable after
Hay 1, 1950, shall be determined as follows:
(i) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (ii)
below, the minimum normal retirement allowance shall
be an amount equal to $12 for each year of creditable
service not exceeding twenty years.
(ii) If a member has fifteen years or more of
creditable service at retirement, his ftormal re
tirement allowance shall in no event be less than
an amount which, together with his social security
benefits, shall equal $720 plus $48 for each year
of creditable service in excess of fifteen;years
but not exceeding twenty-five years.
This clause actually provides two methods of computing the minimum
for an employee with between 15 and 20 years service.

The amount of

his social security benefit would determine which was more favorable,.
For plans which follow the automobile pattern discussed earlier,
there is no necessity for a clause specifically establishing a
minimum.

Once a man has satisfied the 10-year eligibility requirement,

some benefit is payable, however small.

Thus, if the flat amount

payable for each year of service was $2.50, the minimum pension auto
matically would be $25.00 per month.
A minimum is established in the steel pattern plans by a clause
practically identical to that under which the normal benefit is
determined in the automobile industry.

^ Ibid., p. 314.

In the 1961 USW - U. S. Steel
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contract for instance, the plan provided that the minimum would be
$2.60 times years of service after December 31, 1959, and $2.50 times
years of service prior to January 1, 1960.
under the clause is 35 years.

Maximum creditable service

For low-wage, long-service employees,

the minimum formula yields a greater benefit than the regular percent/

of-earnings times years of service formula.
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A great number of plans contain no minimum benefit clause.

Of

the plans contained in a recent survey, 47% either contained no
minimum or provided for Social Security offsets which rendered the
73
minimum meaningless.
Plans covering industrial workers impose no maximum, per se, on
the pension benefit.

In the automobile pattern plans, there is an

automatic limitation since the benefit is determined by multiplying
a flat dollar amount times years of service.

The years of service

which an employee can accumulate is obviously finite.

In those plans

which relate benefits to both compensation and years of service, there
has been no attempt to establish a maximum.

Where they exist, always

in plans covering high income salaried personnel, they tend to be
quite liberal - ranging up to $50,000 per year.
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The purpose of such

a provision is to provide a hedge against having contributions to the
plan declared taxable by the Treasury on the basis of discrimination

72BLS Bui. No. 1307, p. 35.
73

Bankers Trust Company,

^ I b i d . , p . 30.

0 £.

c i t ., p. 28
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in favor of highly paid employees.^

Tax-exempt qualification of a

plan will be discussed later in this chapter.
G . Benefits Inclusive and Exclusive of Social Security Benefits
Benefits under private plans may be integrated with OASDI benefits
in two ways, the "excess" method and the "offset" method.
At present, both OASDI taxes and benefits are dependent upon
income up to $6,600 per year.

Once a worker passes this level, no

additional taxes are paid on his behalf by either himself or his
employer, nor are benefits affected by annual earnings in excess of
this amount.

The primary OASDI benefit is therefore higher as a per

cent of pre-retirement income for an employee making less than $6,600
annually than it is for a worker making more.

In order to allow for

benefits on roughly equal terms, the "excess" method of integration
has been developed.

In establishing rules to determine whether a plan

is discriminatory in favor of high income personnel, the Treasury
specified that a plan would not lose its tax exempt status if the
employer made contributions into a special pension plan for earnings
in excess of $6,600.
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Following this lead, a number of firms have

established secondary plans into which contributions are made on
earnings in excess of $6,600.

These "excess" plans are commonly con

tributory and optional with employees.
The excess method of integration is rare among plans covering
industrial workers.

Obviously designed for high income employees, it

^Commerce Clearing House, oj>. cit., p. 314.
■^Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Sec. 401(a)(5).
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has been adopted almost exclusively for the benefit of salaried
personnel ,77
The offset method of OASDI and private plan integration provides
that all or some portion of the primary public benefit is to be
deducted from benefits otherwise payable by the private plan.

So, for

example, a plan which provided a $300 monthly pension would entail a
private benefit of only $132 if total offset was provided and if the
worker was eligible for the maximum OASDI primary benefit of $168.
Many objections have been raised to the offset method.
it seems poor psychology.

To many

The worker may feel that both the public and

the private benefits are earned, and to have the one partially cancel
the other generates ill will.

The worker might very well argue that

half of the OASDI benefit comes from his own contributions.

This fact

is sometimes recognized by providing that only half of the primary
OASDI benefit will be deducted.

Finally, under the offset scheme of

things, the workers do not benefit by an increase in the OASDI
benefit.78
Possibly because of these objections, offset provisions have been
recently eliminated from a large number of plans.

More often the rule

than the exception in the early 1950s, one recent Department of Labor
study showed that only 20% of the employees included in the survey were
under plans with offset provisions.
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Bernstein, oj>. cLt., p. 30.

^ M c G i l l , op. cit., p. 76.
79BLS Bui. No. 1284, p. 7.
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The trend toward making private
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benefits independent of benefits under OASDI is expected to continue.

Financing Arrangements
A. Contributory versus Non-Contributory Flans
A contributory pension plan requires contributions from both the
employer and the employee.

Under a non-contributory plan, all funds

are provided by the firm.
Insofar as negotiated plans are concerned, contributory plans
have been gradually diminishing in importance.

In 1950, it was esti

mated that 757c. of all workers covered by pensions received these
benefits on a non-contributory basis.
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By 1963, this figure had
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increased to 80%.

Many writers believe that this movement toward

non-contributory plans results directly from the fact that employer
contributions to plans are tax deductible while employee contributions are not.
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The 1949 Steel Industry Fact Finding Board based its

recommendation for non-contributory plans on this basis.

As the tax

laws currently stand, a dollar contributed by the employer results in
a larger benefit than an equal-cost contribution by an employee because
the latter must contribute out of after-tax income.

It was soon

discovered that an employee could be given a "raise" equal to his

on
McGill, o£. c i t ., p. 76.
Ol

Evan Keith Rowe, Health, Insurance, and Pension Plans in
Union Contracts, BLS Bui. No. 1187, p. 5.
82BLS Bui. No, 1407, p. 63.
QQ

William Haddad, "Impact of Tax Policy on Private Pensions,"
in Dan M. McGill (ed.), Pensions: Problems and Trends (Homewood,
Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955), pT 76.
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pension contribution b y having the employer assume the pension contri
bution.

An employer could therefore increase the take-home pay of an

employee by a given amount with less cost than if the regular wage
was increased.

The trend toward non-contributory plans therefore

rests on an economic basis as well as the fact that AFL-CIO leadership
has been unanimous in advocating employer financed plans.
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There are, however, some rather compelling arguments in favor of
jointly financed plans.
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For one thing, the worker generally has

rights under a contributory plan that are not ceded him where the
employer alone contributes.

Upon separation (before retirement and

for whatever reason) the employee can claim his own contributions plus
interest (however nominal - 2 to 3% in most cases).

If the deferred

wage concept of pensions is accepted it might appear to be in the in
terest of justice to give him all contributions made in his behalf,
regardless of who made them.

In practice, only his own contributions

are returned unless he has gained a vested right.

Further, vesting,

which is the right to a benefit financed by employer contributions even
after separation, is much more common in contributory plans.
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This

is doubly important in view of the fact that employee contributions
under a contributory plan are generally small in: relation to contri
butions by the employer.

It is a rare plan that calls for employee
87

contributions in excess of $100 annually.

^Berns t e i n ,

c i t ., p. 221,

®->These arguments are developed in some detail by Bernstein,
o p . cit., pp. 217-223.
^^Sernstein, _op. c i t ., 217.
87BLS Bui. No. 1232, passim.
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The tax savings previously discussed has perhaps been given too
much weight.

The taxpayer with a wife and two children and a gross in'

come of $4,000 to $5,000 simply does not pay that much in taxes.
Finally, benefits under contributory plans tend to be higher.
Obviously, a given contribution by the employer will provide a larger
benefit if matched to some extent by the employee.
A counter-argument against contributory plans is that they cannot
be made compulsory and are therefore likely to result in adverse
selection, with older workers joining and younger workers staying out.
Several states, however, have employee retirement plans which are both
contributory and compulsory.

Requiring a worker to join such a plan

is hardly more coercive than requiring him to join a union and pay
dues, and in some cases, no more costly.
Whatever the relative merits of contributory versus non
contributory plans, there is little logic in making employer
contributions tax deductible while requiring employees to contribute
in after tax dollars.

The self-employed have been allowed to

establish pension funds for themselves on a tax deductible basis
i

since 1962.

In the same year, it was estimated that employee con-

tributions to pension funds was $440 million.
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Even if a 20%

average tax rate is assumed, the revenue loss from exemption of these
contributions would be only $88 million.

In the long-run, the loss

would be much less than this, as pension benefits resulting from the
employee's contribution would be taxable.

®®U. S. Security and Exchange Commission, Corporate Pension
Funds, 196 2 , Release No, 1902, Statistical Series, 1963, p. 3.
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It nevertheless appears that the tendency toward making pension
plans non-contributory will continue.

Employers in large segments of

American industry have accepted the arrangement.

Trade unions can be

expected to continue their opposition to contributory, plans, the fact
that they are committed to the contributory principle of the OASDI
program notwithstanding.
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Finally, if the practice of "package"

bargaining continues to gain favor, the question will become less and
less important.
B . Funding
As indicated earlier, one of the most controversial issues in
pension planning involves funding.

Some conflict arises over the

funding method, i.e., just how much will be set aside and by whom,
but more heat is generated over the issue of the funding agency and
who shall control it.
Insofar as the funding method is concerned, the source of the dis
agreement is easily pinpointed.

By its very nature, a pension plan

creates obligations which often run into millions of dollars.

The

precise amount of the obligation is always unknown, however, since
many of the costs will not be met for decades and can be estimated
only within a wide range of possibilities.

Actuarial experience lags

behind practice, and the periodic revision of plans aggravates the
uncertainty.

In recent years, wide fluctuations in fund earnings has

confounded an already muddled situation.

"
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Nelson Cruikshank, "Some Labor Views on the Social Security
Program" in Proceedings, Industrial Relations Research Association,
1953, p. 183,
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This uncertainty; as

to the future costs and therefore the need

for current funding has led many industrial firms to adopt plans under
which the amount of funding is periodically computed, but never known
in advance.

So long as the obligation assumed is highly uncertain,

there seems to be no alternative.
the contribution must be variable.

And, so long as the benefit is fixed,
The General Motors - UAW plans

contain the following provision:
The Corporation agrees to pay over irrevocably to the
trustee or insurance company as of each anniversary of
the effective date of the plan during the period of
this agreement, contributions or payments for the pension
plan in the amount.,, as determined and certified as of
each anniversary date by one or more actuaries chosen
by, but independent of, the Corporation, and qualified
through Fellowship in the Society of Actuaries.
Other plans achieve essentially the same result as the General
Motor's, plan by providing that the employer will put into the fund so
many cents per hour or any portion thereof as may be needed to main
tain the plan in a "sound actuarial condition,"

In these plans, the

fixed cents-per-hour-worked serves as a maximum on the amount which the
firm can be called upon to contribute in any given year.
As previously noted, the steel pattern plans obligate a firm only
to pay pensions when due.

Any fund established is at the discretion

of the firm and can therefore be increased or diminished as management
of the firm sees fit.

Fiscal prudence has led to funding roughly

equivalent to that in industries in which the contribution is

^ Supplemental Agreement Between General Motors Corporation and
the UAW-AFL-CIO, 1958, Section 2(b).
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contractual, however.

In cases such as this, practice is more impor

tant than formal plan provisions.
The controversy over the funding agency cannot be solved by
leaving the decision to the future, however.

Nor can the matter of

pension fund management be so easily disposed of.

These decisions

have to be made prior to the creation of a fund.
The financial institution which is selected to receive contribu
tions is known as the funding agency.

The contractual obligation

under which the funding agency operates is known as the funding
instrument.
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The Department of Internal Revenue makes it mandatory that the
funding agency be distinct from the contributing firm if contributions
are to be tax deductible.

Whatever control that may be exercised over

the fund must therefore be explicit in the funding instrument.
In industrial pension plans, the funding agency is almost univer92
sally a pension trust.

Such devices as purchases of individual

annuity contracts, group annuity contracts, and deferred annuity
contracts are rapidly losing favor except among some public utilities
and insurance firms.

These devices are devised by life insurance

companies to provide retirement income to those wishing to purchase a
paid up annuity.

Under the group annuity contract, contributions are

not used to purchase individual annuity contracts, but are held in an
undivided account.
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As each participant reaches retirement age or dies,

McGill, ££. cit., p. Ill,
Bankers Trust Company, oja. cit., p. 30.
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an amount is withdrawn from the fund and used to provide individual
benefits.

Under the group deferred annuity arrangement, no refund or

benefit is available should a participant die before annuity payments
commence.

The purchase price of such an annuity is reduced by the

assumption of a given mortality rate among participants.
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Insurance

companies favor such devices for obvious reasons, while the definitely
determinable cost probably appeals to the regulated utility firms.
The pension trust as a funding agency will be the chief concern of
this study since, as noted above, it is the device commonly used by
industrial firms.
Under the pension trust arrangement contributions are made to a
group of trustees which, as noted above, must constitute a legal
entity separate and distinct from the contributing firm.

The Internal

Revenue Code requires that contributions be irrevocable so that monies
once placed in the trust are forever beyond the reach of the firm.
The trust administers the fund and pays benefits according to provi
sions in the funding instrument.

This does not mean, however, that

the firm exercises no control over the fund.

Control over such

matters as investment of the fund may rest with the contributing firm
either through provisions in the funding instrument or the right to
change trustees at will.
The explosive growth of pension trust funds has created a number
of perplexing problems.

The growing size of the pension funds promises

to materially alter some of our basic economic relationships.

^McGill, o£, cit., p. 157,

At the
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present time, estimates of pension fund assets vary from $70 to $80
billion.

Further, they are increasing by about 10 percent annually, so

that by the end of this decade the figure will be in the $120 to $130
94
billion range.
In the period from 1953 to 1957, corporate pension funds purchased
the equivalent of one-fifth of all the new corporate securities offered
for sale.

If the comparison is limited to common stock, net purchases

by the pension trusts equaled 30 percent of the value of all such newly
issued securities.
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While the growth of such institutional purchas

ing promises to add stability to the stock market, it also creates
serious problems of concentrated economic power.
The problem of concentration is aggravated by another difficulty
previously alluded to, i.e., just what is the legal nature of a pension
trust.

Economists have long mulled such problems as the concentration

of power inherent in the nation's corporate structure and the increas
ing separation of ownership and control.

The advance of pension

trusts add a new dimension to these difficulties.

The trusts hold

title to billions of dollars worth of property, but who owns the
trusts?

This is the problem.

Insofar as the corporation or even the

corporate holding company is concerned, there is, after all, an
ultimate owner who in the final analysis can be identified and can
control, however infrequently that power may be exercised.

One writer

refers to the pension trusts as "vast aggregations of wealth upon which

94
Harbrecht, o£. cit., p. 245-46.
^Harbrecht, o£. cit., p. 229.
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many have claims but of which no one can call himself owner."
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Just

as control has ceased to be an operating reality for many owners of
stock, ownership itself is diminishing as a reality insofar as one
thinks of ownership as ultimately residing in persons.

A legal title

ultimately held by a disembodied legal entity boggles the senses.
new form of property law and rights will have to be developed.

Some

Pre

viously established doctrines of trust law simply do not fit the
situation.
To an ever increasing extent these funds are leaving
the realm of usually understood trust principles and
are posing an entirely new concept for dealing with
property that has no parallel elsewhere in law.97
Possibly more important than establishing ownership is the problem
of control over billions of dollars worth of property.
misuse are clear and present.
is well documented.

The dangers of

Misuse of funds by the Teamster Union

In testimony before a Senate committee, it was

revealed that Teamster pension funds had been used to support the in
cumbent Montgomery Ward management in a proxy fight.

One witness

testified that the Teamsters were rewarded by a contract containing
provisions to which the firm had formerly been "unalterably opposed,"

98

The Laundry Workers Union allegedly engaged in similar improper
99
practices in collusion with insurance and employer representatives.

" ibid., p. 4.
" s e n a t e Report No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, p. 67.
98

Senate Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds, Hearings
on Senate Resolution 4 0 , 84th Congr., 1st Sess., 1955, Part 3, p. 1170.
"ibid.
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While the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 1958 (which
grew out of the above hearings) will probably prevent the more flagrant
offenses, control over billions of dollars can be improperly used in
many subtle and nefarious ways.

And, even assuming competent and

honest administration, the problem of concentration will remain.
The desire of unions to participate in pension fund administration
has been previously discussed.

Joint administration would provide an

additional check on the management of trust funds, providing that one
party does not resign its powers to the other.
might also fail on another score.

Joint administration

Collusion between parties of sup

posedly divergent interests is not unknown.
C. Vesting
Vesting may be defined as the right of an employee to leave the
service of an employer prior to his normal retirement date without
forfeiture of his accrued pension.
Vesting provisions of one type or another are almost universal in
industrial pension plans.

In a 1965 survey, 94% of all plans examined

contained a vesting provision.

Previous studies showed that in 1955

only 41% of plans provided some form of vesting, but by 1959 the
figure had grown to 82%.

100

A plan without some type of vesting pro

vision is rapidly becoming a rarity.
Vesting may be accomplished by any one of three methods: deferred
full vesting; deferred graded vesting; and immediate full vesting.

100
Bankers Trust Company, o£. cit., p. 19.
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Under deferred full vesting, a worker who has satisfied certain
age and/or service requirements retains a claim on all accrued bene-;
fits, .payable,!in most>’cases, af normal retirement age.

Thus* a

long service employee who terminates at, say, age 50 becomes eligible
for a pension from the firm upon retirement even though fifteen years
may well have elapsed between his termination and his date of retire
ment.

The 1958 General Motors - UAW agreement states that any worker

who terminates "shall, if such employee has attained age 40 but not age
60, be eligible for pension commencing at age 65 provided the credited
service of such employee at separation is at least 10 years."

Under

this plan, a worker may elect early retirement at age 60, which
accounts for the "but not age 60" restriction.

As with the normal

retirement benefit in the automobile pattern plans, the benefit is
computed by multiplying years of service times a flat benefit.

Service

prior to age 30 is not counted under the vesting provision, however.
Under deferred graded vesting, the worker acquires a claim to a
certain percentage of accrued benefits, with the percentage increas
ing as additional requirements are met.

For instance, a plan may

grant a vested right to 50 percent of accrued benefits after 10 year's
service with an additional 10 percent vesting for each additional
year of service.

Under such a provision, deferred full vesting

results after 15 years of service.
typical of such a provision.
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The following is offered as

"

'^'''Commerce Clearing House, o£, cit., p. 323.
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In the event :a member ceases to be an eligible employee
or in case of voluntary or involuntary termination of
service for reasons other than early retirement, death,
or disability, a member shall have a vested.interest in
the amount of contributions paid or payable to the fund
by the Company for the purpose of funding the member's
benefits, plus interest, as computed by the actuary, in
accordance with the following table:
Years of Service

Percent of Equity Vested

Less than 10 Years
10 Years
11 Years
12 Years
13 Years
14 Years
15 Years

0%

Under immediate full vesting, a worker begins to accumulate
vested rights to the full extent of contributions on his behalf as
soon as he becomes a plan participant.
service is required.

No minimum age or years of

The apparent liberality of this type clause is

often restricted by denying the right to participate in the plan to
employees under 30 years of age.
Of these vesting methods, deferred full vesting is by far the
most common.

A 1958 Department of Labor study of 174 plans showed

that 154 had deferred full vesting, 19 had deferred graded vesting,
and one had immediate full vesting.

102

There is considerable evidence that vesting provisions provide
less actual protection than is commonly believed.

In the view of one

expert, a vesting clause may be so constructed as to be almost costless
to the firm.

102BLS Bui. No. 1259, p. 4.
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I don't think there is any feature in a plan that gives
you more good for the money it costs than vesting, pro
viding you set the vesting point where it doesn't cost
you anything.
And that is what you can do... With a
typical type of vesting after 15 years t o .20 years of
service and the payment (sic) at age 40 or 45, the turn
over is so negligible thereafter that the cost is
^
merely the absence of refunds you would otherwise get.
According to this philosophy, the age and service requirements
should be set so high as to effectively nullify the vesting provision.
What are the age and service requirements in industrial pension
plans?

Is there any discernible trend to change these requirements?

These questions will be dealt with in turn as they obviously have a
direct bearing on the efficacy of vesting provisions.
Of the 174 plans studied by the Department of Labor in 1958, 13%
had a service requirement only.

Roughly half of these required 10

years service, close to one-fourth required 15 years service, and the
rest required 20 or more years service.

104

In a recent survey cover

ing 652,638 automobile workers, 60% had less than 10 years service
and 75% had less than 15.

105

Obviously, a substantial portion of

these employees could not qualify for a vested benefit under the above
requirements.
In the same Department of Labor study, 65% of the 174 plans con
tained both an age and service requirement.

103

Of these, about half

Statement of John M. Hines, Director of Group Annuities,
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, before the
California Personnel Management Association.
Quoted in Bernstein,
o p . cit., p. 245.
104BLS Bui. No. 1259, p. 7.
'^-’Bernstein, o£. cit. , p. 246.
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required age 40 and 10 years of service.
age 40 and 15 years of service.

More than one-fourth required

The remaining plans had requirements

ranging up to age 55 and 25 years of service.
The remaining 22% of the 174 plans in this study provided some
alternative minimum requirement, such as age 45 and 10 years service
or 15 years service regardless of age.
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The adding of age requirements to the service requirement obviously
restricts eligibility further.

In a 1955 survey covering 1.8 million

employees, only 11.4% of the workers under age 45 had 10 years of
service with one employer,
years.

107

and

but 4.4% had service of 15 or more

_
,
..
, .
This survey covered seven metropolitan areas and is prob

ably representative of industrial experience elsewhere.

It thus

appears that the majority of the nation's industrial workers fail to
qualify for vesting because they cannot satisfy the age and service
requirements.
On the question of whether the requirements for vesting are being
relaxed, the answer is a qualified yes.

Of 100 plans studied in 1961,

eleven had liberalized the conditions for vesting in one way or
another since 1958.
significant.
one year.

While some of the changes were slight, a few were

One plan reduced the minimum service requirement by only

Four of the plans reduced the service requirement by 5

years, however.

Still, in none of them was it reduced to less than 10

106BLS Bui. No. 1259, p. 7.
107

U. S. Department of Labor, Older Worker Adjustment to Labor
Market Practices, Bureau of Employment Security Bulletin No. R151,
1956, p. 41.

years.

The other changes served to bring the plans involved more into

line with general practice, i.e., inordinately high age or service re
quirements were reduced.

There was no indication of a tendency to

depart from the more or less standardized age requirements of 40 or
45 or the usual service requirements of 10 or 15 years.

The 1965 study

by the Bankers Trust Company supports the conclusion that there is a
tendency to reduce requirements to these levels, but not to go below
them.
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If this turns out to be the case, vesting may well be as

costless as indicated by the comment quoted earlier.

And, it might be

added, as devoid of benefits.
D. Tax Exempt Qualification
Employer contributions to pension plans are tax deductible if
the plan meets certain requirements laid down by the Internal Revenue
Service.

The funds are later taxed as personal income to the pen

sioner, however.

Employee contributions to pension plans must be made

out of after-tax income.

Pension payments resulting from the employee's

own contributions are not taxed when received, except to the extent
that there are accumulated interim earnings.

The tax exempt status of

employer contributions has nevertheless encouraged the establishment
of non-contributory plans as discussed earlier.
To qualify for tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue
Code

109

108

a pension plan must meet four broad requirements:

(1) the

Bankers Trust Company, o£. cit., p. 19.

1no
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Sections 401-404 and 501(a),
as amended by 76 Stat. 809 (1962), establishes the criteria by which
tax exempt status may be achieved.

86

plan and contributions thereto must be for the exclusive benefit of the
firm's employees;

(2) coverage under the plan must not be discrimina

tory in favor of officers1, stockholders, supervisory, or highly
compensated employees;

(3) it must be impossible for the firm to

divert use of the funds to itself until all liabilities to employees
and their beneficiaries have been s a t i s f i e d , a n d ;

(4) the pension

fund and earnings thereon must be distributed to employees or their
beneficiaries .'*''*''*' Whether or not a plan satisfies these requirements
is largely a matter of Internal Revenue Service judgment.

It is a

common practice to submit new plans to the IRS for an advance ruling.
The Treasury Department has also developed administrative regu
lations which must be adhered to by the contributing firm.

Specifically,

a plan will qualify for tax exempt status only if it is "a definite,
written program and arragement which is communicated to the employees."
Further, the plan must be "permanent" and "provide systematically for
the payment of definitely determinable benefits...."

112

110

The IRS has been quite liberal in allowing firms to invest
pension funds in their own stock and bonds, however. The limits
within which funds can be so used are rather ill defined thus far the principal concern of the IRS appears to be prevention of practices
inimical to the interest of covered employees.
See "Investment of
Pension and Profit Sharing Trust Funds in the Employer's Business
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954," 45 Minn. Law Review 575
(1961) .
Ill

Benefits accrued under a plan must vest when the plan is
discontinued. Termination of a plan may, however, result in r e 
covery of employer overpayments resulting from actuarial error.
To the extent that contributions are clearly excessive they are
not deductible when made.
See Carroll W. Boyce, How to Plan Pensions.
(McGraw-Hill Book Co^, Inc., 1950), p. 181.
•'•■^Treasury Regulation Sections 1.401-1 (a) (2) , 1 ,401-l(b) (1) (i)
and 1.401-l(b)(2), 1956.
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The "permanence" requirement has proven difficult to enforce.

The

Tax Court has been especially lenient in those cases in which an ade
quate business reason for plan termination can be proven.

The IRS has

stressed the time factor in determining permanence, i.e., a plan
terminated within a few years of its inception is suspect, while the
Court has been prone to give more weight to the circumstances under
113
which termination occurs.
Insofar as the "definitely determinable benefits" are concerned,
the employer must either submit a definite schedule of benefits or a
statement of contributions to be made.

In the latter case, the IRS

requires the submission of an actuarial analysis of benefits which will
114
result from the contributions.
Obviously, tax exempt status is not achieved by the insertion of
any particular provision in the plan.

It derives from the nature of a

plan's provisions when taken as a whole.

If the overall plan meets the

prerequisites outlined above, employer contributions are deductible
from gross revenue in arriving at taxable income.
Pension plan provisions as discussed in this chapter will serve
as the basis for comparing the several plans treated in Chapter IV.

113

Lincoln Electric Co. vs. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 326
(6th Cir. 1951) and McClintock-Trunkey C o . vs. Commissioner, 217
F. 2d 586 (7th Cir. 1953).
Cited in Bernstein, o£. cit., p. 199.
^■^Bernstein, o£. c i t ., p. 202.

88
CHAPTER IV

A COMPARISON OF SEVERAL MAJOR PLANS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PROVISIONS

As indicated in Chapter I, this Chapter is devoted to analyzing
and comparing pension plans in four major industries.

Included are

the automobile, steel, rubber, and petroleum refining industries.
The emphasis is primarily on the type of plan which is character
istic of each of these industries, i.e., no particular firm within an
industry is singled out for comparison with other firms in the same
industry.

This approach is taken because each of these industries has

a more or less distinct pattern.

Intra-industry comparison would

therefore result in tiresome repetition of identical or near-identical
plan provisions.

The references made to individual firm plans are

therefore primarily illustrative in nature and are not intended to
convey the notion that the particular provision mentioned is in any
way exclusive with that firm.

In those cases in which the firm de

parts from the industry's pattern, the departure is identified as such.
The analysis which follows coincides with the format established
in Chapter III.

Plan administration is considered first, with admin

istration in each of the four industries considered in turn.

This

method is designed to highlight inter-industry differences, with some
attention given to intra-industry differences where they are significant.
Following the examination of plan administration, the discussion
moves on to: eligibility required; benefit formulae, and;
financing arrangements.

Each of these major topics are subdivided in

accordance with the outline developed in Chapter III.
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The pension plans cited in this Chapter were all secured from the
U. S. Department of Labor, Office of Labor-Management and WelfarePension Reports.

In each instance, the plan cited is the latest which

has been placed on file with that Office and is therefore assumed to be
currently in effect.
fective in late 1964.

All of the automobile industry plans became e f 
All of the steel industry plans date from 1962;

the rubber industry plans from 1964.

The petroleum refining industry

plans bear various dates ranging from 1960 to 1966.
cited in full when it is initially referred to.

Each plan is

Thereafter, plans are

simply identified by the name of the firm.

Pension Plan Administration
The discussion which follows will be principally concerned with
determining who administers the plan insofar as determining eligi
bility and pension amount is concerned and how disputes arising over
these matters are settled.

The problem of control over pension funds

is included in the section dealing with financing arrangements.
A. Administration in the Automobile Indus try
Insofar as individual firms are concerned, provisions dealing
with plan administration are practically indistinguishable in the
automobile industry.

Although each of the references and quotations

given below was taken from the plan of a particular firm, others from
the industry could have easily been substituted.
With slight changes in wording, Chrysler, Ford, and General
Motors all provide that: "There shall be established a Central Board
of Administration hereinafter referred to as the Board, three
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1
appointed by the Corporation and three by the Union."

"The Corporation

Members and Union Members shall serve without compensation as such."

2

Disputes which arise between the dompany appointed members and
the union appointed members are resolved by an impartial chairman who
may vote only in the case of a tie.

"The Company and Union Members of

the Board shall appoint an Impartial Chairman who shall serve until
such time as he may be requested to resign by three members of the
3
Board."

Under each plan, the fees and expenses of the impartial

chairman are shared equally by the firm and the union.
The Board of Administration under each of these plans has the
following powers and responsibilities;
1. To establish the age and credited service of employees
applying for benefits.
2. To grant hearings to those employees who contest de
cisions of the Board.
3. To determine the pension amount of an applicant and to
authorize the trustee to pay such an amount from the
pension fund.
4. To receive an annual report from the trustees of
pension fund receipts, disbursements, and assets, and
a report from the actuary assessing the plan's actu
arial condition.
5. To provide appropriate information explaining the plan
to the company and to the union.

•^Supplemental Agreement Between General Motors Corporation and
the UAW-AFL-CIO (Pension Plan), October 5, 1964, Section 3(a)(1).
2

Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Chrysler Corporation
and the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Exhibit A, The Pension
Plan, Sept. 22, 1964, Section 18(a).
^Ford Motor Company and International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Agreement
Concerning Retirement Plan, Nov. 23, 1964, Article VII, Section 1.
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In all of the automobile industry plans, decisions of the Board
are final and binding on all parties.

The General Motors plan ex

plicitly states that no matter respecting the pension plan shall be
subject to the regular grievance procedure.

4

In summary, pension plans in the automobile industry are jointly
administered with disputes settled by a mutually selected impartial
chairman.
B. Administration in the Steel Industry
Like the automobile industry, pension plans in the steel industry
follow a definite pattern.

Unlike the automobile industry, however,

plans in this industry are administered exclusively by the firm.
Specifically, the firm has the right to initiate action concerning a
pension applicant while the union has the right to challenge.

The

plan of Inland Steel Company is quoted because of its succintness on
this point.

Quoted in its entirety, Section IV of that document reads:

"This Plan shall be administered by the Company."'’

Jones and Laughlin’s

plan is a little more explicit, providing for a Pension Board.
Bethlehem has the same arrangement, but, in each case, the Board is
appointed by the firm.
Unlike the automobile manufacturers, the steel firms make no
attempt to set forth the duties of the administrative boards except
in the broadest of terms.

The Jones and Laughlin plan gives the

^General Motors Plan, Sect. 3(f).
^Pension Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United
Steelworkers of America, July 1, 1962, Section IV.
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Board the power:

"to make and enforce such regulations as shall be

necessary or proper for the efficient administration of this plan."

6

Whenever a dispute arises with respect to eligibility and the
pension amount, a special two-step grievance procedure is established.
If any difference shall arise between the Company and
any employee who shall be an applicant for a pension as
to such employee's right to a pension or the amount of
his pension and agreement cannot be reached between the
Company and a representative of the International Union,
such question shall be referred to an impartial umpire
to be selected by the Company and by the Union.7
The decision of the impartial umpire is final and binding under
all of these plans.
C. Administration in the Rubber Indus try
Plan administration in the rubber industry coincides closely with
practices in the steel industry.

The Firestone plan contains a pro

vision which is representative of the industry.

"The plan shall be

administered by a Pension Board to be appointed by the Employer.

The

Board shall have such authority and perform such duties, consistent
with this Pension Plan, as may be determined from'time to time by the
Employer.
Unlike the steel industry, disputes are settled by resort to the
regular "grievance provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement

£
Jones and Laughlin Steel Company, General Noncontributory
Pension P l a n , Sept. 1, 1962, Sect. IV(a)(c).
^Pension Agreement Between Bethlehem Steel Company and United
Steelworkers of America, April 6, 1962, Section V (1).
O
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Pension and Insurance Plan
for Hourly-Rated Employees, as amended August 1, 1964, Article III.
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9
then in effect between the Company and the Union...,"

As is customary,

the final step in the grievance procedure is arbitration, and the de
cision of the arbitrator is final and binding.
D.

Administration in the Petroleum Refining Industry

In each of the industries thus far considered, a marked similarity
has been noted among firms in the same industry.
ing industry departs somewhat from this practice.

The petroleum refin
In fact, considerable

intra-industry disparity is to be found.
Some of this intra-industry variety is probably attributable to
the fact that most pension plans in this industry are quite old and
were therefore developed before the age of ’'pattern" plans.

The

"youngest" plan included in this study is the Gulf plan which dates
from 1944.

The Humble plan was initiated in 1932.

Although all of

the plans have been substantially revised since their inception,
certain of their characteristics are traceable to the original plans.
Another factor which has no doubt contributed to the variety is
the fact that the petroleum refining industry has not been organized by
a strong and centralized national union.

The automobile, steel, and

rubber industries, by contrast, have been organized since the 1930s and
early 1940s by strong national unions which have tended to impose near
identical conditions on all firms.

Indeed, Walter Reuther or I. W.

Abel would find it difficult to explain significant intra-firm dif
ferences to their constituents.

The result has been a considerable

Q

United States Rubber Company and United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum
and Plastic Workers of America, Pension. Insurance and Severance Pay
Agreement, August 1, 1964, Section D ( i ) .
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amount of homogeneity among firms and the emergence of "automobile
pattern" and "steel pattern" pension plans.
The very lack of strong union pressure has led to a certain degree
of similarity between plans insofar as administration is concerned,
however.

The Gulf Oil Corporation's plan is fairly representative.

That plan states:
Administration of the Plan, the exclusive power to interpret
it, and the responsibility for carrying out its provisions
are vested in an Annuity Committee of five members appointed
by the Board of Directors.10
Rulings of the Company appointed Board are not subject to grie
vance or appeal procedures.

"The decisions of the Committee as to

interpretation and application of the Plan shall be f i n a l . T h e
Sinclair plan simply states that, "The Company's determination.,, in
connection with the interpretation or application of the Plan shall be
conclusive."

12

The Humble plan allows a participant to present a con

trary claim to the Company appointed Benefit Plan Committee (the same
Committee that made the initial ruling), but:

"Upon receiving such a

claim the Committee shall decide whether it is true or not, and its

Gulf Oil Corporation, Annuities and Benefits Plan, August,
1964, Sect. 7(1). Gulf also has a contributory pension plan which
is optional with the employee.
A review of this plan indicates
that benefits are almost wholly financed by employee contributions,
which makes it a sort of modified savings plan.
It was not,
accordingly, included in this study.
^Gulf,

Section 7(2).

■^Sinclair Oil Corporation, Employee Retirement Allowance Plan,
January 1, 1965, Section 12.2.
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decision shall be conclusive for all persons relying on this Benefit
Plan.”13
The Shell Oil Company departs somewhat from the administrative
procedures outlined above, but achieves substantially the same result.
The text of this plan states that, "The general administration of the
Plan shall be vested in the Trustees."3^

Further, "... the Trustees

shall have full power and authority to determine all matters arising
in the administration, interpretation and application of the plan, and
the determination of any such matter by the Trustees shall be conclu
sive on all persons."'*'3

The trustees named in the Trust Agreement are

all Shell officials.3*’
The following conclusions were reached concerning pension plan
administration in the four industries.

In the automobile industry,

administration is by a joint board and disputes are settled by a
mutually acceptable impartial umpire.

In the steel industry, adminis

trative decisions are made by the firm subject to challenge by the
union.

Disputes are ultimately settled by an ad hoc impartial umpire.

In the rubber industry, plans are administered by the firm, but, like
the steel industry, subject to challenge by the union.

Disputes are

ultimately settled by resort to the final two steps of the regular

33Humble Oil and Refining Company, Text of Humble Benefit Plan,
January 1, 1965, Section 12.2.
3^Shell Oil Company, Shell Pension Plan, November 30, 1960,
Section 11.
3,3Ibid. , Article XIII.
1

Shell Oil Company, Shell Pension Plan Trust Agreement,
November 30, 1960.
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grievance procedure as established by the collective bargaining agree
ment.

Arbitration is the final step in settling a grievance.

In the

petroleum refining industry, administration is by the firm or firm
appointed trustees, whose decisions are ultimately final.

The "appeal"

provision in the Humble plan allows no more than a request to review.

Eligibility Requirements for Normal Retirement
All pension plans establish conditions under which an employee may
become eligible for a retirement benefit.

Specifically, for normal

retirement benefits, a worker is generally required to have achieved a
certain minimum age and to have accumulated some minimum number of
years of credited service.

Additionally, many plans currently allow

for retirement under conditions other than "normal."

These departures

may be classified as early retirement, special retirement, and dis
ability retirement.

These forms of retirement have their own special

eligibility requirements and will be treated separately.

The purpose

of this section is to outline normal retirement eligibility requirements
as they currently appear in pension plans in the automobile, steel,
rubber, and petroleum refining industries.
A.

Normal Retirement Requirements in the Automobile Industry

The normal retirement age for employees in the automobile industry
is 65.

General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler all have identical eligi

bility requirements which provide that an employee who "Shall have
attained the age of 65, shall have completed 10 or more years of
credited service... and shall cease active service, shall be entitled
to receive a pension,"I?
^Gene r a l Motors, Article II, Section 1(a)(1).
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Firms in the automobile industry have somewhat elaborate formulae for
computing years of credited service.
credited service shall be computed as
1. For service prior to Feb, 28,
year seniority credited as of

Ford, for instance, provides that
follows:

18

1950: One year foreach
Feb. 28, 1950.

2. For service subsequent to Feb. 28, 1950and prior
Jan. 1, 1958:
a.
b.
c.
d.

1800
1300
750
Less

or more compensated hours - 1299 compensated hours - 1299 compensated hours than 750 compensated hours-

to

1 year
3/4 year
1/2 year
0 year

3. For service since Jan. 1, 1958:
a. 1700 or more compensated hours - 1 year
b. A proportionate credit to the nearest one-tenth
of a year in which the employee received pay for
less than 1700 hours.
With slight changes in effective dates, both Chrysler and General
Motors provide that for service prior to 1950, the employee shall be
credited with one year of service for each year of seniority accumulated
prior to 1950, provided that no service which occurred prior to being
off the payroll for more than 2 years shall be counted.

For service

subsequent to 1950, these firms credit service on the same basis as
Ford does for service since 1958, i.e., one year for 1700 or more com
pensated hours and proportional fractions of one year for each year in
which less than 1700 compensated hours were worked.
The following special provisions with respect to creditable
service appears in one or more of the plans:

18

Ford, Article III, Sections 1, 2, and 3.
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1. Hours of premium pay shall be computed as straight time
hours (Chrysler, Ford, G M ) .
2. Time absent due to an injury which is compensable under
Workmen's Compensation shall be credited at a rate of
40 hours per week (Chrysler, Ford, GM) .
3. Time spent on approved leave of absence while engaged
in local or international union business shall be
credited at a rate of 40 hours per week (Chrysler,
Ford).
4. Time spent in active military service during the Korean
War period (until June 1, 1955) shall be credited
(Ford, GM).
5. Time spent on active military service, but not ex
ceeding four years, shall be credited (Chrysler,
Ford, GM).
6. Credited service shall be reinstated in full for an
employee who breaks service should he be re-employed
within 36 months (Chrysler, Ford, GM ) .
7. An employee who retired for reasons other than
disability shall not accumulate additional service
upon being re-employed (Ford, G M ) .
Briefly, then, normal retirement in the automobile industry is
predicated upon the achievement of age 65 and the accumulation of 10
years credited service, with some variation between firms insofar as
the computation of credited service is concerned.
B. Normal Retirement Requirements in the Steel Industry
Typical of firms within the steel industry, the Republic Steel
Corporation plan states that:

"An employee age 65 or over with 15

years of continuous service may retire and receive a pension."

19

The

amount of creditable service within the steel industry uniformly means

19

Republic Steel Corporation, Pension Plan of Republic Steel
Corporation, January 1, I960, Eligibility.
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"continuous service prior to retirement calculated from the employee's
last hiring date."

20

Continuous service is not deemed to have been broken by the fol
lowing occurrances:
1. Discharge, provided the employee is re-hired within six
months.
2. Layoff for a period not exceeding 2 years.
3. Absence from service due to a compensable disability.
4. Military service for a period not exceeding 4 years.
5. Re-employed retirees may accumulate additional credited
service.
According to these requirement, an employee in the steel industry
receives credited service for any year in which he is employed, re
gardless of how many hours or days are actually worked.

Effectively,

credited service accumulates from a worker's date of hire provided
continuity of service is not broken.
In computing credited service, it appears that the steel industry
is more liberal than the automobile industry.

The automobile industry,

however, requires only 10 years service for normal retirement as com
pared with the steel industry's 15-year requirement.
C. Normal Retirement Requirements in the Rubber Industry
Normal retirement requirements in the rubber industry coincide
closely with requirements in the steel industry.
dustry, B. F. Goodrich provides that:

Typical of this in

"An employee retiring on or

after August 1, 1964, who shall have attained age sixty-five (65) and

^ J o n e s and Laughlin, Section 3(1).
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who has not less than ten (10) years of Continuous Service Credit at
his normal retirement date, shall be entitled to receive a pension
upon retirement."

21

Credited service in the rubber industry means accumulated seni
ority with the firm, which is computed in accordance with the regular
collective bargaining agreement.

22

In general, then, years of credited

service is equal to the number of years employed, regardless of the
number of hours which might have been worked in any of these years.

An

exception to this is that for the purpose of computing the pension
amount (but not for satisfying the 10-year requirement), service after
the attainment of age 65 may not be included.

23

Also, up to two years

of service may be credited for time spent on layoff or approved leave
4T absence.
V.
24
of

D. Normal Retirement Requirements in the Petroleum Refining
Indus try
As previously indicated, there is no industry pattern in the
petroleum refining industry.

The considerable diversity is most ap

parent in provisions dealing with normal retirement.

Suffice it here,

then, to set down some of the more salient features of several plans in
the industry.

21

B.

F. Goodrich, Pension P lan, January 1, 1965, Article 2.1.

22Firestone, Article VIII (3).
23Ibid.
2^United States Rubber Co,., Section C(l).
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Gulf Oil Corporation sets the normal retirement age at 65, with no
minimum service requirement.

Credited service does, however, play an

important role in determining the pension amount.

25

The Sinclair plan has a normal retirement age of 62 with no minimum
service requirement per s e .

A minimum of sorts is required, however,

by an eligibility clause which provides that participation in the plan
is available only to an employee with one or more years of service.

26

The Shell plan coincides with plans in the steel industry, with a
normal retirement age of 65 and a minimum service requirement of 15
years.

27

The same requirement is found in the Humble plan.

28

Insofar as computation of credited service is concerned, the
petroleum refining industry has the usual continuous service require
ments, with allowances for such contingencies as leaves of absence,
military service, sickness, and disability.

The Humble plan, though it

requires 15 years service for normal retirement, fails to specify how
this service is to be computed other than ambiguous statements to the
effect that benefit plan service "means service credited by the-employer
for the purpose of this Benefit Plan," and credited service "means service
29
credited by the employer.”

In general, creditable service and seni

ority are synonymous within the industry.

^~*Gulf, Section 1(12).
^Sinclair, Section 2.1.
^She l l ,
28

Sections l(m) and 3(a).

Humble, Sections 4.1 and 4.3.

^Humble,

"Glossary of Terms.
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Early, Special, and Disability Retirement
As previously indicated, most pension plans allow retirement under
conditions other than "normal."

Generally, these departures are

designed to provide a pension benefit to a qualifying employee who
either:

(a) voluntarily retires before reaching the normal retirement

age; (b) involuntarily breaks service or breaks service under mutually
satisfactory conditions before reaching retirement age, or; (c) b e 
comes permanently disabled.

For the purpose of this exposition,

retirement under these conditions will be referred to respectively as
early retirement, special early retirement, and disability retirement.
Collectively, they shall hereinafter be referred to as specialized
retirement.
In order to avoid confusion with benefit computation under normal
retirement provisions, the methods by which benefits are computed for
specialized retirement are included along with the following discus
sion of eligibility requirements.

The benefits mentioned are payable

to employees who retire after September, 1964.

An employee who retired

before this date would get a somewhat smaller benefit under some of the
plans.

(A revision of the Social Security program became effective on

September 1, 1964).
A.

Specialized Retirement in the Automobile Indus try

Within the automobile industry, provisions dealing with specialized
forms of retirement are identical among the several firms.

As a matter

of convenience and to eliminate needless repetition, the plan of Ford
Motor Company was chosen to illustrate the nature of specialized retire
ment provisions within the industry.
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Early retirement is available to an automobile worker upon the
satisfaction of either of two requirements:

(a) the attainment of 60

years of age and 10 or more years of credited service, or;

(b) the

attainment of 55 years of age or over but less than 60, if age and
credited service total at lea'st 85.

30

Fulfillment of either of these

requirements entitles an employee to a regular early retirement benefit
each month, "in an amount equal to $4.25 for each year of his credited
service at retirement multiplied by the percentage applicable with
31
respect to his attained age when benefits commence as follows:
Age When Benefits
Commence
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62 or over

Percentage
57.9
63.5
69.4
75.2
80.8
86.7
93.3
100.0

An employee who is discharged for cause and who has fulfilled
either of the above age and service requirements is considered to have
retired under this provision.

As will be discussed later, a voluntary

early retiree is eligible for a "supplemented" pension considerably
larger than the amount available under this formula.

As a practical

matter, this formula would be used only by an employee who was dis
charged for cause.

30

Ford, Article IV (2)(a).

^Ford, Article V (2) (b) .
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Special early retirement is available to an employee who is rer
tired at the option of the company or under mutually satisfactory
conditions.

In view of the liberal benefits provided a retiree, this

type retirement appears to be designed to enable the firm to terminate
the employment of an individual whose continued employment has for some
reason become undesirable.
A worker may be placed in special early retirement if he is over
55 but less than 65 years of age and has 10 or more years of credited
service.

The monthly benefit payable to such a retiree is:

...in an amount equal to $4.25 for each year of his
credited service at retirement and, a temporary benefit
commencing at early retirement in an amount equal to
$5.20 for each year of his credited service at retire
ment (not to exceed a total of $130.00); provided,
however, that for any month after the retired employee
attains age 65 or becomes eligible for an unreduced
Social Security benefit the temporary benefit shall
not be payable.
Disability retirement is available to an automobile worker if he
is adjudged by the pension board to be permanently and totally disabled
and is at least 50 years of age and has credited service of at least
10 years.

The benefit to which such a retiree is eligible is exactly

the same as that payable to a special early retiree of equal age and
.
33
service.

■^Ford, Article V (2)(d).
33

Disability benefits are generally denied to an individual in
the automobile and other industries if the disability is the result
of: (a) injury incurred while engaged in a criminal enterprise;
(b) habitual drunkenness or narcotic addiction; (c) an intentionally
self-inflicted injury; (d) injury or disease resulting from service
in the armed forces.
The retiree may also be required to submit to
a medical examination from time to time.
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The latest automobile industry plans provide a special supplemental
allowance to employees who retire under the specialized forms of retire
ment subsequent to September 1, 1965.

(An employee who is retired

through discharge for cause is not eligible for this supplemental
allowance).

The Ford plan provides a supplemental allowance that shall

be:
If the employee shall have reached his 60th birthday on
the date of his retirement, an amount which when added to
his monthly retirement benefit... shall equal: $400
reduced by an amount equal to 66 2/3 cents multiplied by
the number of twentieths of a year that his credited
service at retirement is less than 30 y ears. ^
The drafters of this provision must be accorded recognition as
masters of the art of abstruse expression'.

Translated, it means that

the monthly pension of an early retiree who is at least 60 years old
will be $400 reduced by $1.11 for each month that his service at r e 
tirement is less than 30 years.

A man with 29 years service would thus

have his supplemented pension reduced by $13.33 (12 x $1.11), or, from
$400 to $386.67.
If a retiree is less than 60, the
computed is even more involved.

First

method by which his benefit is
of all, the basic $400 must be

reduced in accordance with the above formula if the worker's service is
less

than 30 years.

The resulting sum is then multiplied by:

a fraction the numerator of which is 60 and the denominator
of which is the number of months from his retirement date
to and including the month in which he would attain age 65.

34

Ford, Article VI (2)(a).

■^Ford, Article VI (2) (b) .
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For a worker who is 55 years of age, this final adjustment reduces
the pension by one-half.

(Sum x 60/120).

Using the formulae outlined above, the supplemented pension of a
worker age 55 who elected to retire after 25 years of service would be
$166.67.

36

($400.- 60 ($1.11) = $333.34, which is further reduced by

the age factor, $333.34 (60/120) = $166.67).

Without the supplement,

the same retiree's pension would have been $61.52.

($4.25 x 25 x .579).

The supplement therefore amounts to $105.15 in this case.
Payment of the supplemental allowance is subject to a number of
conditions:
1. It ceases when the retiree becomes eligible for an
unreduced Social Security benefit.
2. A retiree cannot earn in excess of $1,200 in any
calendar yea r .
3. A retiree's supplemented pension cannot exceed 70%
of his final monthly base pay (173 1/3 x base
hourly rate at retirement).
4. An employee discharged for cause is not eligible for
the supplemental allowance.
The supplemental allowance is designed primarily for workers who
accept regular early retirement.

A special early retiree or a disa

bility retiree who was 55 years of age and had 25 years of service
would get a pension of $236.25 ($4.25 (25) plus $5.20 (25) = $236.25),
and since his pension would therefore exceed the minimum established by
the supplement, no supplement would be payable.

It could, however,

result in a substantial benefit to a retiree, whether regular early,

36

These figures are chosen for purposes of illustration only.
In actual fact, a worker age 55 with only 25 years of service would
not be eligible for regular early retirement.
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special early, or disability, who was between the age of 60 and 65 and
who had service of 30 or more years.

In such a case, the supplemental

allowance would guarantee a $400 monthly benefit, assuming that $400
was less than 70% of his final base pay.

A disability or special early

retiree would otherwise receive an unsupplemented benefit of $257.50.
B. Specialized Retirement in the Steel Indus try
Provisions dealing with specialized forms of retirement in the
steel industry are, as in the automobile industry, highly standardized.
The plan of Inland Steel Company was chosen as typical of the industry.
Terminology in the plans differ, but the results under all of them are
the s am e .
A steel worker may elect early retirement after 15 years of
service and the attainment of 60 years of age.

Fulfillment of these

requirements qualify a worker to receive a special payment equal to 13
weeks vacation pay

37

and a lifetime monthly pension.

An early retiree

is entitled to a benefit equal to one percent of his average monthly
earnings during the last 10 years of service multiplied by the number
of years of credited service, or, a monthly benefit equal to $2.60 for
each year of service after January 1, I960 plus $2.50 for each year of
service prior to January 1, 1960, whichever is greater.

As indicated

in Chapter III, this latter method of computation is designed to
protect the long-service low-wage employee.

37

Collective bargaining agreements in the steel industry
provide that workers in the upper half of the seniority roster
are entitled to a 13-week vacation every fifth year.
A retiree
is entitled to a lump sum payment equal to 13 weeks vacation
pay irrespective of his seniority ranking.
See U. S. Steel
Corporation, Saying and Vacation Plan, 1962, Section 3.0.
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Whichever method is used, the resulting sum is reduced on an
actuarial basis to compensate for retirement before age 65.

The amount

of reduction is based on tables "adopted from time to time by the
OQ

Company."

The Bethlehem plan contains the following table:
Age at Retirement

Percentage

60
61
62
63
64
65

67.18
72.36
78.14
84.60
91.84
100,00

This actuarial reduction may be avoided by deferring receipt of
the monthly benefit until the age of 65.
The steel industry plans do not contain the temporary benefits
(payable until age 65) provided by the automobile industry.

The 13-

week vacation payment might be regarded as a partial offset to this,
however.
A worker may be placed on special early retirement in the steel
industry for any of the following reasons:
or department;
likely;

(a) the shutdown of a plant

(b) layoff, when return to employment is deemed u n 

(c) disability (the disability not being sufficient to qualify

as total and permanent);

(d) under mutually satisfactory conditions.

39

The benefit of a special early retiree is computed by the same
method used for regular early retirement.
however, differ.

Eligibility requirements,

In order to qualify for special early retirement, a

"^Inland, Section II (4) (b) .
Inland, Section I (4).
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worker must either:

(a) have attained a minimum age of 55 and have

minimum service of 15 years and whose age and service total 75 or more,
40
or (b) have combined age and service which totals at least 80.
A disability pension is available to steel workers provided they
have a minimum of 15 years service, regardless of age.

The disability

retirement benefit is the greater of $100 or an amount computed by use
of the same service-times-earnings formula mentioned in connection with
regular early retirement.

A worker placed on disability retirement is

also entitled to the special 13-week vacation payment.

41

C. Specialized Retirement in the Rubber Indus try
A worker in the rubber industry is eligible for regular early
retirement upon the attainment of 55 years of age and the accumulation
of 15 years of credited service.
provision may choose either:

42

An employee who retires under this

(a) an immediate monthly benefit equal to

$3.25 multiplied by years of service, reduced by 4/10 of one percent
for each month by which he is less than 62 at retirement, or (b) an
unreduced amount, deferred until age 62, equal to $3.25 multiplied by
years of service.

43

Under this scheme, a worker who retired at age 55

and opted for an immediate monthly benefit would get a pension reduced
by roughly one-third.

40

Ibid.

^Inland,

Section II (2) .

^Firestone, Article IV, Section 2(a)
^U.

S. Rubber, Section B(2)(a).
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The rubber industry has secondary early retirement provisions
(referred to in industry plans as "special early retirement," but these
provisions do not provide for special early retirement in the sense
that the term has been used in this study) which allow an employee to
retire at age 62 with a minimum of 10 years service.

The monthly

benefit payable to an employee under this arrangement is determined by
multiplying years of service by $3.25.

44

A rubber worker may be placed on special early retirement (in the
sense that the term has been previously used) at the option of the
employer or under mutually satisfactory conditions upon the completion
of 15 years service and the attainment of age 55.

The monthly benefit

of such a retiree is computed by multiplying years of service by $6.50.
No reduction is made for age.

A special early retiree would thus

receive a benefit more than twice that of a regular early retiree of
equal age and service.

Upon becoming eligible for an unreduced Social

Security benefit, the retired employee is entitled to a benefit equal
to $3.25 multiplied by years of service.

45

Disability retirement in the rubber industry is conditioned upon
the completion of at least 10 years of service.
the onset of such disability is immaterial.

The employee's age at

The benefit amount is

computed by the same formula used for special early retirement, and is
also reduced when the employee becomes eligible for an unreduced Social

44

B. F. Goodrich, Article 3.2.

^Firestone, Article V (2) (c) .

Ill

Security benefit.

Unlike the special early retiree, however, a minimum

monthly benefit of $100 is guaranteed to the disability retiree.
D.
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Specialized Retirement in the Petroleum Refining Indus try

As with other plan provisions, there is considerable diversity
among petroleum refining firms insofar as specialized retirement pro
visions are concerned.

None of the firms which were chosen for study

provide for special early retirement.

Specialized retirement within

the industry is therefore confined to early retirement and disability
retirement.
The Gulf Oil Corporation provides that an employee may retire
early if he has reached a minimum age of 50 and his age plus service
equals 75 or more.

The wording of the early retirement provision of

this Company is interesting.

An employee who has established eligibil

ity "...shall be retired early...after he or any of the Gulf Companies
files a written application with the Committee."

47

Evidently, a worker

could be placed on early retirement at the request of the firm whether
or not the employee desired such retirement.
The early retirement benefit of a Gulf employee who defers
receipt of monthly payments until age 65 is equal to 3/4 of 1% of each
year's compensation not over the Social Security ceiling, plus 1^7, of
each year's compensation over such ceiling.

If the retiree chooses an

immediate early annuity, it is equal to the deferred annuity, computed
as above, multiplied by the following percentages:

^Firestone, Article V (3).
^Gulf,

Section 4(B). (Italics furnished).

^Gulf,

Section V (b) .
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Age
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Percentage

Age

Percentage

33
36
39
42
45
50
55
60

58
59
60
61
62
63
64

65
70
75
80
85
90
95

'

Disability retirement is available to a Gulf employee after a
minimum of 15 years of service, without regard to age.

The amount of

such a benefit is computed in the same way as the early retirement
benefit, but without reduction for age.

49

The pension plan of Shell Oil Company provides for two types of
early retirement.

If a worker is 50 years of age or above and the sum

of his age and service is 80 or more, he may retire at his own option.
Alternatively, if the employee is at least 50 years of age and has at
least 20 years of service, he may be involuntarily retired at the
option of the company.

In either case, the employee may choose either

an immediate annuity or defer receipt of the benefit until age 65.
The amount of the benefit in either case is computed by using the
normal retirement benefit formula of 0.8% of final compensation*^ up
to the Social Security tax base times years of service, plus 1.2% of
final compensation over the Social Security base times years of
service.

Should the early retiree chose to receive an immediate

^Gulf,
50

Section V (c) .

Final compensation means the average monthly compensation
of an employee during his five consecutive years of highest earnings
during his last ten years of service.
Shell, Section 1(L).‘
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pension, the monthly benefit is reduced in amount by the same percent
ages mentioned in connection with the Gulf plan, above. ^
A Shell employee may be placed on disability retirement after 15
or more years of service, regardless of age.
retiree would be the greater of:

The benefit of such a

(a) 257o of final compensation, or;

(b) in the case of an employee who is eligible for an early pension,
the unreduced amount of such early pension.

52

The retirement plan of Sinclair Oil Corporation is contributory
and somewhat more liberal in benefits and eligibility requirements
than either the Gulf or Shell plans.
A Sinclair employee is eligible for early retirement upon the
attainment of age 55, without regard to years of service.
retirement age is 62).

(Normal

The pension of an early retiree is found by

taking 1.5% of monthly compensation up to the Social Security tax base
plus 2% of monthly compensation above that base and multiplying the
result by years of service.

53

The benefit under this plan is not based

on the usual "highest five years' earnings."

Data on earnings from

the date of hire are required to compute the benefit.
The benefit thus computed is then reduced by multiplying by the
following percentages:

54

"^Shell, Section 3(b)(1).
■^Shell, Section 3(c)..
^ S i n c l a i r , Section 7.1.
"^Sinclair, Appendix B, Table I.
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Percentage

Age at Retirement

100%

62
61
60
59
58
57
56
55

92
84
76

68
60
55
50

An employee with at least 15 years of service and who has attained
age 50 or more is entitled to an unreduced normal annuity in case of
disability.

A disabled worker under age 50 receives a normal annuity

reduced by 5% for each year that he is less than 50.
An Humble Oil and Refining Company employee with 15 years of
service may retire as early as age 55.

55

In discussing this Company's

specialized retirement system, it will be necessary to restate some of
the plan language to facilitate meaningful comparisons between it and
other plans.

The difficulty arises from the fact that Humble includes

part of a worker's Social Security benefit in what it refers to as
"annuity from company sources."

36

It is thus clear that "annuity from

company sources" is greater than and not comparable to retirement income
payable from the private pension fund.

In effect, in order to arrive

at the private pension benefit, an offset equal to as much as % of
Social Security benefits must be deducted from "annuity from company

"^Humble, Section 8.2 (2) (b) .
C£
Some of the terminology and information concerning early
and disability retirement was taken from a collection of examples
of "How to Estimate Your Monthly Retirement Income" which Humble
distributed to employees in 1966.
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sources."

This applies to normal retirement as well as to early and

disability retirement.
Computation of early retirement benefits under the Humble plan is
somewhat involved.

First of all, it is necessary to compute what is

referred to as the "discounted annuity from company sources."
arrived at by thp following method:
service;

(a) multiply

1

This is

.6 % by years of

(b) multiply the resulting percentage figure by final monthly

pay (average of highest five of last ten years);

(c) multiply the re-

suiting dollar amount by the following percentage figures:
Age

Percent

64
63
62
61
60

Age

97
94
91

59
58
57
56
55

88

85

57

Percent
78
71
64
57
50

If the worker is at least 62, but not yet 65, one-half of the
Social Security benefit to which he is then entitled must be deducted
from this "discounted annuity from company sources" to arrive at the
amount payable from the private plan.
Further computation is necessary if the retiree is less than age
62.

This computation involves:

(a) multiplying years of service (up

to a maximum of 33 1/3 years) by 3%; (b) multiplying the resulting
percentage by % the Social Security benefit to which the employee will
be entitled at age 62.

The resulting dollar amount is then deducted

from the "discounted annuity from company sources" mentioned above.
To this sub-total is then added a flat $100 Pre-Social Security Annuity.

■^Humble, Section 8.2 (2)(b).
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Some appropriate remarks concerning the general nature of benefit
computation under the Humble plan seem to be in order.

First of all,

the company has gone to considerable pain to include, indirectly, part
of the OASDI benefit in its "annuity from company sources."

Since

these benefits obviously are not payable from the private plan but
from a completely independent public plan, there is little reason for
interweaving the two.

Yet, the basic Humble formula (1.6% x Service

x Final Pay) yields an amount which includes part of the OASDI benefit.
The result is that, for long service employees, the plan includes a
full 50% OASDI offset, concealed though it may be.

Proof of this fact

is that an increase in OASDI benefits would result in a reduction in
payment from the private fund equal to 50% of"such an increase.
Beyond this, the benefit formula for a pre-62 early retiree seems
unduly complicated, and in one respect at least, more than a little
baffling.

For such a retiree with 15 years of service, for instance,

45% (3% x Service) of one-half of the OASDI benefit must be deducted
from the amount of his discounted annuity and

$100

added to the-rer

suiting amount in order to arrive at his monthly benefit.

The writer

hereby confesses ignorance of the logic behind this arrangement.

Of

course, 3% times 33 1/3 equals 100%., but then so does an infinite
number of other possible combinations.

The fact that this arrangement

provides a reduced OASDI offset for the short-service employee is plain
enough, but the method by which the magical 3%, was arrived at cannot be
fathomed.

The difficulty springs from the intermingling of public and

private benefits.

The firm might do well to divorce its plan from

OASDI and then, if it wishes, stress the fact that OASDI benefits are
partially financed by the company through OASDI taxes.
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Disability retirement is provided to an employee with at least 15
years of service, regardless of age.

Such an employee is entitled to

the greater of an amount equal to his undiscounted annuity (1 .6 % x
Service x final pay) or a percent of his normal compensation.
cent of normal compensation is based on the following table:
Service
15 years, and
increasing by 1
through a maximum
of 40 years

The per-

58

Percent of Normal Compensation
37%% and
percent
year of
maximum

increasing by %
for each additional
service up to a
of 50%

The criticism voiced earlier notwithstanding, the specialized
pension amounts provided by Humble, even after allowing for the OASDI
offset, are quite liberal when compared with other firms in and outside
its industry.

Within the petroleum refining industry, its nearest

competitor is Sinclair, which has, as indicated earlier, a contributory
plan.

The firm prides itself in being a "pioneer" and "leader" in

providing retirement benefits.

The plan has been frequently amended,

sometimes at intervals as short as six months, in order to maintain
this position.
Perhaps the best method of comparing specialized retirement
benefits would be to assume various age, service, and compensation
levels and see what benefits would be payable under each of the plans
discussed.

The results of such a computation appears in Table IV-1.

This table clearly reflects those factors which enter into computation
of benefits; i.e., age, service, earnings, social security base and
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Humble Oil and Refining Company, Highlights of the Employee
Benefit Program, "Disability Annuity Plan", January 1, 1966.

Table IV-1.

Specialized Retirement Benefits.

Final Monthly Pay - $400
INDUSTRY OR FIRM:

Final Monthly Pay - $550

Final Monthly Pay - $700

Age 55
Svc. 30

Age 60
Svc. 20

Age 62
Svc. 35

Age ."55
Svc. 30

Age 60
Svc. 20

Age 62
Svc. 35

200.00

266.80

280.00

200.00

266.80

Special or Disability
Steel (all)
Early

257.50

‘ 189.00

280.00

257.50

53.74

109.40

Special or Disability
Rubber (all)
Early

1 0 0 .0 0 1

53.742

109.40f

100.oo1

73.90

150.42

100.00

64.74

58.56

113.75'

64.74

58.56

113.75

195.00

130.00

227.50

195.00

130.00

45.00

89.25

61.88

Automobile (all)
Early (Supplemental)

Special or Disability
Petroleum Refining
Gulf
Early

Shell
'

1

45.00

3

1

Age 62
Svc. 35

385.00

Age 55 Age 60
Svc. 30 Svc. 20
■n — ■
200.00
266.80

189.00

385.00

257.50

189.00

400.00

73.90

150.42

94.06

191.44

94.062

191.44

64.74

58.56

113.75

227.50

195.00

130.00

227.50

61.88

122.72

95.63

95.63

189.66

1

400.00,

1

2

3

3

Disability

90.00

60.00

105.00

123.75

82.50

144.38

191.25

127.50

223.13

Early

48.00

48.00

95.20

66.00

66.00

130.90

93.00

93.00

184.45

100.00

100.00

112.00

137.50

137.50

154.00

175.00

175.00

217.00

90.00

100.80

210.00

123.75

138.50

288.75

168.75

189.00

393.75

180.00

120.00

210.00

247.50

165.00

288.75

337.50

225.00

393.75

Disability
Sinclair
"" Early
Disability

Table IV-1.

Continued.

Final Monthly Pay - $400
INDUSTRY OR FIRM:
Petroleum Refining
Humble
Early
Disability

Age 55
Svc. 30
4
147,04

Age 60
Svc. 20

Age 62
Svc, 35

176.16

180.00

160.00

Final Monthly Pay - $550

Final Monthly Pay- $700
Age 60
Svc. 20

Age 62
Svc. 35

207.57

250.11

289.55

315.00

280.00

332.50

Age 60
Svc. 20

Age 62
Svc. 35

Age 55
Svc. 30

203.84

Age 55
Svc, 30
4
171.57

209.31

213.13

190.00

247.50

220.00

250.25

4

None of the steel industry plans contain tables by which the pension of a retiree
less than age 60 can be computed. A minimum disability benefit of $100 is guaranteed.
2Minimum disability benefit is $100.
^Social Security base is assumed to be $6,600.
^The amount of Social Security benefits payable at age 62 is assumed to be the maximum
payable for each income range,

120
benefits, and eligibility requirements.
more of these factors altogether.

Some of the plans omit one or

In some, one factor, such as age, is

given considerable weight, while in others, service may be the most im
portant consideration.
In the automobile industry, earnings do not enter into the
benefit formula except that the pension amount cannot exceed 70% of
pre-retirement earnings.

For an automobile worker, age at retire

ment is the most important consideration, with service a distant
second.
In the steel industry, earnings and service are strategic,
with substantial reduction for the age factor if retirement occurs
several years short of age 65.
For a rubber worker, earnings and service are paramount, with
relatively minor consideration given to age.
Gulf Oil Corporation's plan emphasizes age, service, and
earnings, with earnings achieving increased weight once the OASDI
tax base is exceeded.

The same is true of the Shell plan, although

earnings in excess of the OASDI base are somewhat less important.
The Sinclair plan is quite similar, although earnings means average
lifetime earnings instead of the usual "final pay" earnings.

The

Humble plan gives weight to each age, service, earnings, and social
security benefits.

Of these, service and final pay appear to be of

primary importance.
The factors which enter into benefit computation in each of
these industries and firms are summarized in Table IV-2.

Table IV-2. Specialized Retirement Benefit Formulae.

Indus try
or
Firm

Eligibility
Requirements for
Early Retirement

Automobile
Indus try

$4.25 x Service x Percentage re
Regular Early:
duction based on age, plus a
(a) Age 60 and 10
years' service, supplement which when added to
this benefit shall equal $400,
or;
(b) Age 55 but less reduced: (a) by $ 1 . 1 1 for each
than 60, if age month that service is less than
30 years, and, if age is less
plus service
than 60, further reduced by;
totals 85
(b) multiplying the resulting
Special Early:
Age 55 and 10 years' sum by a fraction, the numer
ator of which is 60 and the
service with con
sent of the firm
denominator of which is the
number of months that age is
or at the option
less than 65. The resulting
of the firm
benefit to be further reduced
if it is more than 70% of

Steel
2
Industry

Regular Early:
Age 60 and 15 years'
service
Special Early:
(a) Age 55 and 15
years' service,
providing that
age plus ser
vice totals 75,
or;
(b) age plus ser
vice totals 80

Regular Early
Retirement
Benefit Formula

The greater of:
(a) 1 % of monthly earnings x
service, or;
(b) $2.60 for each years' ser
vice after Jan. 1, 1960
plus $2..50 for each years'
service before Jan. 1, I960.
Actuarially reduced by a per
centage based on age at retire
ment.

Eligibility
for
Disability
Benefit

Disability and
Special Early
Retirement
Benefit Formula

50 years of age
and 1 0 years'
service

The greater of:
(a) an amount equal
to $4.25 for each
year of service plus
$5.20 for each year
of service (up to
$130.00), or; (b) an
amount computed by
use of the Regular
Early benefit form
ula .

15 years'
service

Regular Early benefit
formula, with minimum
of $ 1 0 0 monthly
benefit for disability

Table IV-2.

Continued (2)

Industry
or
Firm

Eligibility
Requirements for
Early Retirement

Regular Early
Retirement
Benefit Formula

Rubber
Industry

Regular Early:
(a) Age 55 and 15
years' service,
or;
(b) Age 62 and 10
years 1 service
Special Early:
Age 55 and 15 years'
service with con
sent of the firm or
at the option of the
firm
Age 50, providing
age plus service
totals 75 or more.

$3.25 x Service, reduced by
4/10 of 1 % for each month that
age at retirement is less than
62 years

3/4 of 17o of annual'* compensa
tion not over the Social
Security tax base, plus 1.5%
of annual compensation in
excess of such base, with the
resulting amount actuarially
reduced by a percentage based
on age at retirement
0 .8 % of compensation not over
Social Security base x service,
plus 1 .2 % of compensation in
excess of Social Security base
x service, reduced by a per
centage based on age at
retirement

Gulf

Shell

At employee's
Option: 50 years of
age, providing age
plus service totals
80 or more
At Employer's Op
tion:
Age 50 and 20 years'

Eligibility
for
Disability
Benefit

Disability and
Special Early
Retirement
^
Benefit Formula

10

years'
service

$6.50 x Service un
reduced for age, with
$ 1 0 0 minimum for
disability

15 years'
service

Disability: Computed
with Regular Early
benefit formula, but
unreduced for age.

15 years
service

Disability: The
greater of: (a) 25%
of final compensation,
or; (b) the unreduced
amount of such pension
if eligible for an
early pension

1

Table IV-2.

Continued (3)

Indus try
or
Firm

Eligibility
Requirements for
Early Retirement

Regular Early
Retirement
Benefit Formula

Humble

Age 55 and 15
years 1 service

If age 62 or over:
1 ,6 % x service x compensation
x percentage reduction for age,
minus 1/2 of Social Security
benefit to which entitled.
If less than age 62:
1 .6 % x service x compensation
x percentage reduction for
age, from which amount is
DEDUCTED a sum equal to Service
x 37» x 1/2 of Social Security
benefit to which the employee
will be entitled at age 62, to
which amount is ADDED $100.

Eligibility
for
Disability
Benefits

Disability and
Special Early
Retirement
j
Benefit Formula

15 years'
service

Disability:
The greater of:
(a) Early retirement
benefit to which
entitled, unreduced
for age, or;
(b) a percentage of
normal compensation
based on the fol
lowing:
% of
Service
normal pay
15 years..... 37%7»
to a
increasing
maximum
by ^% for
of 40
each addiyears
tional
year to a
maximum of
50%

Table IV-2.

Continued £4)

Indus try
or
Firm

Eligibility
Requirements for
Early Retirement

Regular Early
Retirement
Benefit Formula

Sinclair

Age 55 without
regard to
service

1,5% of monthly compensation up
to Social Security base x ser
vice, plus 2 .0 % of monthly
compensation in excess of Social
Security base times service, re
duced by a percentage based on
age at retirement

Eligibility
for
Disability
Benefit

Disability and
Special Early
Retirement
Benefit Formula

15 years
service

Disability:
Unreduced early re
tirement benefit if
more than 50 years of
age, reduced by 5%
for each year that
age at retirement is
less than 50,

1

All of these plans provide that the pension amount shall be computed in accordance with the normal
retirement formula upon becoming eligible for unreduced Social Security benefits.
steel industry employee is. also eligible for a one-time payment equal to 13 weeks vacation pay
upon retirement...
The resulting sum must be divided by 12 to arrive at the monthly benefit.
^To a maximum of 33 1/3 years' service.
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Normal Retirement Benefits
Normal retirement benefits are ordinarily computed with the same
formula that is used for specialized retirement, except, of course,
that no adjustment is made for the age factor.
In the automobile industry, the monthly benefit of an employee who
retires after January 1, 1965 is $4.25 multiplied by years of service.
The supplemental allowance mentioned in connection with specialized
retirement is not available to an employee who retires under the
normal retirement provision.

59

In the steel industry, an employee who is placed on normal re
tirement is entitled to the greater of:
to

1%

(a) a monthly amount equal

of final compensation multiplied by years of service, or; (b)

a monthly amount caluculated by multiplying years of service before
January 1, 1960 by $2.50 and years of service after January 1, 1960
by $2.60.

If the benefit is computed by use of the first formula, it

is subject to an $80 OASDI offset.
offset is m a d e . ^

If the second formula is used, no

The first four benefit amounts shown for the steel

industry in Table IV-3 were computed with the flat dollar amount
formula, which yields the greatest benefit for the short service
and/or low wage employee.
In the rubber industry, the normal pension amount is computed by
multiplying $3.25 by years of service.

61.

cq

General Motors, Article 2, Section l(b)(4)(ii).
60

Jones and Laughlin, Section II, 3(a) or 3(b).

^U.

S. Rubber Company, Section B (1).

Table IV-3,

Normal Retirement Benefits.

INDUSTRY OR FIRM:

1

Final Monthly Pay - $400

Final Monthly Pay - $550

Final Monthly Pay - $700

20 Yrs.
Service

20 Yrs,
Service

20 Yrs.
Service

30 Yrs.
Service

40 Yrs.
Service

30 Yrs.
Service

40 Yrs.
Service

30 Yrs.
Service

40 Y r s .
Service

Automobile (all firms)

85.00

127.50

170.00

85.00

127.50

170.00

85.00

127.50

170.00

Steel (all firms)

50.50

75.50

100.50

50.50

85.00

140.00

60.00

130.00

200.00

Rubber (all firms)

65.00

97.50

130.00

65.00

97.50

130.00

65.00

97.50

130.00

Gulf Oil Corp.

60.00

90.00

120.00

82.50

123.75

165.00

127.50

191.25

255.00

Shell Oil Co.

64.00

96.00

128.00

88.00

132.00

176.00

124.00

186.00

248.00

120.00

180.00

240.00

165.00

247.50

330.00

225.00

337.50

450.00

60.05

124.05

188.05

92.00

180.00

268.00

120.00

222,00

324.00

1

2,3
Sinclair Oil Co.
4
Humble Oil Co.

The OASDI tax base is assumed |o be $6,600 per year or $550 per month.
The pension amounts shown are based on the assumption that the monthly pay used in the compensation
is average lifetime earnings.For other industries and firms, the monthly
pay means the average
monthly compensation during the five years of highest earnings during the last ten years of service.
■^Normal retirement age is 62 years for this firm.
^The pension amounts shown are the amounts payable from the private pension fund. OASDI benefits
included in this firm's "income from company sources" have been deducted.
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As previously noted, there is considerable variation among firms
within the petroleum refining industry.

Normal retirement benefit

formulae for the four firms included in this study may be summarized as
follows, however:
Gulf - - - - -

of 1% of each year's compensation not over
the Social Security tax base, plus 1.5% of each
year's compensation over such base.
3/4

Shell- - - - - 0.8% of final compensation not over the Social
Security base times years of service, plus
1 .2 % of final compensation in excess of such
base times years of service.
Sinclair - - - 1,5% of monthly compensation up to the Social
Security base times years of service, plus 2%
of monthly compensation in excess of the Social
Security base times years of service.
Humble - - - - 1.6% times service times final compensation
minus 1/2 of the Social Security benefit to
which entitled.
Table IV-3 reflects normal retirement benefits which would be pay
able under these plans for various service and compensation combinations.
It will be noted that in the case of the automobile and rubber in
dustries, the pension amount is independent of earnings and advances
only with service.

In all other cases, the pension amount advances

with both earnings and service.

In the case of the Gulf, Shell, and

Sinclair oil companies, earnings are particularly important once the
Social Security tax base ($550 per month) is exceeded.

Sinclair

provides the highest benefits for all earnings - service combinations.
This is no doubt attributable to the fact that the plan is contribu
tory and therefore financed by both the firm and the employee.

The

employee contributes 2.4% of his earnings on earnings up to the
Social Security tax base and 3.2% of his earnings on earnings which
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exceed that base.

62

An employee earning $700 per month would therefore

contribute $18.00 per month.

Survivor and Pre-Retirement Death Benefits
It is common practice to allow a retiring employee to accept a
reduced monthly benefit during his lifetime so that his surviving
dependent(s) might continue to receive a pension after his death.

The

amount by which the employee's lifetime benefit is reduced generally
depends upon his age at retirement and the age of his designated bene
ficiary.

Survivor benefits are always optional with the employee and

the option must ordinarily be exercised before benefit payments
commence.

A few plans allow a retiree to exercise the option after

benefits have begun upon presentation of acceptable evidence of good
health.

Some plans require that the designated beneficiary be the

employee's spouse, while other require only that the beneficiary have
an insurable interest in the employee.
In addition to survivor benefits, which provide income to the
survivor of an employee who had already retired, some plans provide
benefits to survivors of long-service employees who die before
retirement.

It was estimated in 1965 that 28% of all pension plans

provide some form of benefits to survivors of active employees.

62

63

Sinclair, Section 5.1.

^Bankers Trust Company, 1965 Study of Industrial Retirement
Plans, Bankers Trust Company, New York, 1965, p. 21.

*

129
A . Survivor and Fre-Retirement Death Benefits in the Automobile
Indus try
An automobile worker may opt for a survivor's benefit at any time
before commencement of pension payments.

This option is available to

an employee regardless of the nature of his retirement, i.e., normal,
early, special early, deferred, or disability.

The designated

beneficiary must be the employee's spouse and the couple must have been
married for at least one year at the time the option is exercised.

64

The pension amount of a retired employee who exercises the sur
vivor's option shall be the monthly benefit to which he is otherwise
entitled (excluding any supplemental allowance) multiplied by 90% if
the employee's age and his spouse's age are the same.

This basic

90% is increased by ^%, for each year that the spouse's age exceeds
the employee's age (to a maximum of

1 0 0 %,)

and decreased by %% for each

year that the spouse's age is less than the employee's age.
employee whose spouse is

10

For an

years his junior, the pension payable

during his lifetime would thus be 85% of the amount to which he would
be entitled had the option not been exercised.

At the death of the

pensioner, the surviving spouse is entitled to a lifetime benefit
equal to 55% of the pensioner's reduced b e n efit.^
The surviving spouse of an employee who dies before retirement and
who either:

(a) has attained age 60 or more, or;

(b) has attained at

least age 55 and whose age plus service totals 85 or more, is entitled

^ G e neral Motors, Article II, Section 6(a)(2).
^ G e n e r a l Motors, Article II, Section 6(a)(2)(c).
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to a benefit equal to the amount she would have received had the
employee retired on the date of his death and had he exercised the
survivors benefit option.

66

A pre-retirement death benefit is thus

automatically provided to an automobile worker.
B . Survivor Benefits in the Steel Industry
A steel worker may elect either of two survivor benefit options.
In either case, the option must be exercised at age 60 or five years
before the pension is payable.

This rule may be waived and the option

exercised at a later date (but before actual retirement) upon submis67
sion of satisfactory eviden.ce of good health.
Under one of the options, an employee may chose to receive a
reduced regular pension payable in an unchanging amount for so long
as either the pensioner or his designated beneficiary shall live.
The second option allows the employee to chose a reduced regular
pension payable during his lifetime, with the provision that after
his death one-half of such amount shall be payable during the life of
his designated beneficiary.

68

The amount by which the pension otherwise payable is reduced as a
result of exercising either of these options is based on actuarial
tables which are adopted "from time to time" by the Pension Board.

^Ford,

Section 7(a).

^Inland,

Section II, Paragraph 11(a).

^^Jones and Laughlin, Section II, Paragraph 11(a).
69

Bethlehem, Section II, Paragraph 1 1 (j).

69
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None of the steel industry plans provide pre-retirement death
benefits to survivors.

Even if a steel worker elects one of the above

options and dies prior to retirement, the "election shall cease to be
of any effect, and the co-pensioner shall not be entitled to any payments by reason of the election of such option."

70

C. Survivor Benefits in the Rubber Indus try
A rubber worker is entitled to two types of survivor benefits.
One, a five-year term certain benefit, is automatic and requires no
election by the employee.

The other, similar to steel industry

survivor benefits, must be elected in writing before retirement.
The five-year term certain clause provides that the monthly
benefit payable to a retiree (whether regular, early, or disability)
shall be payable for a minimum of five years.

Should the retired

employee die during the five-year period, the remaining monthly pen
sion payments are made to his designated beneficiary or to his
estate should his beneficiary be dead.

71

The pension payable under

this five-year term certain provision is in an unreduced amount.
The rubber worker may also elect either of two survivor benefit
options.

These options must be elected at least three years before

retirement, except that a later election is possible upon submission
of evidence of good health to the Pension Board.
One of the options allows an employee to elect an actuarially
reduced pension which shall continue payable for so long as either he

Jones and Laughlin, Section II, Paragraph 11(f).
71

U. S. Rubber, Section B, Paragraph 4.
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or his designated beneficiary shall live.

The second option provides

that at the death of the pensioner, his beneficiary shall continue to
receive a benefit equal to one-half of his actuarially reduced
pension.

72

Rubber industry pension plans make no provision for pre-retirement
death benefits.
D. Survivor and Pre-Retirement Death Benefits in the Petroleum
Refining Indus try
Gulf Oil Corporation allows an employee to select either of three
survivor benefit options.

The first allows an employee to chose a

reduced pension payable during his lifetime and continuing in the same
amount to his surviving joint annuitant.

The second option provides

for a reduced amount for the life of the pensioner, one-half of which
amount is payable after his death to the designated beneficiary.
third option amounts to a five-year term certain pension.

The

If this

option is elected, the retiree receives a reduced benefit during his
lifetime, but is assured a total payment equal to five times his annual
unreduced retirement allowance.

Should he die before receiving pay

ments which equal this amount, the difference is paid in a lump sum to
his beneficiary.
Should a Gulf employee die after electing any of these options
but before retiring, he is deemed to have retired on the day before
73
his death, with survivor benefits payable accordingly.

72
73

Firestone, Section II, Paragraph 7.
Gulf, Section 6 (a).
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Any employee who dies before retirement and who is eligible for
either an early or normal retirement benefit shall be regarded as having
had, elected the five-year term certain option even though no option was
in fact exercised.

74

This amounts to an automatic pre-retirement death

benefit.
Shell Oil Company allows a regular or early retiree to provide a
selected beneficiary with either a lifetime monthly benefit or a lump
sum payment.

Selection of either results in an actuarially reduced

benefit to the retiree.

Under the joint survivorship option, the

pensioner may elect for his beneficiary to receive a monthly benefit
equal to his own pension or any smaller monthly benefit which is a
multiple of $10.

The lump sum option allows a retiring employee to

elect a lump sum payment to his survivor in any amount up to $ 1 ,0 0 0 .
Lump sum amounts in excess of this may be elected with approval of
the Trustees.

The lump sum option may be elected singly or in combin

ation with the joint survivorship o p t i o n . ^

No pre-retirement death

benefit is available under the Shell plan.
A plethora of options is available to an employee covered by the
Sinclair plan.

Except for the Social Security Adjustment Option,

election must occur 3 years prior to retirement and not later than age
62.

This time limit may be waived, however, upon presentation of
*

satisfactory evidence of good health.

^Gulf,
^Shell,

Section

6

(b).

Section 3(3).

134
The first option allows an employee to elect the usual joint and
survivorship option.

The survivors benefit may be in any amount equal

to or less than the employee's actuarially reduced monthly benefit.
Only the spouse or a child of the employee can be designated as a bene
ficiary, and death of the employee before benefit payments commence
renders the election null and void.

76

The second option is a ten-year term certain benefit, election
of which guarantees that

120

monthly benefit payments will be made.

Should a retiree die within ten years of his retirement date, the
remaining payments are payable to his beneficiary.

This option is also

rendered null and void should the employee die before benefit payments
77
commence.
The third option available to a Sinclair employee is a Social
Security adjustment option.

Exercise of this option results in larger

private plan benefits until the retiree becomes eligible for an unre
duced Social Security benefit, at which time the private benefit is
70

reduced.

This in itself is not a survivors benefit, as election of

this option alone would create no rights for survivors.

The employee

may, however, make a dual election in the sense that the Social Security
adjustment option may be elected in conjunction with either the joint
and survivor option or the ten-year term certain option.

Dual election

results in the retiree's pension being first adjusted in accordance

7 fi
Sinclair, Section 8.2.
77
78

Sinclair, Section 8.3.
Sinclair, Section 8.4.
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with the Soeial Security adjustment option and then reduced with the
applicable actuarial discount factor pertaining to the other option
elected.

79

Tables for making these adjustments are provided in an

appendix.
As the Sinclair plan is contributory and guarantees the return
of at least the participant's contributions plus interest,
sort of built-in pre-retirement death benefit.

it has a

The plan provides

that contributions plus interest may be returned to the survivor of
a dead participant either in a lump sum or in monthly installments
80
over a period of five years.
The Humble Oil and Refining Company's plan contains two types
of survivor benefits.

One of these benefits is a joint and survivor

option, the other an automatic five-year certain payment.
Under the joint annuity option, an employee may elect to receive
a reduced benefit for life on the condition that following his death
a previously determined monthly amount will be payable to his
designated joint annuitant.

The amount payable to the joint annui

tant, can be any amount equal to or less than the retiree's actuarially
reduced benefit.

81

Failing the election of this option, should a pensioner die
before receiving 60 monthly pension payments, monthly benefits shall

79

Sinclair, Section 8.5.

^Sinclair,
^Humble,

Section 9.4.

Section 9.1.
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automatically continue to his survivor until a minimum of 60 payments
82
have been m a d e .
Should an Humble employee die before the commencement of retire
ment benefits, no pension is payable, i.e., the plan provided no
pre-retirement death benefit.

(To the extent that an employee had

contributed under an earlier contributory plan, these contributions
plus interest are of course payable to survivors).

Financing Arrangements
Several matters pertaining to financing must be dealt with upon
the establishment of a pension plan.
be made concerning:

Specifically, decisions must

(a) who is to pay for the program;

(b) whether

obligations created by the plan shall be fully funded, met out of
current revenue, or some combination of the two, and;

(c) whether a

covered employee shall gain a vested right to a benefit.

The following

is an examination of how these matters are treated in the several
pension plans included in this study.
A. Contributory and Non-Contributory Plans
Insofar as industrial pension plans are concerned, the trend in
the last several years has been toward the provision of pension
benefits without direct cost to the employee.

Of the plans contained

in this study, only one, the Sinclair Oil Corporation's plan, requires
that the employee contribute toward meeting the cost of his pension.
Following the trend, the Humble plan has just recently been placed on a

QO

Humble,_ Section 10.1.
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non-contributory basis.

The reasons for this movement to company

financed plans have been discussed in Chapter III.

The relative desir

ability of non-contributory plans will be discussed in Chapter V.
Suffice it to say here that a simple comparison of pension plans in the
automobile, steel, rubber, and petroleum refining industries reveals a
near unanimous preference for the non-contributory type of plan, with
the Sinclair plan as the only noted exception.
B . Funding
A pension plan may be "funded" to various degrees.

At one extreme

is the fully funded plan under which all accrued obligations could be
met from the existing fund.

A fully funded plan thus requires a fund

which, with interim earnings, would be sufficient to pay lifetime
benefits to those who have already retired as well as to cover any
matured vested rights should the plan and payments into it be immed
iately discontinued.

At the other extreme is the pay-as-you-go plan

under which pensions are paid out of current revenue.

This arrange

ment requires only that sufficient money be placed in the "fund" to pay
currently due benefits.

Discontinuance of the plan and payments into

it would therefore result in an absolute deficiency of funds with
which to meet accrued obligations.
Plans included in this study approach both of these extremes.
Some of them contain funding provisions which require that the plan be
almost fully funded, while others merely require that pension payments
be made when due.

Practice is often more important than plan

provisions, however, as in those cases in which a substantial fund is
established even though no such fund is formally required by the plan.
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A mere reading of funding provisions may therefore be somewhat misleadr
ing insofar as financial security is concerned.
1. Funding in the Automobile Industry
Pension plans in the automobile industry operate on what might be
called a "modified fully funded" basis.

These plans distinguish

between past service costs, which is the cost of the obligations im
mediately assumed when the plans went into effect in 1950, and normal
cost, which is the cost of obligations which accrue with the passage of
time.
When the plans were adopted, each firm assumed a full blown
obligation to pay pensions to qualifying retirees.

The motor companies

could not possibly have been expected to fully fund all past service
costs immediately.

Accordingly, these plans allow a firm 30 years in

which to fund the cost attributable to service before 1950.

Any r e 

vision in the benefit structure which substantially affects past service
cost is also subject to this provision.
fully funded as they accrue.

83

Normal cost obligations are

Thus, had the plans remained unchanged

until 1980, the cost of all normal retirement benefits would have been
fully funded.
Finally, the cost of the supplemental allowances which are payable
in specialized retirement cases need not be funded at all.

The firms

are required only to meet these costs in such a way that "as of each
anniversary the balance in the fund attributable to the supplemental
allowances shall not be less than zero."

83j?ord, Section 5(a).
®^General Motors, Section 2(d).

84

139
2. Funding in the Steel Industry
Funding in the steel industry may be roughly described as "fundas-you-go,"

When a steel worker retires, an amount is placed in the

pension fund which, on an actuarial basis, is sufficient to fully fund
his benefit.

No attempt is made to accumulate funds as workers accum

ulate pension rights.
actually retires.

A worker's pension is funded only when he

Thus, should payments into the fund cease, there

would be sufficient funds to provide pensions to those who had already
retired, but nothing to finance benefits to those who subsequently
reached retirement age.

Accordingly, at any given time, steel industry

pension funds must contain an amount which "shall not be less than an
amount which on a sound actuarial basis shall be estimated to be suf
ficient to pay the pensions which shall have been granted under the
85
pension plan...."
It would thus appear that funding in the steel industry, at least
insofar as formal plan language is concerned, is on a somewhat less
secure financial basis than the automobile industry, which accumulates
pension funds on an accrual basis.

The steel industry might be compared

to a firm which replaces worn out capital equipment out of current
revenue, while the automobile industry is analagous to a firm which
accumulates depreciation reserves.

There is evidence that some of the

steel firms go beyond formal plan requirements in funding practices,
however.

If such is the case, practice is obviously more important than

formal plan provisions.

^Bethlehem, Section VI.
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3. Funding in the Rubber Industry
Funding practices in the rubber industry are practically identical
to those of the steel industry, i.e., pensions are funded as they are
granted with no accrual for accumulated service.

Rubber firms are

bound to place into a trust fund "an amount estimated on a sound actu
arial basis to be sufficient to pay all pensions awarded at retirement
under the pension plan."
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4. Funding in the Petroleum Refining Indus try
Gulf Oil Corporation's retirement plan affords the widest possible
leeway to the firm's Board of Directors insofar as funding is concerned.
Once each year an actuary chosen by the Pension Committee submits an
"actuarial valuation" to the Committee which in turn recommends to the
firm's Board of Directors the contribution needed for the year.

The
,87

Board may, however,

"for any reason defer or reduce contributions-.

The report of the actuary is therefore only a guideline and is in no
way binding on the Board.

The Board is obligated only to make suf

ficient annual contributions so as not to "reduce any annuitant's
accrued benefits or affect the benefits to be paid under the plan."

88

It would be entirely possible for Gulf to finance its pension plan on
a pure pay-as-you-go basis.
The Shell plan is on the same footing, forthrightly stating that
contributions "shall be made at such times, in such manner, and in such

86

B. F. Goodrich, Article 7.2.

8^Gulf, Section 8 (b).
88Ibid.
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amounts as its Board of Directors, giving due consideration to accepted
actuarial principles, shall deem advisable to provide the benefits of
this plan.
Even though the Sinclair plan is contributory, the clause which
deals with company payments into the plan differs little from similar
clauses in the Gulf and Shell plans.

Sinclair states that it "intends"

to pay into the trust fund amounts "needed in addition to contributions
of participants to provide the benefits payable under the Plan."

The

payment of such amounts may be made "at such times and in such amounts
as the Company shall decide."
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Sinclair estimates that a man retiring at age 62 would receive
$10.62 for each dollar that he contributed.

How much of this repre

sents accrued earnings on employee contributions and how much is Company
contribution,

is not revealed.

Humble Oil Company's plan follows the general petroleum refining
industry's pattern.

It agrees to pay the full cost of the pension

program, but leaves the timing and amount of company contributions up
to the firm.
C. Vesting Provisions
Most pension plans provide that an employee who has met certain
age and service requirements will be entitled to a deferred pension
benefit even though he breaks service with the firm before becoming
eligible for either normal or early retirement.

89
90

Shell, Section 5.
Sinclair, Section 6.1.

The employee therefore
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gains a vested right to a benefit payable, generally, upon the attain
ment of age 65.
The questions that need to be asked about vesting provisions
concern eligibility requirements, i.e., what age and service combina
tion is qualifying, and how the deferred vested benefit is computed.
The industries and firms under study will be examined with these
questions in mind.
1. Vesting in the Automobile Indus try
Recent amendments to vesting provisions in the automobile industry
have rendered these plans

possibly

the most liberal to be found.

Since September 1, 1964, any employee who is less than age 60 but who
has accumulated

10

years of credited service is eligible for a deferred

benefit if separated.

The reason for the separation is irrelevant.

The pension is payable upon the attainment of age 65 in a monthly
amount equal to $4.25 for each year of service.

Further, the former

employee may choose to commence receipt of pension payments at age 60,
in which case the monthly benefit is reduced by

6/10

of

1

percent for
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each month that his age at commencement is less than 65.
amounts to a

7

This

.2 % reduction for each year that the former employee's

age is less than 65, or, a 36% reduction if payments commence at age 60.
The liberality of these provisions in relation to other industries
rests in the fact that a deferred pension is payable:
years of service;

(b) regardless of age at separation;

(a) after only

(c) irrespective

of the reason for separation, and; (d) as early as age 60,

91

General Motors, Article VII, Section 2(c).

10

143

2. Vesting in the Steel Industry
Vesting is available to a steel worker under rather restricted
circumstances.

To be eligible an employee must have reached age 40

and must have 15 or more years of service when separation occurs.

Even

then, coverage is confined to those employees who are separated as a
result of permanent shutdown or who have been laid off and not recalled
within two years.

A man who voluntarily separated or who was dis

charged for cause would consequently be ineligible.
An employee who meets the eligibility requirements is entitled to
a pension benefit upon the attainment of age 65.

Except for the 13-

week vacation payment, which is not payable, the deferred vested
pension is computed by use of the normal retirement benefit formula of
service multiplied by

1%

of final compensation.
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3. Vesting in the Rubber Indus try
A rubber worker who terminates employment after ten years of
service is eligible for a deferred vested pension providing he is at
least 40 years of age at separation.
irrelevant.

The reason for the separation is

The benefit payment commences at age 65 and is equal to

$3.25 times years of service.

93

(This is the normal retirement

formula).
In lieu of such deferred pension, a Firestone employee may accept
a lump sum severance award equal to 1\ week's pay for each year of
service up to 15 years.

^Inland,

If the employee has 15 or more years of

Section 1 (6 ) (a).

^ B . F. Goodrich, Article 2.3.
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service, the severance award is equal to 1% week's pay for each year of
service.

94

This particular option does not appear in other rubber in

dustry plans.
4. Vesting in the Petroleum Refining Indus try
In spite of differences on other pension plan matters, the Gulf
and Shell Oil Companies are in agreement on one thing; that rights to
pension plan benefits do not vest.

Thus, if a Gulf or Shell employee

is not otherwise entitled to a benefit, termination results in loss of
all pension claims, regardless of attained age and service.

This is

not a matter of actual plan provisions, but simply the absence of
provisions which provide benefits under conditions other than early,
disability, or normal retirement.
A Sinclair employee who breaks service for any reason except re
tirement gains a vested right to a pension benefit, provided he does
not withdraw his own contributions from the plan.

If he has less than

ten year's service, the pension amount is an actuarially determined
annuity based on his own contributions.

If he has exactly ten years of

service he is entitled, at age 65.,, to an additional annuity (over and
above his own contributions) equal to 50% of normal annuity benefits,
with the percentage increasing by 5% for each additional year of
service up to a maximum of 20 years.

This additional annuity is, of

course, paid out of company contributions.

94
95

95

Firestone, Article VII, Paragraph 11.
Sinclair, Section 10.1 (a)(ii).
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It thus appears that ten years of service entitles a Sinclair
employee to a 50% vested right, which percentage increased by 5% until
a fully vested right is gained after 20 years of service.

The age of

the employee at termination is irrelevant.
Whatever percent of a normal annuity is vested, the former
employee may choose to begin receipt of his benefit as early as age
55.

His benefit is reduced by 5%, however, for each year that his

age at commencement is less than 65.
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An Humble employee gains a fully vested annuity after 10 years
of service, regardless of age at termination.

This right is voided,

however, should he withdraw contributions made under a former plan.
The benefit is computed by use of the normal retirement benefit
97
formula (1.670 x service x final pay), and is payable at age 65.
This section on vesting concludes the analysis of actual
pension plan provisions.

The following Chapter summarizes the

findings and conclusions arrived at during the course of this study.

^Sinclair,
97

Section 10.1(b).

Humble Oil and Refining Company, Summary of Benefit Plan
Changes, December 31, 1965.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

From a slow and halting beginning, industrial pension plan coverage
has been dramatically expanded and revised.

Despite the fact that the

nation had been through a series of economic, political, social, and
international upheavals, expansion in pension plan coverage appears
to have followed a steady course until the mid-1940s.

The first in

dustrial pension plan was established by a felt manufacturer, Alfred
Dolge, in 1882.

By 1929, 139 manufacturers had pension plans.

1938, this number had grown to 238, and by 1940, to 437.

By

During

these early decades, it appears that pension plan expansion followed
its own slow but inexorable course despite the expansionist attitude
at the turn of the century, World War I, the prosperity of the
roaring 1920s, or the suffocating depression of the 1930s.

The great

transformation came during the late 1940s and early 1950s as the
result of a number of new elements within the economy.
World War II brought with it economic and political conditions
which were highly conducive to pension plan expansion.

The manpower

shortage and competition among firms for employees in conjunction
with the wage freeze acted to stimulate the use of fringe benefits
as a means of attracting and holding manpower.

The nation's blue

collar workers soon found themselves enjoying perquisites formerly
reserved for industry's upper echelons.

In general, the growth of

fringe benefits received the blessings of the National War Labor
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Board, whose responsibility it was to hold the line on wage r a t e s .
Until the late 1940s, labor unions gave scant attention to
pensions in contract negotiation, the general assumption being
that it was the prerogative of management to grant or withhold such
benefits.

The United Mine Workers, with John L. Lewis as president,

was the pioneer in introducing pensions to the collective bargain
ing table in 1946, when the mine operators agreed to establish a
pension fund by setting aside 5<? for each ton of coal mined.

The

real breakthrough came, however, in the 1949 Inland Steel Case
when the National Labor Relations Board ruled that pensions were
a bargainable issue under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.
By 1963, it was estimated that 22,000 industrial pension plans
were in operation, most of them included in collective bargaining
agreements.
Provisions in the earliest pension plans were quite simple,
generally setting forth only eligibility requirements and the
pension amount.

Those in operation today tend to be rather lengthy

documents which spell out in detail how a wide range of contin
gencies and alternatives shall be handled.

Even so, these provisions

can be placed in four general classifications:
with administration of the plan;
requirements;

(1) those dealing

(2) those dealing with eligibility

(3) benefit formulae, and;

(4) financing arrangements.

Insofar as administration is concerned, there is considerable
inter-industry diversity, and, in some industries, appreciable
intra-industry variations.

Of the four industries included in this
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study, only the automobile industry provides for joint administration
by management and labor.

Any dispute arising under the plans con

cerning eligibility and pension amount is referred to a six member
board which is made up of three company appointed members and three
union appointed members.

Deadlocks are referred to a mutually

acceptable impartial chairman who may vote in the case of a tie.
Plan administration in the steel industry is by the firm.

Decisions

concerning an employee's right to a pension may be challenged,
however, and subjected to a special two-step grievance procedure
which culminates in arbitration before an impartial umpire.

In

the final analysis, administration in the steel industry differs
from the automobile industry more in form than in results.

The

rubber industry is quite similar to the steel industry, except
that disagreements are settled by resort to the regular grievance
procedure established by the collective bargaining agreement.

In

the petroleum refining industry, administration is by the firm,
whose determination is conclusive.

Where an appeal is allowed by

one of these plans, it amounts to no more than a request that the
decision be reviewed.
Eligibility requirements for a normal retirement benefit in
the automobile, steel, rubber, and petroleum refining industries
may be summarized as follows:
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Table V-l.

Eligibility Requirements.
Minimum Age

Industry or Firm
Automobile
Steel
Rubber
Petroleum Refining:
Gulf
Sinclair
Shell
Humble

Minimum Service (Years)
10
15
10
10
No minimum
No minimum
15
15

65
65
65
65
65
62
65
65

^The right to participate in this plan is reserved to employees with
one or more years of service.

In general, years of service in all industries is coterminous
with seniority.

Time spent on leaves of absence, military service

(up to 4 years), sickness, and disability is commonly counted as
credited service.
Considerable diversity exists among industries and firms insofar
as normal retirement benefits are concerned.

The normal retirement

benefit to which a man with 30 years of service and average monthly
earnings of $550 would be entitled in each of the industries and
firms is summarized in Table V- 2 .

Table V-2.

Normal Retirement Benefits^.

Automobile Industry
Steel Industry
Rubber Industry
Petroleum Refining Industry
Gulf
Shell
Sinclair
Humble

$127.50
85.00
97.50
123.75
132.00
247.50
180.00

^Computation based on the assumption that the retiree has 30 years
of service, average earnings~~of $550 per month, and has reached
normal retirement age.
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Some form of early, special early, or disability retirement is
provided in most industrial pension plans.

Early retirement pro

visions allow a qualified employee to elect retirement before reaching
normal retirement age, in some cases as early as age 55.

Election of

the early retirement option always results in a reduction in the
monthly benefit.

The most liberal early retirement benefit is

provided by the automobile industry, which guarantees up to 70% of
pre-retirement earnings for a 30-year man between the ages of 60
and 65.

Early retirement benefits to which employees under the plans

studied would be entitled, assuming various age, service, and
earnings combinations, are presented in Table IV-1 of Chapter IV.
Special early retirement is provided by the automobile, steel,
and rubber industries.

Though eligibility requirements differ

somewhat between these industries, a worker otherwise qualified may
be placed on special early retirement at the request of the firm
or under mutually satisfactory conditions.

The benefit of a special

early retireee is normally greater than the benefit payable to a
regulqr early retiree of equal age and service.

In the rubber

industry for instance, a special early retiree age 55 with 30 years
of service would receive $195 monthly.

A regular early retiree

similarly situated would receive a monthly benefit of $65.74.

None

of the petroleum refining plans included in this study provided for
special early retirement.
All of the pension plans studied provided for some form of
disability retirement.

In many of these, eligibility requirements

are lower than for other forms of specialized retirement.

Indeed,
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age at the onset of the disability is immaterial under some of the
plans.

Under those plans which provide for special early retirement,

the disability benefit is the same as the special early benefit for
similarly situated employees.

The steel industry guarantees a minimum

disability benefit of $100 per month which applies if the benefit
formula yields a smaller amount.

In the petroleum refining industry,

which does not have special early retirement provisions, the benefit
for a disabled worker is usually computed in the same way as for a
regular early retiree, but is unreduced for age.

The Shell plan

guarantees a disability benefit that is at least 25% of final com
pensation, and the Humble plan sets the minimum at 37%% of pay.
All of the pension plans included in this study contained some
form of survivor or pre-retirement death benefit.

A survivor

benefit is payable to the beneficiary of an employee who dies after
retirement.

Pre-retirement death benefits are payable to the

beneficiary of an employee whd dies before retirement.

Survivor

benefits are usually optional with the employee, and, when elected,
result in a reduction of the primary benefit.

Such an option is

available in one form or another in every plan included in this
study.

Generally, pre-retirement death benefits are payable to

survivors of employees who have satisfied eligibility requirements
for early retirement but who are still working at the time of death.
In the automobile industry, the benefit is equal to the amount
which would have been payable had the employee elected the survivors
benefit option and retired on the date of his death.

Pre-retirement

death benefits are not available in either the steel or the rubber
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industry.

In the petroleum refining industry, only Gulf offers a

true pre-retirement death benefit.

A five-year term certain benefit

is guaranteed an employee who has established eligibility for either
normal or early retirement.

The Sinclair plan, which is contributory,

provides that the employee's contribution-plus interest will be
returned to the survivor of an employee who dies before retirement.
This could hardly be regarded as a pre-retirement death benefit,
however.
Several matters pertaining to financing must be dealt with in
a pension plan.

A plan may be contributory or non-contributory; it

may be funded or unfunded; and pension rights may or may not vest.
Insofar as payments into the plan are concerned, the great
majority of industrial pension plans are financed on a non-contributory
basis, i.e., the firm meets the full cost of the plan.

Of the

several plans analyzed herein, only one, the Sinclair Corporation's
plan, is financed on a contributory basis.

Some observations con

cerning the relative merits of contributory and non-contributory
plans appear later in this chapter.
Irrespective of who is to bear the cost of a pension plan, a
decision must be made concerning what portion of the cost is to be
met out of current contributions and what part is to be met out of
previously accumulated funds.

A plan may be fully funded in the

sense that the accumulated fund would be sufficient to meet all
matured obligations should the plan and contributions into it be
immediately terminated, or, it may operate on a pure pay-as-you-go
basis, in which case the "fund" is never larger than the amount
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necessary to pay currently due benefits.

The plans examined in the

course of this study approach both extremes.

Automobile industry

plans operate on a fully funded basis insofar as normal retirement
benefits are concerned, except for pension obligations assumed at the
inception of the plans and any additional obligations assumed by
virtue of revision of the benefit structure.

The companies have 30

years in which to fund obligations arising from either of these
causes.

An unrevised plan would therefore be fully funded after 30

years of operation.
Funding provisions in the steel and rubber industries require
that upon the retirement of an employee an amount be placed in the
pension fund which would be actuarially sufficient to pay a lifetime
benefit to him.

Should one of these plans and contributions into it

be discontinued, the fund would be sufficient to pay benefits to
those who had already retired, but would contain no monies for those
who had qualified for a pension or vested right but had not actually
retired.
Pension plans in the petroleum refining industry allow the con
tributing firm considerable leeway insofar as funding is concerned.
Typically, contributions are made at such times and in such amounts
as firm officials deem advisable.

Although an actuary's assessment

of the financial condition of the plans is commonly required, funding
provisions are written so that such an assessment acts only as a
guideline and is in no way binding on the firm.

Basically, each of

these plans guarantees only that benefits will be paid when due.
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Most pension plans provide that an employee who meets certain
age and service requirements will be entitled to a deferred pension
even though he separates before becoming eligible for either a normal
or early retirement benefit.

Such deferred vested benefits are

commonly payable at age 65, and are usually computed by use of the
normal retirement benefit formula.
Of the plans included in this study, t h e .automobile industry
plans are the most liberal insofar as vesting is concerned.

A worker

in that industry gains a vested right to a benefit after ten years
of service, regardless of age at separation.

Also, the reason for

separation is irrelevant, and the benefit is payable as early as
age 60.
In the steel industry, a worker must have attained the age of
40 and must have accumulated 15 or more years of service before
pension rights vest.

A worker who is separated for cause or who

separates voluntarily is not eligible for a vested benefit.

Also,

the 13-week vacation benefit which is payable to a normal retiree

is

not payable to a man who qualifies for a vested benefit.
A rubber worker who terminates after ten years of service is
eligible for a vested pension providing he is at least 40 years of
age at separation.

As in the automobile industry, the reason for

separation is irrelevant.
Neither Gulf nor Shell provide pension benefits under conditions
other than early, disability, or normal retirement.

Thus, if an

employee is not qualified for a benefit under one or more of these
conditions, separation results in loss of all pension rights,

155

regardless of age and service at separation.
After ten years of service, a Sinclair employee is entitled to a
benefit equal to 50% of a normal retirement annuity, with the.per
centage increasing by 5% for each additional year until a fully vested
right is gained after 20 years of service.

Age of the employee at

separation is not relevant.
An Humble employee gains a fully vested pension right after ten
years of service, regardless of age at separation.

The benefit is

payable at age 65 and is computed by use of the normal retirement
benefit formula.
In analyzing employee benefit programs, caution must be exer
cised in making inter-industry and inter-firm comparisions when
pension plans alone are the basis upon which the comparison is made.
Pensions are only one of the many fringe benefits which may be
afforded by an employer-employee relationship.

Not only may benefits

in other areas compensate for a weak pension plan, but they may also
provide benefits to a retired employee which closely approximate
pension benefits.

Stock purchase plans, paid up li-fe insurance, and

matching savings plans are all of this nature.

In essence then, the

comparisons and conclusions contained herein pertain to pension plan
coverage only, and not to the overall employee benefit program of an
industry or firm.
If pension plans are to be judged on the basis of benefits pay
able to qualifying employees, plans in the automobile industry are
generally superior to those found in other industries.

Insofar as

normal retirement benefits are concerned, a low-wage worker would
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enjoy a distinct advantage over a steel or rubber worker of similar
service.

A 30-year man making $350 per month would receive a monthly

benefit of $75.50 in the steel industry, $97.50 in the rubber in
dustry, and $127.50 in the automobile industry.

In the petroleum

refining industry, only Sinclair's plan would provide more at $157.50.
For higher paid employees, however, the automobile worker would fare
J

less well than a steel worker or an employee in the petroleum
refining industry.

Benefits in these industries are computed on the

basis of a service times percent of earnings formula whereas benefits
in the automobile industry are computed by multiplying service by a
fixed dollar amount.
An automobile worker is likely to enjoy a substantial advantage
over workers in other industries if he accepts or is placed on
specialized retirement (early, special early, and disability).

A

long service automobile worker retired under these conditions would
receive a benefit greater than that available to a worker covered by
any other plan included in this study.

The Sinclair and Humble plans

provide specialized benefits which exceed automobile industry benefits
only when the worker has both short service and high earnings.
Finally, the automobile industry provides more liberal vesting
and funding provisions than any other industry or firm analyzed.

In

addition, it is the only industry which provides for an automatic
pre-retirement death benefit.
The Sinclair Oil Corporation's plan provides the highest normal
retirement benefits of all the plans included in this study.
Specialized retirement benefits are greater in the automobile industry,
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and, in some cases, under the Humble plan.

Except for funding and

pre-retirement death benefit provisions, the Sinclair plan ranks
roughly on par with the automobile industry.
The Humble Oil Corporation's plan compares favorably with the
Sinclair plan in all areas except normal retirement benefits.

For

various age, service, and pay combinations, the monthly benefit
under the Humble plan is generally $60 to $80 less than that available
under the Sinclair plan.
The Shell Oil Company's plan strikes the median between the
strongest and the weakest of the plans studied.

It is superior to

the Gulf, steel, and rubber plans insofar as most normal and
specialized retirement benefits are concerned.

A major weakness is

its lack of a vesting provision. . Comparatively, this is not as much
of a disadvantage as it might appear because of the weakness of
vesting provisions in those plans which contain them.
The Gulf Oil Corporation's plan pays larger normal retirement
benefits than either the rubber or steel industries.

In some cases

the rubber industry pays higher specialized retirement benefits.
Except for its lack of a vesting provision, the Gulf plan appears
to be somewhat superior and, as indicated earlier, the vesting pro
visions of the rubber and steel industries promise more than they
deliver.
It is difficult to choose between the rubber and steel industry
plans.

Out of the nine different service and pay combinations for

which normal retirement benefits were computed (see Table IV-3, p. 126),
the rubber industry paid the highest benefit in six cases.

It also
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pays the highest specialized retirement benefit for most age, service,
and pay combinations.

Steel industry plans appear to be the least

effective of all the plans included in this study.
Inter-industry and inter-firm ranking of pension plans is a most
difficult business.

The three primary determinants of pension bene

fits, i.e., age, service, and rate of compensation, are given
different weight by each plan.

The benefit amount of a retiree

therefore depends upon the weight that is given to the determinant
in which his position is strongest.

Anyone who attempts to evaluate

and compare pension plans is immediately brought face to face with
the fact that each plan stresses the determinant which is most
acceptable to the contracting parties involved.
However tenuous an attempt at ranking may be, decisions must
be made in the establishment and amendment of pension plans.

These

decisions must be based on an understanding of what each clause in
a plan does and does not do..

It is with this in mind that the pension

plans analyzed herein are ranked as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Automobile industry
Sinclair Oil Corporation
Humble Oil Corporation
Shell Oil Company
Gulf Oil Corporation
Rubber industry
Steel industry

Several rather pronounced trends have been noted in the course of
this study which deserve comment insofar as their general nature and
desirability are concerned.
First, the trend toward non-contributory pension plans appears
somewhat questionable.

As non-contributory plans are favored by
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virtually the entire labor movement and by. a growing number of
employers, the counter-arguments which follow apply to most industrial
pension plans in existence today.
Unions have made much of contract negotiations in which contribu
tory plans have been placed on a non-conbributory basis.

If package

bargaining is as prevalent as advertised, these unions are delivering
much less than the membership is led to believe.

If the plan con

version is made in lieu of a basic wage increase, the membership
gains only a small tax advantage, a considerable portion of which
will later be recouped by the Internal Revenue Service from pension
benefits.

It is the view of the writer that unions have oversold

non-contributory plans and that all parties involved have given undue
weight to the tax advantage achieved.

In fact, the present practice

of making only employer contributions tax deductible is open to
question.

A tax law could certainly be devised to allow for employee

contributions on a tax deductible basis.
enjoyed this right for several years.

The self-employed have

The feared abuse by over-

contributing should not be too difficult to prevent.
Another point, previously discussed, needs only to be mentioned
here.

Pension benefits are necessarily greater when employer contri

butions are matched to some extent by bona-fide employee contributions.
Finally, union and employee claims to certain rights are
strengthened by the fact that a plan is contributory.

A Union

certainly has a stronger argument for participation in pension fund
administration if the fund is partially created by contributions by
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its membership.

Further, as indicated earlier, liberal vesting pro

visions are much more prevalent under contributory plans.
Summing up, a hard-headed examination seems to favor contributory
plans.

A change in the tax laws which have encouraged the adoption of

non-contributory plans would possibly reverse the trend.
Another problem which deserves serious consideration is the
problem created by the magnitude of pension trust funds, the size of
which will soon surpass the $100 billion mark.

The rate of growth

is rapid, and there is no discernible limit in sight.

The economic

ramifications inherent in the control of this vast aggregation of
highly liquid and mobile purchasing power are myriad.

Present

federal statutes are designed to protect the interests of benefici
aries only, leaving most investment decisions to trustees.

These

trustees are generally answerable to a firm, even though the firm
cannot claim legal title to the funds.

A firm or group of trustees

are thus allowed to exercise all the rights of ownership over stocks
and bonds which are purchased with pension funds.

This amounts to

control without ownership or even direct legal liability.

The

possibilities of abuse of such a position or misuse of funds are
quite evident.

The fact that the abuses thus far detected have in

volved trade union controlled funds is no argument that corporations
do not or will not engage in similar practices.
Volumes could be written on possible safeguards or solutions
to the problems created by the existence of these billions of dollars
being held in trust.

It is sufficient here to draw attention to the

fact that there is a problem and to state that the source of the
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problem - pension trust funds - is destined to increase in magnitude
in coming years.
Another area in which considerable improvement could easily be
made is in vesting provisions.

As currently constituted, these

provisions afford no protection to the mass of the nation's in
dustrial labor force for the simple reason that most workers cannot
satisfy the age or service requirements which are prerequisites to
the gaining of a vested right.

Indeed, under present plans, once a

worker is old enough and has accumulated sufficient service with a
firm to qualify for vesting, the likelihood of his separation is
remote.
In the writer's view, immediate full vesting should be practiced
by American industry.

Package bargaining indicates that contribu

tions to pension funds are often in lieu of wage increases, a fact
which gives the worker a strong claim to immediate full vesting.
Such a system would also alleviate several problems which have come
to be associated with pensions.
First, an adequate pension for every retiree would be much more
certain.

A dollar placed in a pension fund at age 25 yields a much

gt-eater benefit than a dollar placed at age 55.

Too, there would

obviously be more funded dollars of all "ages" for a mobile worker.
Secondly, it is well known that many firms refuse to hire older
workers because of the pension obligation which must be assumed.
It ia costly to provide a lifetime pension to an individual after
only ten or fifteen years of service.

The employment problems of

the older worker, i.e., the worker over 45 years of age, have been
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the subject of extensive public and private investigation.

The writer

submits that the difficulty would be substantially eliminated if
vesting provisions in American industry were revised to provide im
mediate full vesting.

This would spread the cost of a pension over

all of a worker's employers, thereby substantially relieving the last
employer of an obligation which he is understandably reluctant to
assume under the present system.
Finally, the mobility of the nation's labor force would be
enhanced by such a system.

A flexible and mobile labor force will

become more and more a necessity as the nation's economy becomes
more dynamic.

The technological explosion in products and methods

of production is certain to create an environment in which constant
reallocation of labor resources will be needed.

This reallocation

must be fast and efficient if we are to avoid a rapidly growing body
of the frictionally and technologically unemployed.

The continuing

attachment of excess workers to the coal mining industry because of
reluctance to forfeit pension rights is illustrative of the misallocation problem which can spring from a non-vesting pension system.
Difficulties connected with pension fund transfers would
admittedly be present, but hardly insurmountable.
of handling vested funds are available.

Several methods

Funds created by each

employer could simply remain in trust until retirement of the worker,
at which time application could be made for a benefit from each fund.
Alternately, the individual funds could be transferred to a central
trust at retirement age.

Under either of these systems, the con

tributing firm would retain control of the funds until the worker
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retired.

Possibly a simpler and more direct solution would be the

creation of a clearinghouse into which vested funds would be trans
ferred immediately upon separation of an employee.

Such a device

would avoid the creation of multiple trusts for a single worker,
but might be opposed by employers faced with loss of control over
pension funds.
The problem, however, is not so much how vested funds are to
be administered, as it is to develop pension plans in which vesting
is a reality rather than a promise.

To secure vesting provisions

which actually result in vested pension rights is a legitimate goal
for organized labor.
Notice has previously been taken of the needlessly obscure
provisions in some of the plans studied.

The automobile industry

plans and the Humble Oil Corporation's plans are especially abstruse
in some of their specialized retirement provisions.

It is doubtful

that one percent of the employees covered by these plans could
compute their own early retirement benefit.

The content of these

provisions could easily be more clearly expressed as in fact they
are in many other plans.
The divorcement of private plan benefits from OASDI benefits
would clarify some of the plans.

The early retirement provision

of the Humble plan follows an elaborate procedure whereby public
benefits are initially included in the computed benefit and then
partially or wholly removed.

Steel industry plans provide for a

maximum $80 OASDI offset against normal retirement benefits.

Any

worker who has satisfied the requirements for normal retirement is
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virtually certain to have become eligible for at least an $80 OASDI
benefit.
tic.

The offset has consequently become automatic and anachronis

There is simply no justification for including an amount in the

private plan benefit which must be subtracted out as a matter of
course.

The practice is more than useless; it gives the impression

that it was calculated to deceive.
Some of the points emphasized in this critique may appear
trivial in light of the tremendous forward strides which industrial
pension plans have made since the 1950s.

The intention of the writer,

however, was to point out existing weaknesses, and not to denigrate
a movement which will doubtlessly redound to the benefit of millions
of retiring workmen.

Even after giving due allowance for the inac

curacies inherent in extrapolating past trends, an attitude of
optimism is unavoidable.
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